The Timing of Team Production Incorporating Reciprocity
Guangxing Wei, Jingling Peng

Abstract
This paper develops a game model of team production incorporating the preference of reciprocity to probe the intrinsic mechanism how the reciprocity influences the team efficiency under different game timing, which is compared with that of inequity aversion and selfish preference respectively. It is found that the reciprocity may promote the Pareto improvement of the team efficiency under looser condition than that of inequity aversion. As long as the final mover is reciprocal instead of selfish, the extent of Pareto improvement under sequential game is bigger than that under simultaneous game even if other agents except the final one move randomly. Therefore, the principal should screen and select reciprocal agents to establish team and ensure that they move sequentially. It offers a new theoretical explanation for the existence of the principal, and a new approach for team incentives.

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