Institutional Governance and Oil Rents: Evidence from the Republic of Congo
Cyriaque MBINGUI

Abstract
This article analyzes the effect of Institutional Governance on Oil Rents in the Republic of Congo over a period from 1996 to 2021, using the Auto Regressive Distributed Lags (ARDL) model. The study finding shows that, in the short run, institutional governance has a positive and significant effect on oil rents. However, in the long run, the effect of corruption on oil rents is significantly negative. These results have enabled us to formulate two (2) economic policy implications. The first is a policy geared towards institutional governance by strengthening corruption control and transparency, and by giving full power to the EITI, the body empowered to control oil revenues. The second is a policy based on the fight against impunity. To achieve this, governments must define and apply punitive methods for rogue administrators, encourage optimality in the mobilization of oil revenues, and prioritize the general interest by combating the remarkable inequalities in the distribution of oil revenues.

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