Zia-Ul-Haque and the Proliferation of Religion in Pakistan

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Abstract

Though Pakistan is the result of an Islamic movement in undivided India, Islam was never institutionalized politically and militarily till Zia took power on July 5ᵗʰ 1977 as a result of coup d'état. His regime was in need of legitimacy which was facilitated by the Afghanistan war (1979). Pakistan was directly facing political, economic and strategic consequences of the Afghan crisis. Politically, it was facing immense pressure from the former Soviet Union for providing help to the refugees and mujahideen. Strategically, it was facing direct Soviet Union military threat, often resulting in its space violation by the Russian planes and helicopters. Economically, it was bearing the burden of 4.2 million Afghan refugees. Religiously, it has induced Islamic extremism and sectarianism in Pakistan. The events of 1979 provided an opportunity to Zia to initiate a process of Islamisation mainly for two reasons; firstly to stabilize and legitimize his regime and secondly to acquire international acceptance. The study intends to show the efforts Zia-ul-Haque (1977-88) made to institutionalize and proliferate Islam in Pakistani society and to answer the question "were his efforts religiously sincere or politically motivated?"

Key Words: Zia-ul-Haque, Islamisation, Hudood Ordinance, Afghan War and Jihadis.

1. Introduction

The Zia-ul-Haque regime was a combination of the mullah and military alliance where he used Islam to legitimize his dictatorial rule. The internal dimension of the Mullah-Military alliance was linked to the regime's requirement to appease the right wing religio-political groups so as to remain in power. The external dimension was related to Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan's military encouraged the *Jihadis* to fight Pakistan's proxy war against the former Soviet Union purely to deny direct government participation in the standoff. So, Islamisation was able to develop strong roots within the country due to the Zia policies in Pakistan (*Amin, 1982: 25*).

While the military regime used Islam internally to gain religio-political legitimacy, the concept of *jihad* was used externally to arouse religious sentiments and mobilize guerilla bands of *mujahideen* (Jihadi fighters) against the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. Pakistan's Mullah-Military alliance therefore, emerged through the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, (religious political party) as a result of internal and external dynamics during the 1980s. Thereafter, this alliance manifested through militant groups and their Kalashnikov culture that outlived its relevance in the 1990s and proved problematic for the security and stability of Pakistan. Zia followed the Islamic political ideology of the *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI) and mixed religion with politics with a two point agenda: to legitimize his rule and acquire political allies to prolong his rule (*Chengappa, 2004: 1-2*). The military encouraged the *Jihadis* to fight Pakistan's proxy war against the Soviet forces purely to project the war as a struggle between Islam and "Godless" communism rather than a confrontation between capitalism and communism (*2004: 25*).

The Pakistan military and the JI established a close working relationship with each other. The JI aimed to establish an Islamic state that adopted the *Shariah* and for this the assistance of the army was imperative. In turn the Pakistan military exploited the Islamic concept of *Jihad* and its accessory the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) trained JI volunteers for trans-border operations into Afghan soil against the Soviet forces. Since the elections of 1970, the JI bids to infiltrate in the civil institutions and social structure (*Ahmad, 1978*).

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The external element that involves Soviet military presence in Afghanistan generated a resistance from the Islamic fundamentalists groups such as *Jamaat-i-Islami* and *Hizb-i-Islami* in Afghanistan who in turn developed linkage with their Pakistani counterparts. These Pakistani fundamentalist groups teemed up with the Pakistan military and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate. As a result, the nexus between the Pak- military and the ISI Directorate began to take shape and ultimately resulted in the "Islamisation" of Pakistan (*Chengappa, 2004: 46-7*). The officer corps whose *spirit de corps* has been formulated in the Western tradition also affected by the changed security environment around Pakistan as well as the new emphasis on Islamic ideology within the country (*Jalalzai, 1998: 138*).

The rationale to resort to religious sentiments was the only option for the Islamabad-Washington combine action against the Kabul-Moscow nexus (*Chengappa, 2004: 47*). However, Zia-ul-Haque's twist that the armed forces were not only the defenders of the geographical frontiers but the ideological frontiers as well and his emphasis on "*Iman*, *Taqwa* and *Jihad*" (Faith, Piety and Religious War) as opposed to the Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah's slogan "Unity, Faith and Discipline" in the wake of the Afghan *Jihad* in the late 1970s was bound to affect the ethos of military whose officers had always been motivated in the name of Islam (*Jalalzai, 1998: 138*).

Thus Zia utilized the prevailing national and international environment to legitimize and stabilize his regime. The present study is an attempt to find out the various methods and measures Zia used to proliferate Islam in the Pakistani civil and military institutions, its institutionalization, the repercussions of his Islamisation process and the people response to it. The 2nd portion projects the religion as means for war and peace; the 3rd portion highlights the efforts of Zia toward Islamisation of Pakistan including the institutionalization of Islam, the Hudood ordinance, the blasphemy law and the various religious punishments. The last portion will portray the conclusion.

2. Religion as a Means for War and Peace

Most of the vicious wars in history have been fought in the name of religion. Religious fundamentalists believe that they are acting in the name of Allah and can't be wrong (*Jalalzai, 2002: 15*). The aggressive message of Osama-bin-Laden and his *Al-Qaeda* network, which suggests that a divine-guided world revolution can be materialized only by *Jihad* against the infidel West as well as against apostate regime in the Middle East, has encouraged intensive activism beyond the religious/spiritual realm. It has been transmitted through modern electronic devices to millions of people motivating many of them in a wide range of places, e.g. Sudan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bosnia, Croatia, Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon, the Philippines, Kenya, Tanzania, India, Russia, the United States and the United Kingdom to political and military actions which include self-sacrifice and murder in the name of religion (*Bergen, 2002: 46-51, 76-80*). For *Al-Qaeda*, the victory will not end with Afghanistan, Jihad will remain an individual obligation until all other land that belonged to Muslim are return to them (*2002, 52*).

The relationship between religion and world change has been a challenging issue for both the social sciences and humanities. Historically, the dominant view in social science supports the role of religion in tradition maintenance and preserving and justifying the existing social structure, peace and stability (*Schwartz and Huismans, 1995*) while the opposite view of this relationship portrays religion as encouraging change in the world. The religious emphasis on world change and repair is expressed clearly in the Biblical imperative justice, "*justice you shall pursue*" (Deuteronomy 16:20) and the emphasis of the Biblical leaders of a peaceful society, e.g. "*and they shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation neither shall they learn war any more*" (Isaiah 2:4). Many scholars view the efforts for political and social equality as a spiritual struggle attempting to realize God's kingdom on earth (*Pargament, Maton and Hess, 1992: 19-36*). For example Islam considers the creation of a moral order in human society as one of its main goals: Judaism calls severely for world repair and spiritual leaders such as Martin Luther, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Mother Teresa have tried to put this theology into practice (*Pargament and Park, 1995*).

The leadership of such figures and organizations of faith attempting to transform the world closer to a religious ideal and to realize "God's Kingdom" on earth have contributed significantly to social change that aims at the correction of injustice (*Pargament, Maton and Hess, 1992: 6-11*).

According to Smith (*1996*), religiously provoked social actions to change the society for the better can be shown in numerous examples of religiously based charitable activities and political activism like the significant contribution of people and religious organizations to the mobilization of major movements such as the Black Civil Rights Movement, Poland's Solidarity Movement, the South African Antiapartheid Movement and the Movement for Indian Independence. It can also be seen in interfaith dialogues among religious leaders and activists in both national and international arenas in order to facilitate the resolution of conflicts and bring about world peace, e.g. during August 2000, as many as 2000 of the world's pre-eminent religious and spiritual leaders gathered at the United Nations for a Millennium Peace Summit and during December 2001, Christian, Jew and Muslim leaders met in Brussels to try to curb conflicts (*Gopin, 2000: 20-24 and Silberman, Higgins, and Dweck, 2005*).

Unfortunately, intensive activism in the name of religion has also been confirmed in numerous historical and recent acts of violence, wars and terrorism across the world such as the conflict between Hindus and Muslims in India, Jews and Muslims in the Middle East, East Timor, Lebanon, Catholics and Protestants in Ireland and Russia etc., the global activism of the *Al-Qaeda* network and the killing of medical doctors by Christian anti-abortion groups (*Kimball, 2008: 4 and Fox, 2002: 34-35)*. This description of aggressive activism in the name of religion is consistent with the assertion that more destruction perpetrated in the name of religion than by any other institutional force in human history (*Allport, 1966*). It is also consistent with the description of religious violence by experts on terrorism which is motivated in whole or in part by religious imperatives that often led to more intense acts of violence producing higher levels of fatalities than the relatively more discriminating and less lethal incidents of violence perpetrated by secular terrorist organizations (*Hoffman, 2006: 80*) and as being a constant danger to modern civilization and the entire world (*Ganor, 2005: 41-45*).

There is a general agreement that religious institutions can provide organizational resource for mobilization in a number of ways. For example, religious institutions such as madaris, mosques, churches and temples can facilitate activism by providing suitable meeting places, which might be the safest places under oppressive regimes and by having extensive access to the media. Religion can further project the process through which religion motivates people to passionately conduct both peaceful and violent activism (*Silberman, Higgins, and Dweck, 2005*).

Religion may facilitate activism by stimulating a sense of self-efficacy, i.e. by suggesting that individuals have the power to change and improve both themselves and the world around them (*Silberman, 2004*). Religion can also encourage activism by recommending certain values. Two interesting examples for religious values that might facilitate both violent and peaceful activism would be "selflessness" and "self-sacrifice". These two values can guide people to sacrifice their needs and lives in religious wars or in acts of suicide bombing while within other religious meaning systems these values can facilitate selfless act of love and compassion.

According to Schwartz and Huismans (*1995*), religion can facilitate violent activism in a variety of ways. First, religion often contain values and ideas that may trigger prejudice, discrimination and violence by encouraging the consciousness of belonging to a selected and privileged community and by emphasizing the other of those who do not follow the tenants of the religion. According to Allport (*1966*) religion includes three basic invitations to bigotry:

  a. The doctrine of election, e.g. the concepts of God's chosen people or God's country which may imply the inferiority of other as rejected by God.
  b. The belief that one's religion teaches absolute and exclusive truth may lead to derogating the teaching of other religions and philosophical formulations as if those teachings are wrong and are a threat to human salvation.
  c. Theocracy i.e. the view that a monarch rules by divine right, that the church is a legitimate guide for government.

The second process through which religion can facilitate violence is desecration. Any belief, action, object or goal that is professed as sacred can be desecrated. Since, a perception of desecration has a highly negative effect. It may facilitate intensive violent activism against those who are believed to have caused the desecration, e.g. the blasphemous cartoons published in Denmark press. Similarly, the Middle East conflict seems to be fueled to a certain extent by a sense of desecration of both Jewish and Muslim holy places. A sense of desecration of Saudi Arabia especially of its two holy sites, Makkah and Medina, by the American presence has been mentioned as one of the main source of Bin Laden anger toward the United States (*Silberman, 2004*).

Thirdly, religious beliefs that seem to threaten one's religious meaning system are often perceived as predominantly dangerous attacks on both personal and communal identity. Such perceived threats often provoke violent reaction among the adherents of the challenged religion.

Fourthly, the rules and standards of behaviors that religions usually provide often result in behavior that is likely to provoke conflicts. This can happen in two ways:

Either the prescribed action might be inherently conflictive as in the case of religious call for "holy wars" or the required actions may be perceived as threatening by another group, forcing the members of the second group to defend their beliefs. Evangelism, which suggests that there is either an obligation unfulfilled or spiritual reality unfulfilled as long as the whole world does not profess the tenets of a particular religion is a good example of the two ways in which religious rules can increase violent conflicts (*Gopin, 2000: 31-35*).

Fifthly, because of its power to morally justify any goal or action through the process of sanctification, religion can provide an excellent source for the legitimization of the most violent acts within both individual and collective meaning systems (*Fox, 1999*). One example of religious based moral justification would be the attack of the *Al-Qaeda* organization across the world which the organization described as part of the holy war, consistent with the teaching of spiritual leader the Holy Prophet (SAW) and preached by the religious scholars (*Silberman, 2004*).

Religious terrorism is often redefined through theological reinterpretation as holy wars, as sacred events or as being fought for Allah. These events are not viewed as violence within the religious meaning system of those who participate in them. On the contrary they viewed it as religious battle for justice aimed at making a more peaceful and just world (*Salengut, 2003: 2-5, 11*).

However, Silberman (2004) mentions that religion has a strong potential for facilitating conflict resolution and peace. Firstly, religion often includes values that can facilitate peace such as sanctity of life, selfless love and compassion, self examination, forgiveness, humility and self criticism, which facilitate resolution between groups, religious discipline, i.e. religious idea of self restraint may facilitate restraints in violent situation, the notion of interdependence, i.e. the idea that the acts of one individual or nation can affect the whole world, the vision of a more just society leading toward peaceful world, the explicit encouragement of non violence and the call for peace and pacifism. Secondly, religion can include powerful myths in a way that may facilitate peaceful activism. Thirdly, religion can provide some rules and standards of behavior that may facilitate peaceful relations without group member. Fourthly, religion can increase activism for peace by prescribing special ritual of forgiveness and reconciliation that can be applied in both interpersonal and inters group contexts.

3. Zia-Ul-Haque and Proliferation of Religion

General Zia-ul-Haque was the first Pakistani ruler who persistently adopted concrete steps for the Islamisation process in Pakistan. Zia and his colleagues were the first to decide that Islam could become the chief unifying factor in their divided country. One of the important reasons for Zia's Islamic ideology was his intense desire to muster support of urban activists' centers which could prove a tremendous backing for Zia's *Nifaz-i-Islam*. The anti Bhutto movement which had some of the highly organized fundamentalist groups like *Jamaat-i-Islami* (JI) had been organized in these centers. Zia had developed a rather superficial concept of woman position and role in an Islamic society and believed that the women should be confined within the four walls of the house (*Rabbani, 2002: 496-97*). Zia's Islamisation program, therefore, necessarily focused on the social role of the urban female. "*Chaddar*" and "*Chardivari*" meaning the veil and the home became the slogan of the advancing force of Zia ideology (*Qasir, 1984: 118*).

Zia showed his intentions to Islamize Pakistan on September 1, 1977 in a public pronouncement in these words "A presidential form of government closest to Islamic ideology with president or *ameer* elected by the entire nation was best suited for Pakistan. The president will be checked by a legislature and shall be guided by the consensus of opinion "*Ijma*" in the "*majlis-e-mushawarat*" the council of advisors consisting of the *ulema* possessing unimpeachable character. The president will be counterchecked by the prime minister and the prime minister by the National Assembly (*Kaushik, 1993: 54*).

Zia Islamisation had a political, social and economic agenda. The political rationale was essentially aimed at the legitimization of his regime that was not a popularly elected one. The social agenda was to obtain the support of the religious political parties and accede to their demands for an Islamic state. The economic aims were to implement Islamic banking practices and accomplish an equitable distribution of wealth among the people (*Chengappa, 2004: 4*). According to Chengappa (*2004: 4*), Zia was impelled by internal and external consideration in the Islamisation process. The internal compulsions were: (a) the necessity to retain power due to fear of civilian revenge; (b) to negate the residual popularity of Islamic socialism associated with the predecessor Pakistan Peoples' Party (PPP) regime; (c) to legitimize his political authority and (d) to practice an authoritarian system of government. The external factors which influenced his policy of Islamisation were: (a) an attempt to strengthen the Islamic identity of the country; (b) to obtain foreign funds from Muslim nation for propagation of Islam and (c) to enhance military ties with Muslim nations.

Zia's military regime laid emphasis on giving Pakistan a real Islamic system of working. On December 2, 1978, in a nationwide address General Zia accused politicians of exploiting the name of Islam, saying "many rulers did what they pleased in the name of Islam. Pakistan was created in the name of Islam and would survive only if it sticks to Islam" (*Rabbani, 2002: 496*). In September 1980, in a speech on the death anniversary of Jinnah he stated "The measures which are being initiated today to establish an Islamic social order in Pakistan are the true manifestation of Jinnah dreams (*The Dawn*, *September 11, 1980*). Increased links with the Middle East, both at government level and through large scale migration of labor as well as the example of events in Iran, Afghanistan and elsewhere had certainly led to a greater awareness of the possible options (*Piscatori, 1989: 105*).

After assuming power, the task that the government set to was its public commitment to enforce *Nizam-e-Islam*, a 180 degree turn from Pakistan predominantly Anglo-Saxon law as a preliminary measure to establish an Islamic society in Pakistan. General Zia announced the establishment of *Shariah* benches. Speaking about the jurisdiction of the *Shariah* benches he said every citizen will have the right to present any law enforced by the government before the *Shariah* bench and obtain its verdict whether the law is wholly or partly Islamic or un-Islamic.

Zia's concept of an Islamic state was similar to that of the founder of the *Jamaat-i-Islami*, Maudoodi, and deeply influenced by his religious philosophy such as a non-party theocratic state with a despotic president. In August, 1978 Zia invited some of the JI prominent leaders to help him in the timely and effective implementation of *Nifaz-i-Islam* which they not only accepted but considered as the golden opportunity for the execution of Islamic system (*Rabbani, 2002: 503*).

Zia implemented a variety of reforms for Islamisation, the features of many of which in the legal system, economy, elections rules, administrative practices and other sectors of society are magnificent. On April 7, 1979 the Federal Cabinet passed the national education policy that banned the establishment of new English language school and were replaced by *madaris* and *maktabs* at the primary level. Moreover, English language schools had to change their medium of instruction to Urdu (*Chengappa, 2004: 15*). Zia also declared that the degree of *madaris* was equivalent to the Master degree from the Pakistani university. The *Deobandi madaris* and organizations such as *Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan* mushroomed during Zia time and enlarged his support base. The state patronized *madaris* because Zia needed young people to fight the US proxy war against the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan which only the students from *Deobandi madaris* with the history of anti-imperialist struggle and those run by the *Jamaat-i-Islami* could do (*Jamal, 2003*).

The regime ensured to make Islamic education a compulsory subject till graduation. The subject was included as a compulsory subject for competitive examinations to prestigious careers in government. Moreover, the establishment of *madaris* became a cradle for fundamentalist elements and sectarian conflicts that affected the internal security and stability of the country.

Steps towards Islamisation of Pakistan military were also taken. The later entrants were distinctively less westernized. Their traditional values and attitudes depicted the more religious environment of that day. Friday prayers at regimental mosques, a matter of individual choice in the past, were then regularized and General Zia personal touch could be seen in the new dispensation under which the pay and status of *maulves* in the services had been raised (*Mukherjee, 1989*).

A Directorate of Religious Instruction was instituted to educate the officer corps on Islam in the military training institutes. Similarly, the official stamp that General Zia give to a book titled "The Quranic Concept of War" authored by Brigadier S. K. Malik in 1979 is a testimony of military Islamisation. Another symbolic step was the military leadership decision to switch from western style dresses at military messes to the traditional *sherwani* in 1979 (*Cohen, 1992: 97*).

Jamaat-i-Islami infiltrated the officer corps which had been facilitated by practice introduced under Zia of sending combat officers to universities in Pakistan, over many of which the JI has pervasive influence. Zia, himself a close relative of Mian Tufail, the then chief of JI, provided ample protection for secret cells of the JI inside the armed force. It was the only political organization which had such opportunities. Most important however, is perhaps the fact that the JI propaganda among vast number of troops was officially sanctioned by commanding officers (*Ahmad, 1978*).

The Zia regime's next Islamic milestone was the referendum held on December 19, 1984. The voters were asked whether they would cast their votes for or against Islam instead of whether they want Zia as president or not. Eventually, in the post martial law phase, Zia attempted to use Islam as a weapon against democracy through the the passage of the 1986 Blasphemy law, unapproved Shariah Bill and the passage of Shariah Ordinance on June 15, 1988 (*Zaidi, 2002*).

3.1 Hudood Ordinance

Under this ordinance the punishment of imprisonment or fine or both as provided in the existing Pakistan Penal Code for theft, was substituted by the amputation of the right hand of the offender form the joint of the wrist by a surgeon. For robbery, the right hand and the left foot from the ankle should be amputated (*Kamran, 2008: 121*). In 1979, the drinking and selling of wine by Muslims was banned and the sentence of imprisonment of six month or a fine of Rs. 5000/- or both was provided in the law. Under the Prohibition Order, these provisions of law were replaced by the punishment of eighty (80) strips based on the *Ijma* of the companions of the Holy Prophet (SAW). However, the law does not apply to non-Muslim (*The Prohibition Order, 1979*).

Under the *Zina* Ordinance, the provision relating to adultery were replaced as that the guilty (both man and woman) will be flogged with hundred strips if unmarried and shall be stoned to death, if married (*The Offence of Zina Ordinance, 1979*). The ordinance inflicted great injustice to women in Pakistan and provoked bitter international criticism. Due to national and intentional pressure, the first conviction and sentence under the *Zina* Ordinance of stoning to death of Fehmida and Allah Bakhsh were set aside in September, 1981 (*Kamran, 2008: 122*). In some cases the women making allegation of rape were convicted for adultery while the rapists were acquitted. This attracted bitter criticism demanded repealing of the Zina Ordinance. Similar was the case of *Safia Bibi*, a blind girl of 13 year, who was convicted for adultery under the Ordinance while the rapists were acquitted. The decision was that much condemned by the public that the Federal Shariah Court by its own motion called for the records of the case and ordered her release from prison on her own bond (*2008: 122-23*).

The Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) and the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) were amended through Ordinances in 1980, 1982, and 1986 to declare anything causing dishonor to the Holy Prophet (SAW), *Ahle Bait* (family of the Prophet (SAW), *Sahaba* (companions of the Prophet (SAW)) and *Sha'ar-i-Isalm* (Islamic symbols) a cognizable offence, punishable with imprisonment or fine or both (*Kamran, 2008: 123*). Article 295A of PPC says that a deliberate and malicious acts to outrage religious feeling of any class by insulting its religion or religious beliefs will be punished by up to 10 years imprisonment or with fine or with both; 295 B makes the defiling etc of Holy Quran be punished by imprisonment for life; 295 C mentions that the use of derogatory remarks etc in respect of the Holy Prophet (SAW) be punished by death and fine; 298 A makes the use of insulting remarks etc. in respect of holy personages as punishable by 3 years imprisonment or with fine or with both; 298 B mentions the misuse of epithets description and titles etc. reserved for certain holy personages or place by *Ahmadis* as punishable by 3 years imprisonment and fine; and 298 C makes an *Ahmadi* calling himself Muslim or preaching or propagating his faith or outraging the religious feeling of Muslims or posing himself a Muslim a punishable crime for 3 years imprisonment and fine (*Pakistan Penal Code: Act XLV of 1860*). These amendments are controversial and have attracted sever national and international criticism. The government has been unable to modify these amendments because the religious political parties, though not having ballot power, have street power.

Regular observance of prayers was made compulsory. Arrangements were made for performing noon prayers (*salat-al-zuhur*) in the government and semi-government offices and educational institutions during office hours and official function and at the airport, railway stations and bus stops. Similarly, an "*Ehtrami-i-Ramzan*" (respect for fasting) ordinance was issued providing that complete sanctity during the Islamic month of *Ramzan* be observed including the closure of cinema houses three hours before the *Maghreb* (Sunset) prayers (*2008: 125*).

General Zia-ul-Haque's amendments to the constitution also provided for the definition of a Muslim as "Muslim means a person who believes in the unity and "oneness" of Almighty Allah, in the absolute and unqualified finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (SAW) as the last of the Prophethood of Muhammad (SAW) and does not recognize as a Prophet or religious reformer, any person who claims to be a Prophet in any sense of the word or of any description whatsoever, after Muhammad (SAW)" (*2008: 120*). The amendment made the Ahmadi as religious minority.

Directions were issued to the mass media to reflect orthodox Islamic value. Film censorship was stricter than ever and various cultural activities considered not in conformity with the fundamentals of Islam were discouraged (*Rizvi, 2000: 247-48*).

In addition to the religious offences and punishments, Zia also made important changes for the institutionalization of religion. Zia affirmed a case for an Islamic State in Pakistan in the following words: "Had the Islamic System been introduced at the appropriate time, all the basic necessities of every citizen would have been met easily. I am an optimist. This is my faith and I have mentioned it previously that this country had only been created in the name of Islam but could survive only in the name of Islam. As a matter of fact, Pakistan came into being for a particular objective and that objective *Inshallah* will be accomplished. When this objective will be achieved will depend on when we begin to give practical shape to our real love and dedication for Islam" (*Kaushik, 1993: 47*).

The first among the various attempts to institutionalize Islam was to create an Islamic Council and Shariah Courts. The Council of Islamic Ideology and *Shariah* Courts were created in all High Courts in 1979. *Shariah* Courts had the power to strike down any law as un-Islamic if it violated the basic law of Islam. A *Shariah* Council consisting of *ulema* was established to look into the constitutional and legal matters of the state in order to bring them in accordance to Islamic thought. Appellate *Shariah* benches were instituted in the Supreme Court of Pakistan in February, 1979. This was a big step towards establishing the supremacy of *Shariah* over the secular Anglo-Saxon law that Pakistan had inherited from the British colonial masters (*Burks, 1991: 36*).

The second attempt was made in establishing a Federal Shariah Court (FSC). The Court was established with the jurisdiction extending to whole of the country. Appeals against the decisions of the lower and high courts can be brought before the *Shariah* Courts for hearing. The Supreme Court of Pakistan can hear the appeals against the decisions of the FSC. However, Pakistan family laws and financial affairs are out of the jurisdiction of the FSC. The FSC decides various issues brought before it in the light of *Quran* and *Sunnah*. Any citizen can challenge any law of the country in the *Shariah* Court where he has to prove that a certain law is against the provisions of Islam.

Zia-ul-Haque then established and selected a Majlis-e-Shoora in 1980. It was to be the Islamic parliament and act as the Parliament of Pakistan in place of the National Assembly. Most of the members of the *Shoora* were scholars, *ulema*, intellectuals, economists, journalists and professionals belonging to different fields of life. The body was clearly unrepresentative and had no legislative powers. It was nearly a debating body and acted as a board of advisors for the President (*Shahid, M. I. and Shahid M., 2005: 257*).

A further attempt was made to establish numerous cells, committees, commissions, university departments and other agencies assigned to study, plan or implement the Islamic transformation of society. The government arranged many conferences on Islamic subjects, topics and themes. It orders the mass media to cover international, regional, national and local conferences and seminars on Islam. It hosted National Conventions of the *ulema* and *mashaikh*. In Central Superior Services (CSS) examination and in MBBS (Bachelor of Medicine and Bachelor of Surgery) admission extra marks were given to the candidates who had learnt the whole of the *Quran* by heart (*Rabbani, 2002: 503-04*).

To implement his thoughts, a *Shariah* Faculty was set up at the Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, in 1979. Zia inaugurated the faculty where special arrangements were made for institutions in *Shariah* law at the Post Graduate level.

A year later it became a separate and independent educational institution and was called the Islamic University (*2002: 504*). Later, the *Salat* committees were set up at district levels which were to impress upon the people to be punctual in offering their prayers. Government offices were instructed to fix timings for prayers during office times. Nearly 100,000 prayers inspectors were appointed in the urban and rural areas to supervise and watch the observance of daily prayers by the people in different localities.

The growth of *madaris* (religious schools) was an integral part of Zia Islamisation. He encouraged the *Deobandi* JI run *madaris*. The degrees of *madaris* were made equivalent to the Master degree from Pakistani University. Zia took advantage of Afghan war to promote *madaris*. The rise of religious influence in Pakistan can easily be understood by the number of established religious institutions. In the 1950s besides a few *Shia's madaris*, there were 137 traditional *Sunni madaris* in Pakistan. By 1971 they were close to 900 *madaris*, with about 3000 teachers and more than 30,000 regular students. In the 1980's the number of *madaris* boomed to 45,000-50,000 instead of the 4000 officially registered. Southern Punjab has the highest number of *madaris*, around 8000, and this has one of the lowest levels of literacy in Pakistan, with a significant percentage of population living on or below the poverty line. The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) has around 10, 000 religious institutions. Peshawar alone has more than 50 madaris (*Hilali, 2002*).

To Islamize the economy the National Investment Trust and the Investment Corporation of Pakistan were asked to operate on equity basis instead of interest from July 1, 1979. Interest free counters were opened at all the 7,000 branches of the nationalized Commercial Banks on January 1, 1980. But interests bearing National Saving Schemes were allowed to operate in parallel. Interest free banking system called as Profit and Loss Sharing (PLS) was initiated in January 1981. By mid 1985 all Pakistani banks were switched over to this scheme. The transformation of the banking system led to the generation of financial instruments like Loans with Service Charges, *Qarzai Hasana*, Mark Down, Buy Back, Leasing, Hire Purchase, *Musharka, Mudarba* (participation term certificate) (*Shahid, M. I. and Shahid M., 2005: 258-59*).

The *Zakat* and *Ushr* Ordinance was promulgated on June 20, 1980. *Zakat* was deducted from bank accounts of Muslims at the rate of 2.5% annually above the balance of Rs. 3000/- from mainly interest bearing saving. However, shares held in National Investment Trust, the Investment Corporation of Pakistan and Foreign Exchange Bearer Certificate Scheme that offered fixed interest were exempted. *Ushr* was levied on the yield of agricultural land in cash or kind at the rate of 10% of the agricultural yield annually. Central, Provincial, District and Tehsil *Zakat* committees were appointed to distribute *Zakat* funds to the needy, poor, orphans and widows. The *Zakat* was to be deducted by banks on the first day of *Ramzan*. This ordinance was sharply criticized by the *Shia* sect which was later exempted from the compulsory deduction of *Zakat* (*Noman, 1990: 154*)

In the armed forces, the position of the religious teachers was raised to that of a commissioned officer. A Directorate of Religious Instructions was instituted to educate the officer corps on Islam. More importantly, religious education became a part of the curricula at the Pakistan Military Academy and also for promotion examinations from Lieutenant to Captain and Captain to Major (*Hussain, M. 1993*).

However, it can be argued that the major emphasis of Islamisation had been regulative, punitive and extractive. Very little efforts were made to implement other aspects of Islam, for example social and economic egalitarianism and accountability of those exercising political authority. The then policy of Islamisation was not to solve the major social-economic and political problems of the country and would be counterproductive to the goal of Islamisation of Pakistani society. Zia used Islam as a tool to achieve his political objective in a state in which people have a very emotional attachment to Islam; where the political institutions are highly weak and underdeveloped and democracy has very delicate roots to flourish in. General Zia-ul-Haque's initiatives of Islamic project for Pakistan had political, constitutional and financial objectives. Politically, he wanted to cope with the situation which had emerged after the physical elimination of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. For that purpose Zia had to gain the political support of the religious political parties and especially of JI which had a very strong street power among the emotionally Islamic society of Pakistan. Constitutionally, he wanted to legitimize his otherwise illegitimate position with the support of the religious political elements by presenting himself as the Amir-ul-Momineen (the religious leader of the Muslims). Financially he wanted get aid from the Arab Muslim states. His Islamic project did not Islamize the society in true sense because the intentions were not honest. Never in the history of Pakistan ever *were Hudood laws* implemented in a truly Islamic sense.

Zina ordinance brought greater miseries to the women who brought the case to the court when raped while the accused men were set free due to insufficient witnesses or due national and international pressure as the case of Allah Bakhsh and Fehmida shows. According to Piscatori (*1989: 143-45*) there are doubts about whether General Zia, for all his reliance on scholarly authority both in Pakistan and elsewhere in the Islamic world, has really formulated an adequate program of change. Not only has he seemed to concentrate too much on the punitive aspects, there has also been little attempt to create a sense of popular involvement. Far reaching pronouncements on the need for an interest free banking system, for example, have been implemented very cautiously. The values that Zia was enforcing seem rather similar to the traditional military values of loyalty and discipline. From the beginning of Afghan war, Zia also had been insistent that he favored the most fundamentalist of the groups, the *Hizb-i-Islami* led by Gulbadin Hekmatyar, for Hekmatyar not only protected Pakistan from the resurrection of the call for Pakhtoonistan but was also a preferred candidate of the JI (*Weaver, 2002: 79-82*).

4. Consequences of Religious Proliferation

President Zia-ul-Haque can be credited with the questioning distinction of the introduction of political Islam into the body politic of Pakistan. Undoubtedly, political Islam has always been a factor in the domestic politics of Pakistan since its creation. However, Zia pampered and encouraged the rightist parties to pursue their narrow interests in a manner that no regime had ever done before in Pakistan. Perhaps, the impetus to political Islam in Pakistan's neighborhood - Afghanistan & Iran- during the late 1970s influenced Zia to initiate a similar experiment to mix religion with politics. The Islamisation process, which was used as a political weapon has caused severe damages to Pakistan life. Wrong interpretation of Islam has resulted in the rise of fundamentalism, obscurantism and retrogression. Since the death of Zia, inconsistency and instability prevails in Pakistan. The most obvious costs which Pakistan pays for are:

A. Sectarianism

Islam, which should have served to unite the people of Pakistan (over 92% of them are Muslims) has been, and is being misused to divide them into mutually hostile sectarian groups. A worrying trend which is the direct outcome of the Afghan *jihad* and General Zia Islamisation process is the emergence of dozens of fundamentalist religious movements of varying persuasion, each more militant than the other. The growing religious intolerance is evident if we see the statistics of sectarian strife in recent years. Over the last decade there has been a major escalation in sectarian tension, the number of sectarian killings and armed sectarian groups. Among those that have gained particular prominence are *Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan* (SMP), the *Tahrik-i-Nifaz-e-Jafaria* (the main politico religious *Shia* Party in Pakistan), later renamed the *Tehrik-i-Jaferia Pakistan*, the *Anjuman-Sipah-i-Sahaba* later renamed the *Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP), an offshoot of the *Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam*, a leading politico-religious *Sunni Deobandi* Party. A further offshoot of the SSP is the even more militant *Lashkar-e-Jhangavi* (*Jalalzai, 2002: 17*). The autonomy of traditional religious institutions and Zia's Islamisation of Pakistani society injected the poison of religious sectarianism, fanaticism and bigotry into the country, pitting sect against sect and religion against religion (*Hilali, 2002*). Actually the Iranian revolution at the same time made Zia and the Arab monarchs nervous about its fallout impacts which they countered by further strengthening *anti-Shia* sects such as *Deobandi* and *Ahl-i-Hadith* in Pakistan, thus fueling sectarianism in country (*Jamal, 2003: 17*).

The present state of organized sectarian conflicts can be traced to the murder of *Tahrik-e-Nifaz-e-Fiqa-e-Jafria* (TNFJ) leader Arif Hussain Al Hassami in 1988 and when *Ahl-i-Hadith* leaders, Allama Elahi Zaheer and Habib-ur-Rehman Yazdani were killed along with six others at a meeting near the Minar-e-Pakistan at Lahore in 1987. By 1992 it was clear that the SSP had access to sophisticated arms and also acquired the ability to use them even against the law enforcing agencies. The race for setting up rival sectarian outfits started with some *Shia* elements, the TNFJ, later nomenclature was modified to *Tehrik-i-Jaferia Pakistan* (TJP). In response to this attempt by minority to impose its view over a majority, a *Deobandi* (a sub-sect within the *Sunni* sect) cleric Mulana Haque Nawaz Jhangvi founded the *Anjuman Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan.* This outfit evolved into a dubious political organization, reportedly has a terrorist arm tool while its offshoot, *Jhangvi* force, is a dedicated terrorist outfit. Besides these two outfits, there were several *Sunni* organizations which are involved in sectarian violence.

Since 1980s sectarian conflicts can be explained in term of specific government policies that gave rise to militant sectarian groups. Foremost among these was the Zia government Islamisation program led to the formation of *Shia* group, which led to the creation of *Sunni* militant groups (*Jalalzai, 2002: 17-20*).

The level of extremism has become a matter of concern as people from all walks of life are affected. People were increasingly alarmed over incidents like the occupation of a newly build hospital to be run by well known social worker Abdul Sattar Edhi in Karachi in December, 1997 by religious students form a *madrassa* run by Maulana Fazlur Rahman's Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam (JUI). Just eight days after the incident, Maulana Fazlur Rahman went there and made a speech against Edhi calling him an infidel and defending the action of his students by calling it a holy war against Edhi (*Hussain, G., 1998*).

The rise of sectarianism in Pakistan has created a serious challenge for Islamabad's foreign policy i.e. how to maintain a balance in its relations with brother Islamic countries, Saudi Arabia and Iran. By allowing Iran and Saudi Arabia to fund, influence and use sectarian organizations of their liking, we have virtually encouraged Riyadh to fight a proxy war on the soil of Pakistan, with serious consequences, sectarian disharmony and law and order in the country.

B. Fundamentalism

Islamisation also resulted in a relationship between the religious fundamentalists and Afghan *mujahideen* guerillas with their Kalashnikovs automatic rifles that proved to be a problem in the post Zia period. The support for fundamentalism can be cited by the suggestions given by Ansari commission appointed by Zia. Besides the other suggestions the commission recommended that a woman can not be the head of the state and a woman contesting the elections for a parliament seat must be at least 50 years of age and should have husband's permission (*Rabbani, 2002: 500*).

It was under Zia that narrow and bigoted religiosity became the state policy. He sought the political support of the *mullah* for his illegal regime. The CIA took over the task of organizing armed religious groups in Afghanistan in co-operation with Pakistani agencies. When the Russian left Afghanistan, the CIA was withdrawn leaving it to Pakistan to deal with the mess they had created. Foolish Pakistani policies since then especially under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif especially supporting and recognizing Taliban Government in Afghanistan got Pakistan even more heavily involved with once US sponsored fundamentalist groups. The Musharraf Government was trying to moderate the Pakistani society by expounding the policy of "Enlightened Moderation" but has done very little to turn away from these policies to extricate Pakistan from the mess that it inherited from Zia's Islamisation and Afghan policy. A major factor in the present situation is the proliferation of *madaris* since Zia time. They receive generous foreign funding. These *madaris* had little difficulties in recruiting *Taliban*, who turned into fanatic, ready to die for what they are taught to believe are sacred causes. They are also indoctrinated about what Islam is and what it prescribes. It gave rise to a pan Islamic class of fighters. Most of the fundamentalist groups convinced that it was their might that led to the exit and subsequent disintegration of the former Soviet Union. If they could do that they can do anything. According to Reddy (*2001*) most of fundamentalist groups see the *Taliban* militants as their role model. Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) engaged in various activities have been accused of pursuing the Western agenda and put on notice (*2001*). Likewise, Islamic fundamentalism has also been a cause of concern in China. As early as 1992, consequent to an abortive Islamist uprising in the town of Baren in Xingjian, 22 people were killed. China immediately closed down its road link with Pakistan. In May 1999, she tightened its visa policy for Pakistanis. Russia has also blamed Pakistan for sending freedom fighters to fight in Chechnya and Dagestan (*The Indian Express, January 5, 1995*).

C. Law and Order

The availability of the light weapons in the hands of religious fundamentalists is an internal security disaster (*Chengappa, 2004: 17*). The lawlessness in Karachi, the commercial capital of Pakistan, affects the state of the economy that has overtime gradually witnessed a decline in foreign direct investment. The country abounds with armed units which have to call themselves as *Sipah, Lashkar*, and *Jaish.* SSP has access to sophisticated arms and even use them against the law enforcing agencies. In June, 1992, its militants killed five policemen by using a rocket launcher. In an attempt by police to storm the SMP headquarter in Thokar Niaz Beg on the outskirts of Lahore resulted in the loss of about five police vehicles. SMP activists involved in serious crimes fled from police custody in Bahawalpur in May, 1996 and used rockets against the police. In Punjab, 1994 was one of the worst years in terms of sectarian violence when such incidents claimed 73 lives and more than 300 people were injured. Many of these clashes were the result of indiscriminate firing on the people saying their prayer (*Jalalzai, 2002: 18*).

Sunni-Shia sectarian violence continued endlessly in Pakistan. The massacre of 25 Shia mourners at the Mominpura graveyard in Lahore on 11 January 1998 set the stage for a series of reprisal killings that left 75 to 78 people dead and 80 wounded in Punjab alone (*The dawn, December, 26, 1989*). The cycle of "tit for tat" killings once confined to the southern districts of Punjab continued to spread to the major cities in Punjab and to Sindh and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and broadened to include massacres of innocent worshippers of both beliefs. Every year on *Ashoora,* law and order situation touches the lowest ebb. On 9th February 2006 there occurred bomb explosion in Hungo, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa which left dozen killed (*The dawn, February, 10, 2006*).

D. Religious Elements (Groups) Above the Law

Militant cadres of organizations like *Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan*, *Lashkar-e-Jhangvi* and *Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan* are comprised of militant youth, the drug mafia, tradesmen and local toughs looking for socially accepted role in society. The religious elements and groups which are the products of Zia Islamisation and Afghan policy have posed soft and severe threats to Pakistan stability. These groups are *Harkat-ul-Ansar Pakistan* (HAP)[1]*, Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan* (SSP)[2], *Lashkar-i-Jhangvi Pakistan* (LJP)[3], *Tahrik-i-Nifaz-e-Jafaria Pakistan* (TNJP)[4] and *Sipah-i-Muhammad Pakistan* (SMP)[5].

5. *Instrumental Use of Islam in Pakistani Politics*

The reassertion of Islamic values in Pakistan had widespread social and political impacts. Major legal economic and social changes have been wrought by Islamic reforms measures. New rules and institutions were developed for the administration of justice, economic investment and the collection and distribution of special taxes for social welfare purposes. Perhaps more far reaching than the specific Islamic laws and programs had been the changed public atmosphere. In many respects Islam had come to define the parameter of political discourse. This is dictated to some degree by the martial law regulations which provided sever punishments for the utterance of public statements against the regime, the military or Pakistan Islamic ideology. The Islamisation had some restricted and specific benefits. First of all religion was used as a legitimacy of rule. When General Zia discovered that his regime was totally lacking authority, he took refuge in divine providence and it was soon claimed that the Almighty Allah has communicated with the General in a dream, that he had experienced "*ilham*" a state of grace in which a divine massage entered his heart, charging him with the task of creating an Islamic state and society in Pakistan. Such a claim to the seat of power is more in line with medieval claims of the divine right of kingship rather than any desire to submit to the will of the people who might be given the opportunity to affirm such a purpose through a free and genuine expression. Since the Zia regime was without any mandate to rule, he took the cloak of religion as a basis of legitimization (*Mahmood, 1989: 139*). It is argued that the object of Islamisation was not Islam but rather invoking a claim to state power as an alternative to restoration of representative government. From this perspective Islamic reforms were a witty device to mobilize popular support especially among the *mullahs* and bigots and to divert attention from issues of representation versus authoritarian rule (*Weiss, 1987: 39*).

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[1] This group emerged in 1980 with the purpose to fight the former Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This is a *Sunni*-religious militant group, though not involved in sectarianism but it strongly supports the SSP move against the *Shia* community.

[2] This group is an offshoot of *Jamiat-i-Ulema-i-Islam* and was established in 1985.

[3] LJP was formed in 1996 by a breakaway group of radical sectarian extremists of SSP. The outfit uses terror tactics in its aim to force the Pakistani state in accepting its narrow interpretation of *Sunni* sectarian doctrines as official doctrine. The victims of its terror tactics have been leaders and workers of rival *Shia* outfit, bureaucrats, policemen and worshippers of the other sects. It was headed by Riaz Basra who is reportedly involve in about 300 cases of murder and robbery and is accused of masterminding a series of murders attacking Iranian missions killing the Iranian diplomats Sadeq Ganji in December 1990 (*Jalalzai, 2002: 70-71*).

[4] TNJP was established in March, 1979, a *Shia* religious pressure in response to Zia's Islamisation policies which favored Pakistan *Sunni* majority. The TNJP adopted an aggressive confrontational style of politics in the early years, but adopted a soft and moderate stance after the death of Allama Arif Al. Hassami in August 1988.

[5] SMP is one of the most militant religious organizations in Pakistan. It is the newest and the most violent players in the deadly game of sectarianism in Punjab. Raza Naqvi the moving force behind the organization has a long criminal record. He has served time in jail and been involved in a number of cases of terrorism. In December, 1994 SMP workers attacked the offices of the Islamabad based newspaper, *The Pakistan Observers*, alleging that not only did the paper out give their party proper coverage, but also accusing its owner of connection with the SSP and using the paper to print anti *Shia* SSP literature.

Religion was also used as a shield of survival for elites. As religion is very instrumental in Pakistani politics from the very beginning, it has been used as a tool not only by the religious parties but also by the secular ones. The religious elites have established a definite place for themselves among the various groups that determine political process and decision making in Pakistan. Using religion as a tool, they have a significant influence on the politics of Pakistan and have a tremendous amount of street power, despite the fact that the religious elites associated with religious parties did not do well in terms of vote in elections except the October, 2002 elections. The religious elites and specially those belonging to the fundamentalist schools of thought have often been successful in impressing upon the people the fact that the promised Islamic state has not been established and that the political leaders merely invoke the name of Islam to win political support (*Sayeed, 1967: 162*).

Besides that it is also possible to say that religion was used as a tool of state identity. For the majority of 92% of the citizen of Pakistan, religion is the very reason we are Pakistani at all rather than Indians. Religion was responsible for the creation of Pakistan. Religion lay at the heart of the Pakistan Movement in the year before 1947, creating the drive and longing necessary to oppose the popular dreams of a united Indian subcontinent. Pakistan was founded on the promise that the Muslims of the sub-continent wanted to build up their lives in accordance with the teaching and traditions of Islam. Religion was effective in creating Pakistan in two ways-one negative, the other positive. Negatively, Muslims came to fear domination by Hindus. "Islam in Danger!" became a widening cry while positively; many educated Muslims sought Pakistan in order to develop their community into what they believed a true Islamic society. After independence, the religious elements struggled to identify Pakistan with Islam by emphasizing on the passing of Objectives Resolution, the Islamic shape of the 1956, 1962 and 1973 constitutions. In its foreign policy it has a specific tilt toward the Muslim states of the world. This move was strengthened with the Islamisation scheme of Zia as he embarked on establishing fraternal relations with the Sunni states of the Middle East and pampering Sunni at the expense of Shia madaris in Pakistan.

Furthermore it can also be said that Islam was used as a weapon of state solidarity. The Muslim League appealed for electoral support in the elections of 1945 and 1946 in the name of Islamic solidarity. In dire crisis it has been the religion which has united the nation. During the war with India in 1965, the front page of *The Dawn* carried the following verses of Quran. "*O, Prophet (SAW) urge the believers to fight. If there be of you twenty steadfast, they shall overcome two hundred and if there be of you a hundred they shall overcome a thousand of those who disbelieve, because they are a people who do not understand* (Quran, chapter 8, verses 65-66). When faced a threat from India or separatist tendencies form East Pakistan, we have found in Islam an admirable symbol or rallying cry for nation solidarity. Pakistan when came into being consisted of two parts. It had neither a common language nor a uniform culture. It was neither a geographical unit nor an economic one. These two wings differed in all matters except that they had a common religion. Religion thus produced the high degree of enthusiasm which carried Pakistan into existence and kept it going when the world believed it would soon collapse. For all their diverse languages and culture Pakistanis shared a common creed that cemented them in common action at national and international levels. At the national level this common action has been materialized the form of Islamic constitutions and policies while at international level it has brought common policies and actions in favor of Muslim states like Bosnia, Palestine and Afghanistan.

Conclusion

The circumstances surrounding Pakistan creation including the raising of Muslim consciousness provided a pool of potent symbols on which Islamic groups could later draw. These symbols were most heavily exploited by those who had opposed the creation of Pakistan. This phenomenon was most clearly manifested in the extensive debates in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly over the Objectives Resolution but it also found expression in the anti-Ahmadi riot of 1953. The formal designation of Pakistan as an "Islamic Republic" in the constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973, the establishment of an Islamic Ideology Council and other measure, manifesting the vital roles of the religious elites in Pakistan's politics. The clergy's hand was definitely strengthened with the advent of Zia's martial law and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The Iranian Revolution and the Communist coup in Afghanistan followed by the Soviet intervention in 1979 contributed to a closer working relationship between the government and religious forces. The JI had been a partner to the government Afghan policy since 1977. No doubt the JI and the ruling Generals did not completely share each other's goal but they realized that a co-operative relationship would be mutually rewarding.

The Jamaat derived benefits by enjoying a relative freedom to engage in a low keyed political activities and also extending its influence in the bureaucracy, the military, the mass media and the educational institutions. For the military, the threat of political agitation by a political party with a highly disciplined cadre was temporarily eliminated. The JI played a major role in molding public opinion in favor of Jihad against the Soviet Union.

The Islamisation process of Zia had three aspects. Firstly, to mobilize and forge a cooperative relationship with those who shared the regime's perspective on Islamisation; secondly, reliance on the conservative Islamic principles to introduce changes in the politico-legal system, especially in the 1973 constitution, and thirdly, to introduce several measures, including new laws, administrative actions and guidelines for imbibing the Islamic spirit in the society. Zia was unable to consolidate the Islamisation of Pakistan because most of his policies died with him. In a sense Islamisation was an extension of Zia's individual religious inclinations and not truly a reflection of the people's aspiration in general but only a small group of Islamic fundamentalists. This is evident from the fact that if the policy of Islamisation embedded itself so deeply in civil society, the people would have voted religio-political parties like JI to power rather than PPP in the post Zia period.

Zia's policies and the project of Islamisation have far-reaching political, religious, ethnic, constitutional repercussions on the Pakistani society. Politically, his policies have initiated a civil war in the form of MQM (Muhajir Qumi Movement) and PPP tussle in Karachi. In order to weaken the rising power of PPP at the eve of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto death, Zia encourage and pampered the MQM which has become a constant threat to the security of other ethnic groups in the area. Till present MQM is that much stronger and active that it has a big say in the provincial setup and policies and this will continue till the time another group gains the prominence to equalize MQM influence.

Religiously, Zia's policies have radicalized the society to the point that the then "Freedom Fighters" and the today's "Taliban" have been a constant threat to the security and integrity of the state. It has worsened the law and order situation in Pakistan in general and KPK in particular. Bomb blast and suicide bombing is the order of the day. Hundred thousands of children have been orphaned. A similar number of women have been widowed. This form of insecurity has badly affected the economic position of the state. Foreign investors are unwilling to invest in Pakistan for security reasons. Madaris have gained the upper hand and are sometimes dictating to the state. The Lal Masjid episode is a clear evidence of the prominent position taken by the madaris which is the legacy of Zia religious policies. Again, Zia had encouraged the Sunni madaris at the expense of Shia Madaris with the result that we have created greater scope for ethnic and religious disharmony in the form of Sunni-Shia tussle which worsens the law and order situation during the month of Muharram. This also has international ramification in our relation with Iran. The encouragement and nourishment of Taliban during Zia time and their present day's activities in Afghanistan and Kashmir has also made hurdles in maintaining friendly relations with our neighbor states Afghanistan and India.

Constitutionally, his policies have modified the original parliamentary shape of the 1973 Constitution to a presidential one. The society was divided in to Muslims and Non-Muslims by providing the definition of a Muslim in the constitution. The religious instruments in the form of ordinances were used as a tool to achieve his political objectives. His introduction of blasphemy law in the Pakistan Penal Code is often wrongly used against the minorities and none can dare to modify because he is killed by the fanatics.

However, Pakistan needs "Religion" or "Religious Supremacy" because Pakistan is politically instable, economically weak, strategically or military vulnerable and the roots of democracy are very weak. The majority of the people is illiterate and backward, has emotional attachment with the religion and has no sense to respect law of the land but have an unseen fear of Allah.

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