

Exploring “The Clash of Civilization as a Paradigm” and the “Cause of the Civilizational clash”: *a review of literature*

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Abstract

Starting with the term civilization in singular and plural sense, this paper covers the relevant literature of “clash of civilization as a Paradigm” and then goes on to explore “the cause of civilizational clash” from the research microscope of authentic sources.

I. Civilization

Civilized societies have been in existence for about six or six and a half millennia. The earliest civilized societies arose "probably in the fifth millennium B.C." But the word 'civilization' is of recent formation. A revised understanding of term 'civilization,' is necessary to deal with the 'clash of civilizations'. Our first task, then, is to understand how and why this linguistic coinage came about and what the content that stands behind it is. It is very difficult to define this familiar term because the term has been used in a wide variety of ways. Frequently it has been defined by reference to an individual or a society and a distinction also exists between civilization in the singular and civilizations in the plural. Fortunately, there are a number of major scholarly efforts delineating the subject and tracking the usage employed over the centuries in various parts of the world. We should take our cue from the etymology of the word 'civilization.' This pseudo-Latin word is a modern French coinage. It derives its original meaning from Latin: from *civis* which referred to the status of citizenship.

In Latin, however, this word also acquired secondary meanings. *Civis* denoted not only the fact of Roman citizenship, but also its superiority over the primitive condition of the foreigner or barbarian.

The acquired as well as literal meaning has lingered on into modern times, although the word "civilization" itself did not gain currency in European thought until the second half of the eighteenth century. Before the arrival of the abstract noun 'civilization,' there lay at least two millennia of efforts by Greeks, Romans, and medieval Europeans, to distinguish themselves from 'barbarians' by verbs and adjectives referring to civility and cultivation. In any case, it appeared long after the verb and the participle, to civilize

and civilized, which can be seen as early as the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The French verb 'civiliser' was in use by 1694. According to Havelock Ellis:

"The verb civiliser existed as far back as 1694, meaning to polish manners, to render sociable, to become urbane".²

The history of the French word 'civilization' has been reviewed by Lucien Febvre in his essay *Civilisation: Evolution d'un Mot et d'un Groupe d'Idees* (Civilization: Evolution of a Word and a Group of Ideas), in the volume *Civilisation: Le Mot et l'Idée* (Civilization: The Word and the Idea), 1930. In this article Lucien Febvre declares that he has found no usage of the term before 1766 in any French text.³ The first publication of the word 'civilisation' in French, according to Febvre, was in Amsterdam in 1766 in a volume entitled *L'Antiquité Devoilée par ses Usages*:

"Lorsqu'un peuple sauvage vient à titre civilisé, il ne faut jamais mettre fin à l'acte de la civilisation en lui donnant des lois fixes et irrévocables ; il faut lui faire regarder la législation qu'on lui donne comme une civilisation continue." 4

"When wild people have been suddenly civilized, one never should put an end to the act of civilization by giving him fixed and irrevocable laws; it is necessary to make him look at the legislation that one gives him like a continuous civilization."

No doubt, C. Funck-Brentano is of the view that there is one pre-nineteenth century use known, Turgot's: "*Au commencement de la civilisation*" 5 but Febvre claims that Turgot himself did not use the word, that it was introduced into the published text by Turgot's pupil, Dupont de Nemours. Febvre explains:

"Malheureusement, le mot n'est pas de Turgot, fort probablement, mais de Dupont de Nemours qui l'aura employé tout naturellement en publiant, beaucoup plus tard, les œuvres de son maître. On ne le re-trouve pas dans le texte qu'a reproduit M. Schelle, d'après les manuscrits directement".⁶

"Unfortunately, the word is not Turgot's, most probably, but of Dupont de Nemours who will quite naturally have employed it, much later,

¹ Rushton Coulborn, *The Origin of Civilized Societies* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). 3.

² Havelock Ellis, *The Dance of Life* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1923), 275.

³ Lucien Febvre, "Civilisation: Evolution d'un mot et d'un groupe d'idées," *Civilisation : le mot et l'idée* ed. Lucien Febvre, Emile Tonnelat, Marcel Mauss, and Alfredo Niceforo (Paris: La Renaissance du Livre, 1930), 14. http://classiques.uqac.ca/classiques/febvre_lucien/civilisation/civilisation_idee.pdf

⁴ Ibid., 15.

⁵ A. L. Kroeber et al., *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (Cambridge, MA: Peabody Museum, 1952), 17.

⁶ Lucien Febvre, "Civilisation: Evolution d'un mot et d'un groupe d'idées," 14.

while publishing works of his Master . One does not find it in the text which Mr. Schelle directly reproduced according to the manuscripts."

Febvre also establishes by a number of citations that by 1798 the word was fairly well established in French scholarly literature.

Yet, before concluding, it is worth considering that Febvre's disciple Fernand Braudel, one of the greatest French historians of the 20th century, analyzed that, "As far as we know, civilization first appeared in a printed work in 1766, though doubtless it was current in speech earlier."⁷ However, "Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, Jean Starobinski"⁸ and German Sociologist Norbert Elias⁹ convincingly argue, the first literary¹⁰ evidence of the evolution of the verb civiliser into the concept civilisation, in an accepted nonjuridical sense, appears to be in 1756, by Victor de Riqueti Marquis de Mirabeau (one of the leading Physiocrats and the father of the French revolutionary politician) in his work *L'Ami des homes*.

Although the *Dictionnaire universel françois et latin (or Dictionnaire de Trevoux)* of 1743, speaks of *civilisation* as a "term of jurisprudence," where it designates a society in which civil law has replaced military law, it remained for Mirabeau to broaden the term so that it referred as well to a group of people who were polished, refined, and mannered, as well as virtuous in their social existence. In fact, he uses it only three times in the course of a book of well over 500 pages. Its first occurrence, in the supposedly secularizing Enlightenment, civilization is seen as resting on a religious basis. In a chapter on "Work and Money", we are told:

"La religion est sans contredit le premier et le plus utile frein de l'humanita: c'est le premier ressort de la civilisation"¹¹]

"Religion is without doubt humanity's first and most useful constraint; it is the mainspring of civilization"

The second usage occurs many pages later. Increasing luxury, we are told, brings an increase in poverty and a decrease in population. Here, we are warned of the danger of civilization falling into decadence.

"De-la naitroit comment le cercle nature] de la barbarie a la decadence par la civilisation et la richesses peut titre repris par un ministre habile et attentif, et la machine remontee avant d'etre a sa fin."¹²

"From there one can see how the natural circle leading from barbarism to decadence, by way of civilization and wealth, might be begun again by a clever and attentive minister, and the machine reactivated before coming to an end"

The last usage says that

"voyons dans les etats de finance cc revenantbon de la barbaric et de l'oppression sur la civilisation et la liberty"¹³

"in financial affairs we can see this ghost or specter of barbarism and oppression weighing down on civilization and liberty"

7 Fernand Braude], *On History*, trans. Sarah Mathews (Weidenfeld & Nicolson; London), 180. [French Title: *Ecrits sur l'histoire*. A collection of Braudel's essays(Flammarion Paris, 1969).]

8 Bruce Mazlish, *Civilization and Its Contents* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004), 5.

⁹ Norbert Elias, *The Civilising Process. Vol. I: The History of Manners* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978). [Originally published in German as *Über den Prozess der Zivilisation. Vol. I: Wandlungen des Verhaltens in den weltlichen Oberschichten des Abendlandes* (Prague: Academia, 1937).]

10 Michael Levin, .1S *Mill on Civilization and Barbarism* (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 10. "

¹¹ Victor Riqueti Mirabeau, *L'Ami des homes*, <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k89089c>.

¹² Victor Riqueti Mirabeau, *L'Ami des homes*, <http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k89089c>. "

¹³ Ibid.

In 1768, He used it again later in another one of his essays, which remained unpublished, but which he entitled "*L'Amour des femmes ou Traite de la Civilisation*."¹⁴ In this essay, he gave it a more precise meaning:

"la civilisation d'un peuple est adoucissement de ses moeurs, l'urbanite, la politesse et les connaissances rdpandues"¹⁵

"The civilization of people is the softening of his manners, urbanity, the politeness, and widespread knowledge.

These qualifications are all attached to people. Mirabeau seems to have been one of the first persons if not the first, to use the word 'civilization'.

The English word 'civilization' had development almost precisely parallel to that of French word. Febvre also makes a case for the view that the English word was borrowed from the French¹⁶. The word 'civilization' with its roots in the Roman experience (from the Latin *civis*, citizen), is not to be found in Middle English. 'Civilization' entered the language in the early eighteenth century, as a technical legal term. Although the Samuel Johnson, in *A dictionary of English Language*, speaks of 'civilisa'tion' in a juridical sense where it means "A law, act of justice, or judgment which renders criminal process civil; which is performed by turning an information into an inquest, or the contrary"¹⁷ yet Samuel Johnson excluded civilization, in non juridical sense, from his dictionary and preferred civility.

"CIVILITY. n.s. [from civil.] Freedom from barbarity; the state of being civilized...Politeness; complaisance; elegance of behaviour...Rule of decency; practice of politeness."¹⁸

We will not investigate here what motivated Johnson to refuse the term civilization while preparing a fourth edition of his folio Dictionary. Whatever his motives, it is sufficient that Boswell had urged its inclusion. Boswell notes for Monday, March 23, 1772:

"On Monday, March 23, I found him busy, preparing a fourth edition of his folio Dictionary. Mr. Peyton, one of his original amanuenses, was writing for him. I put him in mind of a meaning of the word side which he had omitted, viz., relationship; as father's side, mother's side. He inserted it. I asked him if humiliating was a good word. He said he had seen it frequently used, but he did not know it to be legitimate English. He would not admit civilization, but only civility. With great deference to him, I thought civilization, from to civilize, better, in the sense opposed to barbarity, than civility; as it is better to have a distinct word for each sense than one word with two senses, which civility is, in his way of using it."¹⁹

The literary use of term 'civilization' which Boswell had urged Samuel Johnson to introduce in his Dictionary in 1772--in the sense of "opposed to barbarity"--was prescient. As George C. Caffentzis in his essay, *On the Scottish Origin of "Civilization,"* commented:

"As a Scotsman trained in Civil Law, Boswell perhaps sensed that the time for legal definitions was passing"²⁰

14 Rene Dubos, *Civilizing Science* (Dedecation Address for Helen Goodhart Alltshuil Hall and the Millicent McIntosh Centre, Barnard College, New York City November 14, 1969.) <http://beatl.barnard.columbia.edu/barnard/documents/civilizing.htm>

15 Jan Ifversen, *The Meaning of European Civilization - A Historical-Conceptual Approach* (Working Paper no. 51-97, Centre for Cultural Research, University of Aarhus, 1997) [Electronically published: February 18, 1998] http://www.hum.au.didckulturf/pages/publications/jileuropean_civilization.htm

16 Lucien Febvre, "Civilisation: Evolution d'un mot et d'un groupe d'idees," 19.

17 Samuel Johnson, *A dictionary of English Language* (Times Books Limited; London, 1979). No Page Numbers. [First Published in two folio volumes by a group of London booksellers on 15 April 1755.] Is

18 Samuel Johnson, *A dictionary of English Language* (Times Books Limited; London, 1979). No Page Numbers.

19 James Boswell, *The Life of Samuel Johnson: 1709-March 18, 1776*, ed. Roger ingpen, 2 vols. (London: Pitman, 1907), 1: 394.

20 Silvia Federici, ed., *Enduring Western Civilization: The Construction of the Concept of Western Civilization and Its "Others"* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995), 32.

Since then, it has become current in all modern languages in the meaning of a particular kind or phase of culture that has been in existence during a particular age.

Civilization is a word easier to describe than it is to define. It is used in innumerable settings. 'Civilization' originally referred to three different but interconnected meanings. Firstly it refers to a state, a condition or a stage: the state or condition of the individual, society or humanity. Sometimes it refers to the state of being civilized, that is, to the possession of good manners and self-control, as in the phrase "a thoroughly civilized man". This was the original meaning of the term when it was introduced, first into French, during the 18th century. Sometimes it also refers to the decadent uncreative stage. Spengler uses the term 'civilization' in the sense of the late, decadent uncreative stage which terminates the development of his 'great cultures'.

"Looked at in this way, the "Decline of the West" comprises nothing less than the problem of Civilization. We have before us one of the fundamental questions of all higher history. What is Civilization, understood as the organic-logical sequel, fulfillment and finale of a Culture? For every culture has its own Civilization. In this work, for the first time the two words, hitherto used to express an indefinite, more or less ethical, distinction, are used in a periodic sense, to express a strict and necessary organic succession. The Civilization is the inevitable destiny of the Culture, in this principle we obtain the viewpoint from which the deepest and gravest problems of historical morphology become capable of solution. Civilizations are the most external and artificial states of which a species of developed humanity is capable. They are conclusion, the thing become succeeding the thing becoming, death following life, rigidity following expansion, intellectual age and the stone built, petrifying world-city following mother-earth and the spiritual childhood of Doric and Gothic. They are an end, irrevocable, yet by inward necessity reached again and again."²¹

Secondly it refers to a "process of refinement"²² of the individual, society or humanity. Civilization, According to Arnold Toynbee,

"is a movement and not a condition, a voyage and not a harbour. No known civilization has ever reached the goal of civilization yet."²³ In his work 'A Study of History' he concludes that "Following Whitehead's lead, I should define civilization in spiritual terms. Perhaps it might be defined as an endeavour to create a state of society in which whole of the mankind will be able to live together in harmony, as members of a single all-inclusive family. This is I believe, the goal at which all civilizations so far known have been aiming unconsciously, if not consciously."²⁴

According to Fernand Braudel:

"Civilization, we say, is a collection of cultural characteristics and phenomena."²⁵

The third meaning of the term 'civilization' came into English usage from German. John Gottfried von Herder and other writers of the 18th century took great pains to rescue the German language and style thought from the borrowed finery of French. In so doing, they stressed the uniqueness of their own nation and the differences of their own nation and differences of its culture from that of any other folk. By generalizing this idea, civilization of course becomes plural. A writer ought to speak, not of the progress of civilization in general (as the French did). As Seyyed Hossein Nasr criticizes that

²¹ Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West, Volume 1, Form and Actuality*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd, 1980), 31.

²² Philip Bagby, *Culture and History - Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations* (Longmans, Green & Co.; London, 1958), 74 -75.

²³ Arnold Toynbee, *Civilization on Trial and the World and the West* (New York: A meridian Book), 58.

²⁴ Arnold Toynbee, *A Study of History*, ed. Arnold Toynbee and Jane Caplan (Weathervane Books; New York, Foreword 1972), 44. [The first abridged one-volume edition.]

²⁵ Fernand Braudel, *On History*, 177.

"One of the most tragic and unfortunate heritages of 18th and 19th century European thought for the whole globe was the reduction of civilizations to civilization, that is the use of the singular of the word civilization. This is really an intellectual disease which reached its peak in 18th century Europe, France with the age of enlightenment and 19th century Germany and England with the idea of progress and development. It is the idea that there is fact only one civilization and all other civilizations were building blocks towards that one civilization."²⁶

Briefly, the word civilization in singular was established in English by Boswell's suggestion, though it seems not to have penetrated in plural form until more than fifty years later. According to Lucien Febvre, The first plural use of the term 'civilisations' is in 1819, by Ballanche in *Le Vieillard et le jeune Homme* (The Old man and the Young man).

"L'esclavage, écrit Ballanche la page 102 de l'addition Mauduit, n'existe plus que dans les débris des civilisations anciennes."²⁷

"Slavery, Ballanche writes on page 102 of the *Mauduit edition*, does not exist more than in the remains of old civilizations."

He also noted that a little further, on page 111, Ballanche used "l'héritage de toutes les civilisations précédentes"²⁸ (the heritage of all preceding civilizations).

Was this the first time that 'civilizations' in a French printed text, substituted 'civilization'? Lucien Febvre was not sure. There are also some other claims that the idea of a plurality of civilizations is already implicit when Volney, before 1814 in his *Eclaircissements sur les Etats-Unis*, speaks almost ethnographically of "la civilisation des sauvages."²⁹

In any case, in the second decade of 19th century, after all sorts of vicissitudes, civilization moved from the singular to the plural. This triumph of the particular over the general fits fairly well. The application of civilizations to human societies was late-apparently post-1800-and for some reason was characteristic of the German language and at first confined to it. The term "civilizations" in the plural may not suggest a simple unilinear vision of history, but it does suggest a world divided into very large human entities, each united by an enduring cultural essence. Let us agree then to use 'civilizations' to refer to the largest distinct human entities. As Philip Bagby wrote:

"We shall therefore use the term 'civilization' simply to mean the largest distinctive entities which we happen to find in our survey of the field. Thus the Chinese culture, though now that of a single politically integrated unit, will be called Chinese civilization, because there is no larger entity in which it can be included. Similarly the Western European super-culture will be called a civilization, but its component parts, British and French cultures, will be technically called subcivilization."³⁰

And Will Durant is of the view:

"As men are members of one another, and generations are moments in a family line, so civilizations are units in a large whole whose name is history; they are stages in the life of man."³¹

First of all, we get civilization, concept relating to humanity as a whole, and civilizations, scattered through time and space. The occurrence of civilizations in either space or time always reveals significance.

26 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Religious and Civilisational Dialogue", *Islam21*, Issue 29 (June, 2001)

http://I.alhewar.com/seedhussein_nasr.htm

27 Lucien Febvre, "Civilisation: Evolution d'un mot et d'un groupe d'idées," 37.

28 Lucien Febvre, "Civilisation: Evolution d'un mot et d'un groupe d'idées," 37.

29 A. L. Kroeber et al., *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions*, 72.

30 Philip Bagby, *Culture and History - Prolegomena to the Comparative Study of Civilizations*, 165.

31 Will Durant, *The Story of Civilization: Part IV: The Age Of Faith*, (Simon & Schuster, New York, 1950), 343.

Moreover, the Romance languages, and English in their wake, used civilization to denote social cultivation, improvement, refinement, or progress but This term goes back to Latin *civis*, *civilis*, *civitas*, *civilitas*, whose core of reference is political: the citizen in an organized state or society as against the tribesman. The term civilization does not occur in classical Latin, but seems to be a Renaissance Romance formation, probably French and derived from the verb *civiliser*, meaning to achieve or impart refined manners, and improvement, Thus the word 'civilization' began by definitely containing the idea of betterment, of improvement toward perfection. The term still retains this meaning today, in many usages, both singular and plural.

To follow the history of a concept, its diffusion between countries and academic disciplines, its modifications under the impact of broader intellectual movements, is a characteristically anthropological undertaking. But, we have documented the gradual refinement of a concept we believe to be of great actual and still greater potential significance in investigating the real cause of the clash of civilizations. The concept of civilizations as used today in 'Clash of civilizations' is the emergence of an idea that was gradually strained out of the several connotations of an existing word.

II. Clash of Civilizations

The word 'Civilizations,' used in the plural, denotes the plurality of broadest human entities. Toynbee considers that the thesis of the unity of civilization is a misconception into which Western scholars have been led by the influence of their social environment. He states:

"The misleading feature is the fact that, in modern times, our own Western Civilization has cast the net of its economic system all round the World, and this economic unification on a Western basis has been followed by a political unification on the same basis which has gone almost as far; for though the conquests of Western armies and governments have been neither as extensive nor as thorough as the conquests of Western manufacturers and technicians, it is nevertheless a fact that all the states of the contemporary world form part of a single political system of Western origin. These are striking facts, but to regard them as evidence of the unity of civilization is a superficial view. While the economic and political maps have now been Westernized, the cultural map remains substantially what it was before our Western Society started on its career of economic and political conquest. On the cultural plane, for those who have eyes to see, the lineaments of the four living non-Western civilizations are still clear. But many have not such eyes; and their outlook is illustrated in the use of the English word 'natives' and of equivalent words in other Western languages,"³²

During the early 1950s, the notion of "encounters between civilizations" was presented by Arnold J. Toynbee in The B.B.C. Reith Lectures (1952).

"The encounter between the World and the West may well prove, in retrospect, to be the most important event in modern history. It is an outstanding instance of an historical phenomenon of which there are other famous instances in the past, and the comparative study of the course and consequences of these encounters between civilizations that *are* one another's contemporaries is one of the keys to an understanding of the history of mankind."³³

Meanwhile, in 1955, a Canadian representative to the UN who was instrumental in establishing the United Nations, Lester B. Pearson wrote:

"The most far-reaching problems arise no longer between nations within a single civilization but between civilizations themselves."³⁴

³² Arnold J. Toynbee, and D. C. Somervell, *A Study of History* vol. 1, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), 36.

³³ Arnold Toynbee, *The World and the West* (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), V.

³⁴ Lester B. Pearson, *Democracy in World Politics* (Princeton:, 1955), 82,

In 1957 Lester Pearson was the winner of the Nobel Prize for Peace, On December 10, 1957, Gunnar Jahn, Chairman of the Nobel Committee delivered his presentation speech in the Auditorium of the University of Oslo. At its conclusion, he cited Pearson's words:³⁵

"We are moving into an age when different civilisations will have to learn to live side-by-side in peaceful interchange, learning from each other, studying each other's history, and ideals of art and of culture to mutually enrich each other's lives. The alternative in this overcrowded little world is misunderstanding, tension, clash and catastrophe."

Gunnar Jahn also stated:

"Lester Pearson's work has been carried on during a period of tension and open conflict, not only among nations but between races and different civilizations."³⁶

In 1961, Bernard Lewis identified this clash within Muslim world in a Turkish perspective:

"In Turkey, as in other Muslim countries, there are those who talk hopefully of achieving 'a synthesis of the best elements of West and East'. This is a vain hope -- the clash of civilizations in history usually culminate in a marriage of selected best elements, but rather in a promiscuous cohabitation of good, bad, and indifferent alike. But a true revival of a religious faith on the level of modern thought exercise life is within the bounds of possibility. The Turkish people, by the find their practical common sense and powers of improvisation, may yet a workable compromise between Islam and modernism that will enable them, without conflict, to follow both their fathers' path to freedom and progress and their grandfathers' path to God."³⁷

In attempts over the years to make sense of the complexities of the Arab-Israeli conflict, Gabriel Ben-Dor has worked out a graphic way of identifying the elements of the conflict. The depth and various levels of Arab-Israel conflict, and some of the issues arising, are depicted in as four concentric circles, each external circle representing widening scope of the conflict.

"The fourth circle represents a veritable clash of civilizations-"epistemological conflict,,,"³⁸

Gerrit W. Gong observed in his book

"The confrontation that occurred as Europe expanded into the non-European world during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was not merely political or economic, and certainly not only military. It was fundamentally a confrontation of civilizations and their respective cultural systems. At the heart of this clash were the standards of civilization by which these different civilizations identified themselves and regulated their international relations."³⁹

In the preface of this book he commented:

"However, the imposition of Europe's standard of 'civilization' on the non-European world precipitated a confrontation of cultural systems as fundamentally irreconcilable standards of 'civilization' clashed with each other."⁴⁰

³⁵ Gunnar Jahn, *The Nobel Peace Prize 1957 Presentation Speech*, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1957/press.html.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Bernard Lewis, *The Emergence of Modern Turkey* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 418.

³⁸ Gabriel Ben-Dor, *State and Conflict in the Middle East: Emergence of the Postcolonial State* (New York: Praeger, 1983), 194.

³⁹ Gerrit W. Gong, *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society* (Clarendon Press, 1984), 3.

⁴⁰ Ibid, xi.

But these initiatives fell under criticism and became marginalized in scholarship. The real reason why this paradigm ceased to attract scholarly attention was political. The Cold War of the second half of the twentieth century came to define the objectives and limits of international studies. In words of Robert W. Cox and Michael G. Schechter:

"From the 1950s through the 1980s, when the Cold War was the central organizing principle of the academic study of international relations, a whole system of knowledge was built up with that principle as its foundation - studies of military-political conflict, of the rivalry of economic systems, of ideological constructions of the meaning of the world, all built around a fundamental Manichaeian cleavage of we and they, self and other, good and evil." ⁴¹

The Cold War in the second half of the twentieth century suppressed the civilizational differences. But the end of the Cold War has led to a greater recognition of civilizational identities as significant factors in contemporary world politics. According to Robert W. Cox,

"Once the overarching control of the Cold War was lifted, the underlying but obscured diversity of the human situation became more fully apparent and neorealism lost its monopoly of explaining the world and proposing action." ⁴²

In 1990, a leading Western scholar, Bernard Lewis, had undertaken an approach of his own in *The Roots of Muslim Rage* that gave promise for a new beginning. He concluded:

"It should now be clear that we are facing a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations - that perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient revival against our Judo-Christian heritage, our secular present, and the worldwide expansion of both. It is crucially important that we on our side should not be provided into an equally historic but also equally irrational reaction against that revival." ⁴³

Thus during the late twentieth century, "Clash of civilizations" paradigm once again became an object of interest but this time in a religious context. Even Bernard Lewis used the term 'secular' in Christian sense. As he writes in his book *What went wrong?:*

"Secularism in the modern political meaning- the idea that religion and political authority , church and state are different, and can or should be separated- in a profound sense, Christian. Its origins may be traced in the teachings of Christ, confirmed by the experience of first Christians; its later development was shaped and, in a sense, imposed by the subsequent history of Christendom,"

Many other scenarios have been proposed. I will proceed quickly through these scenarios. The first of these is the 'Third Wave' thesis of Alvin Toffler. In *The Third Wave and War and Anti-War Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century*, He gives a theoretical perspective:

"Because massive changes in society cannot occur without conflict, we believe the metaphor of history as "waves" of change is more dynamic and revealing than talk about a transition to "postmodernism". Waves are dynamic. When waves crash in on one another, powerful crosscurrents are unleashed. When waves of history collide, whole civilizations clash. And that sheds light on much that otherwise seems senseless or random in today's world." ⁴⁴

⁴¹Robert W. Cox, and Michael G. Schechter, *The Political Economy of a Plural World; Critical Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization* (London: Routledge, 2002), 139.

⁴²Robert W. Cox, "Civilizations and the Twenty-First Century," in *Globalization and Civilizations* ed. Mehdi Mozaffari (London: Routledge, 2002), 1.

⁴³Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage: Why So Many Muslims Deeply Resent the West and Why Their Bitterness Will Not Be Easily Molified," *Atlantic Monthly*, 266 (September 1990), 60.

⁴⁴Alvin and Heidi Toffler, *War and Anti-War Survival at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (U.K: Little, Brown and Company, 1994), p.18.

He further explains that

"Today, the lineup of world civilizations is different. We are speeding toward a totally different structure of power that will create not a world cut in two but sharply divided into three contrasting and competing civilizations-the first still symbolized by the hoe; the second by the assembly line; and the third by the computer."⁴⁵

Tofflers' scenario portrays a world once bisected into First Wave (agrarian) and Second Wave (industrial).

"First wave civilization, as we've seen, was inescapably attached to the land. Whatever local form it may have taken, whatever language its people spoke, whatever its religion or belief system, it was product of the agricultural revolution. Even today, multitudes live and die in premodern, agrarian societies, scrabbling at the unyielding soil as their ancestors did centuries ago. Second wave civilization's origins are in dispute. Some historians trace its roots to the Renaissance, or even earlier. But life did not fundamentally change for large numbers of people until, roughly speaking, three hundred years ago. That was when Newtonian science first arose. It is when the steam engine was first put to economic use and the first factories began to proliferate in Britain, France and Italy. Peasants began moving into the cities. Daring new ideas began to circulate-the idea of progress; the odd doctrine of individual rights; the Rousseauian notion of a social contract; secularism; the separation of church and state; and the novel idea that leaders should be chosen by popular will, not divine right."⁴⁶

In The Third Wave, Toffler states:

"We must, as a first step, launch the widest public debate over the need for a new political system attuned to the needs of a Third Wave civilization."⁴⁷

The second scenario was presented in a well-known article by Francis Fukuyama entitled *The End of History?* He proclaimed that Western liberalism had become the unrivaled global model providing the ultimate form of political and social development. Liberal democracy, he maintained, constituted the end point of mankind's ideological evolution. According to Fukuyama:

"What we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of a particular period of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."⁴⁸

Fukuyama later restated his original argument in a subsequent book *The End of History and the Last Man*⁴⁹ His argument predicated the end of ideological conflicts, not history itself, and the triumph of political and economic liberalism. He argues that there is a positive direction to current history. Fukuyama is still more confident that it is an evolution in the direction of liberal democracy. In a presentation to the American Political Science Association on September 1, 2006, he explained:

"This was the essence of the end of history: for any society that wanted to be modern, there was no alternative to a market economy and a democratic political system."⁵⁰

⁴⁵ Ibid., 21.

⁴⁶ Ibid, 19.

⁴⁷ Alvin Toffler, *The Third Wave* (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1980). 458. '

⁴⁸ Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *National Interest*, 16 (Summer 1989): 319.

⁴⁹ Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

⁵⁰ Francis Fukuyama, The Clash of Cultures and American Hegemony, *The American Interest*, 2.1, (September/ October 2006) <http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article.cfm?Id=178&MIId=5>.

The third scenario, the coming anarchy, was offered by Robert D. Kaplan in an article 'The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet,'⁵¹ as well as in his books 'The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century'⁵² and the collection of his articles *The Coming Anarchy. Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*.⁵³ He raises profound questions about the assumptions of both conservatives and liberals and paints vivid pictures of dangers and realities of the emerging world. He envisaged a general collapse of political authority that would accompany massive movements of populations, environmental crises and epidemics.

These models attempted to provide answers to the central political and social questions of the post- Cold War world and made a great deal of noise in the 1990s but were not vindicated by events. Standing on the threshold of the twenty-first century, are we about to begin an era that is characterized by a clash of civilizations? This question was raised in 1993 by Samuel Huntington in a widely discussed article.⁵⁴ The title of Huntington's article and subsequent book, Edward Said points out⁵⁵, is drawn from Bernard Lewis's essay, *The roots of Muslim rage*. The title of that article included a question mark, whether seriously or rhetorically intended. This is the central question of the early 21st century. Those who work within the world-system perspective have been asking that question for more than two decades. When we come to 1990s, before Huntington, some began to talk of a civilizational conflict. Robert Gilpin sees the signs of civilizational conflict not only between the West and Islam, but among others as well.

"Today the revival of Islamic, Chinese and Hindu civilizations, as well as the emergence of potentially powerful new or previously isolated civilizations, in particular Japan, Brazil, and Mexico, suggest that a new era is opening."⁵⁶

Three years later, Huntington presented his thoughts in greater detail in a book with the question mark omitted from the title: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. The clash of civilizations, however, became the paradigm for the post-Cold War world and the very definition of the new order of world policy in the twenty-first century. The following quotations summarize his principal theses: "It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will be not primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future."⁵⁷

Huntington's argument is that, until the end of the cold war, conflict had been based predominantly upon conflicts within Western civilizations. In the post-cold war period, however, he argues that conflict is no longer going to occur in the West but between the West and non-Western civilizations. He writes:

"The most important groupings of states are no longer the three blocks of the Cold War but rather the world's seven or eight major civilizations."⁵⁸

51 Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease Are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet," *The Atlantic Monthly*, 273.2 (February 1994):44-76.

52 Robert D. Kaplan, *The Ends of the Earth: A Journey at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (New York: Random House, 1996).

53 Robert D. Kaplan, *The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War*, (New York: Random House, 2000).

54 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs*, 72.3 (Summer 1993): 22-49.

55 Bill Ashcroft, and Pal Ahluwalia, *Edward Said* (New York: Routledge, 2001), 127.

56 Robert Gilpin, "The Global Political System," in *Order and Violence*, ed. J. D. B. Miller and R. J. Vincent (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), 139.

57 Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," 22.

58 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Simon & Schuster; New York, 1997), 21.

And In his book, He writes:

"Civilization identity will be increasingly important in the future, and the world will be shaped in large measure by the interactions among seven or eight major civilizations. These include Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and possibly African civilization. The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another."⁵⁹

By the mid-1990s the idea of a world moving towards clash of civilizations had been absorbed by many leading European politicians and academics. Much criticism and debate followed, most of which was concerned with the implications of his thesis and his failure to define 'civilization' adequately. Some critics took issue with his classification of certain cases, while others objected to his overly generalized view of the world.

Huntington argues that

"If differences in civilization are not responsible for these conflicts, What is? The critics of civilization paradigm have not produced a better explanation for what is going on in the world. The civilizational paradigm, in contrast, strikes a responsive chord throughout the World."⁶⁰

He presents a more detailed description:

"History has not ended. The world is not one. Civilizations unite and divide humankind. The forces making for clashes between civilizations can be contained only if they are recognized. In a "world of different civilizations", as my article concluded, each will have to learn to co exist with others". What ultimately counts for people is not political ideology or economic interest. Faith and family, blood and belief, are what people identify with and what they will fight and die for. And that is why the clash of civilizations is replacing the Cold War as the central phenomenon of global politics, and why a civilizational paradigm provides, better than any alternative, a useful starting point for understanding and coping with the changes going on in this world."⁶¹

Half a century later, Lester Pearson's warning rings with even greater urgency. During the late twentieth century, Clash of civilizations paradigm once again became an object of interest; but this revival was still circumscribed by the residues of Cold War mentality. Huntington's theses and the recommendations that flow from them have been criticized vigorously by numerous specialists, most of them concentrating on what they consider his mistaken judgments regarding areas of their expertise, or on the specific recommendations he makes. I find many of these criticisms persuasive, but they are not my topic in this instance. I shall, rather, examine the cause of the clash of civilizations in Huntington's work and ask whether it is an appropriate cause.

III. Cause of Civilizational Clash

According to many Western commentators, religions are on a collision course. The confrontation is often portrayed as a clash of civilizations. Two pieces have been particularly influential: Bernard Lewis *The Roots of Muslim Rage* and Samuel P. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations?* Both have been seminal in defining the parameters of a debate that has gripped diplomats, policymakers, journalists, and academic analysts. What was significant about Huntington's work was that in spite of appearing to speak the language of 'civilizations,' his thesis actually relied on a concept of conflict of religions. It was religion that provided the fundamental concept in his theorizing, not civilizations. In this respect, Huntington's argument allocated to 'religions' a prominent role in clash of civilizations. No doubt religious differences could be problematic in world politics, but Huntington had gone a step further and explicitly identified 'religions' as the source of serious, and potentially violent, confrontations. He makes very clear that at the heart of any and every culture and civilization is the issue of religion.

⁵⁹ Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," 25.

⁶⁰ Samuel Huntington, If not civilizations. What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World, *Foreign Affairs*, 72.5 (November/December 1993):194.

⁶¹ Samuel P. Huntington, ' If Not Civilizations What? Paradigms of the Post-Cold War World," 194.

He writes that

"Of all the objective elements which define civilizations, however, the most important usually is religion, as the Athenians emphasized. To a very large degree, the major civilizations in human history have been closely identified with the world's great religions, and people who share ethnicity and language but differ in religion may slaughter each other, as happened in Lebanon, The former, Yugoslavia, and the Subcontinent."⁶²

In clash of civilizations, civilization was reduced to nothing more than a matter of identification based upon an alleged religious similarity. According to Huntington,

"People do not live by reason alone. They cannot calculate and act rationally in pursuit of their self-interest until they define their self. Interest politics presupposes identity. In times of rapid social change established identities dissolve, the self must be redefined, and new identities created. For people facing the need to determine Who am I? Where do I belong? Religion provides compelling answers, and religious groups provide small social communities to replace those lost through urbanization. All religions, as Hassan al-Turabi said, furnish "people with a sense of identity and a direction in life." In this process, people rediscover or create new historical identities. Whatever universalist goals they may have, religion gives people identity by positing a basic distinction between believers and non believers, between a superior in group and a different and inferior out-group."⁶³

He further establishes his point of view that

"Religion is a central defining characteristic of civilizations, and, as Christopher Dawson said, "the great religions are the foundations on which the great civilizations rest." Of Weber's five "world religions," four - Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism - are associated with major civilizations. The fifth, Budhaism is not."⁶⁴

Huntington claims that there is no common ground between Islam and Western Christian ideologies and confrontation between them is inevitable. Along these same lines he explains the causes of this outgoing pattern of conflict. He argues that

"The causes of this outgoing pattern of conflict lie not in transitory phenomena such as twelfth-century Muslim fundamentalism. They flow from the nature of the two religions and civilizations based on them. Conflict was, on the one hand, a product of difference, particularly the Muslim concept of Islam as a way of life transcending and uniting religion and politics versus the western Christian concept of the separate realms of God and Caesar. The conflict also stemmed, however, from their similarities. Both are monotheistic religions, which, unlike polytheistic ones cannot easily assimilate additional deities, and which see the world in dualistic, us-and-them terms. Both are universalistic, claiming to be the one true faith to which all humans can adhere. Both are missionary religions believing that their adherents have no obligation to convert nonbelievers to that one true faith. From its origins Islam expanded by conquest and when the opportunity existed Christianity also. The parallel concepts of "jihad" and "crusade" not only resemble each other but distinguish these two faiths from other major world religions."⁶⁵

Huntington retorts, "It is human to hate." Humans require identity, and they acquire it, says Huntington, through the enemies they choose. With the collapse of Cold War enmities, new forms of identity will inevitably be constructed upon new patterns of hostility. Differences of religion, says Huntington, will provide the needed template for the clashes to come.

"The late twentieth century has seen a global resurgence of religions around the world (see PP. 95-101.). That resurgence has involved the intensification of religious consciousness and the rise of fundamentalist movements. It has thus reinforced the differences among religions."⁶⁶

62 Samuel (.Huntington, *The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order*, 42.

63 Ibid., 97.

64 Ibid., 47.

65 Samuel P.Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 210-211. ⁶⁶Ibid, 64.

Huntington argues that the emphasis continues to be on religions and claims that the reassertion of age-old religious and ethnic identities has led to a clash of civilizations.

"The philosophical assumptions, underlying values, social relations, customs, and overall outlooks on life differ significantly among civilizations. The revitalization of religion throughout much of the world is reinforcing these cultural differences." ⁶⁷

He adds:

"The renewal of religion throughout the world far transcends the activities of fundamentalist extremists. In society after society it manifests itself in the daily lives and work of people and concerns and projects of governments. The cultural resurgence in the secular Confucian culture takes the form of the affirmation of Asian values but, in the rest of world manifests itself in the affirmation of religious values. The "unsecularization of the world", as George Weigel remarked "is one of the dominant social facts in the late twentieth century"⁶⁸

In his article, He writes:

"The processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity. In much of the world religion has moved in to fill this gap, often in the form of movements that are labeled "fundamentalist." Such movements are found in Western Christianity, Judaism, Buddhism and Hinduism, as well as in Islam. In most countries and most religions the people active in fundamentalist movements are young, college-educated, middle-class technicians, professionals and business persons. The "unsecularization of the world," George Weigel has remarked, "is one of the dominant social factors of life in the late twentieth century." The revival of religion, "la revanche de Dieu," as Gilles Kepel labeled it, provides a basis for identity and commitment that transcends national boundaries and unites civilizations."⁶⁹

The French religious sociologist, Gilles Kepel, voices his opinion in his French book *La Revanche de Dieu* ⁷⁰ (God's Revenge). American's like Weigel and Huntington share his view. In *La Revanche de Dieu*, he offers a compelling account of the resurgence of religious belief in the modern world. His focus is radical movements within Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. This work delves into the history of modern revivalist movements in Christianity, Islam, and Judaism. The author analyzes the causes and the methods that these movements employed to accomplish their goals. They all called people to return to God and to reject secularization and modernism. In Chapter One, he discusses the history of the emergence of Islamic movements and their encounters with their governments, especially from the second half of the twentieth century.

In Chapter Two, Kepel traces the history of re-Christianization in Europe from 1950 onward. Chapter Three focuses on the roles played by American televangelists in re-Christianizing America. In Chapter Four, Kepel elaborates how re-Judaization began in the 1970's through Jewish movements.

Kepel argues that all these movements have one common goal: the rejection of secularism. While both the Islamists and Gush Emunim resorted to violence to *re-Islamize* and *re-Judaize* from above and rejected democracy as a political option, Christian movements did not use violence to re-Christianize the community. Rather, they accepted the dichotomy of separation between the state and the church and recognized democracy as a preferable system of government.

67 Ibid., 28

68 Ibid., 96

69 Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 96. 7° Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," 26.

70 Gilles Kepel, *The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism in the Modern World* trans. Alan Barley (University Park, Pennsylvania: Penn State University Press, 1994). [Originally published in French as *La Revanche de Dieu. Chrétiens, fells et musulmans a la reconquete du monde* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1991).1

Huntington refers that

"This revival, la revanche de Dieu, Gilles Kepel termed it, has pervaded every continent, every civilization, and virtually every country. In the mid-1970s, as Kepel observes, that trend toward secularization and toward the accommodation of religion with secularism "went into reverse. A new religious approach took shape, aimed no longer at adapting to secular values but at recovering a sacred foundation for the organization of society-by changing society if necessary. Expressed in a multitude of ways, this approach advocated moving on from a modernism that had failed, attributing its set backs and dead ends to separation from God. The theme was no longer aggiornamento but a 'second evangelization of Europe', the aim was no longer to modernize Islam but to 'Islamize modernity.'" "This religious revival has in part involved expansion by some religions, which gained new recruits in societies where they had previously not had them. To a much larger extent, however, the religious resurgence involved people returning to, reinvigorating, and giving new meaning to the traditional religious of their communities. Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Orthodoxy, all experienced new surges in commitment, relevance, and practice by erstwhile casual believers." ⁷¹

Samuel Huntington states:

"The late 20th century has seen the global resurgence of religions around the world". ⁷²

He further adds:

"In the modern world, religion is a central, perhaps the central, force that motivates and mobilizes people." ⁷³

Karen Armstrong, a former nun and best-selling author, also writes:

"One of the most startling developments of the late 20th century has been the emergence within every major religious tradition of a militant piety known as 'fundamentalism.' Its Manifestations are sometimes shocking." ⁷⁴

She is of the opinion:

"In the late 1970s, fundamentalists began to rebel against this secular hegemony that started to wrest religion out of its marginal position back to center stage. In this, at least, they have enjoyed remarkable success. Religion has once again become a force that no government can safely ignore. Fundamentalism has suffered defeats, but it is by no means quiescent." ⁷⁵

Major changes have occurred in global politics over the course of the past decade. Huntington presents a more detailed description that

"...in the past decade or so there has been a tremendous resurgence of religion in societies all over the world. During the twentieth century, a secular century, Lenin, Attaturk, Nehru, Ben Gurion, and the Shah all defined the identity of their countries in the secular century's modern terms. That has changed. The Shah is gone. The Soviet Union is gone, and in its place is a Russia that in public statements identifies itself quite explicitly with Russian Orthodoxy. In Turkey, India, and Israel, major political movements are challenging the secular definition of national identity. Politicians in many societies have found that religion either is crucial to maintaining their legitimacy as rulers or must be suppressed because it presents a challenge to that legitimacy.)" ⁷⁶

⁷¹ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, 95-96.

⁷² Ibid., 64.

⁷³ Ibid., 66

⁷⁴ Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam* (London: Harper Perennial, 2004) ix.

⁷⁵ Karen Armstrong, *The Battle for God: Fundamentalism in Judaism, Christianity and Islam*, ix, x.

⁷⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *Religion, Culture, and International Conflict After September 11*, ed. Michael Cromartie (14 June 2002), 1-2. http://www.eppc.org/docLib/20030504_CenterConversation14.pdt

Huntington, in 2007, pushes his argument further:

"I don't suggest that the West is uniform. Obviously there are divisions within the West and divisions within Islam. *There* are different sects, different communities, different countries. So neither Islam nor the West is homogenous at all. I don't think it is all that useful to think in terms of two solid blocs. But there is still commonality within. People everywhere talk about Islam and the West. Presumably that has some relationship to reality and has some meaning. Of course, the core of that reality is differences in religion."⁷⁷

When Huntington speaks of the "clash of civilizations," what he really means is the "clash of religions" the clash of the great religions.

The cause of Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' lies in:

- The revitalization of religion throughout much of the world.
- The unsecularization of the world.
- The reaction of an ancient revival against Judo-Christian heritage.
- The problem within Abrahamic Faiths.
- The conflict of Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, and Confucianism.

A principal difficulty with Huntington's formulation is that, having reintroduced these factors to thinking about the clash of civilizations, he *overstated* their role. He emphasizes differences in religions. The question of clash of civilizations has thus re-emerged in the discourse of international affairs, but as a conflict of religions. But this is only one part of the reality. These observations have no doubt some truth, though perhaps not entirely in the way Huntington envisages. For example, although there are distinctive differences of doctrine, law, institutions, and values among Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, there are also a host of similarities. They all see themselves as children of Abraham, are monotheists, believe in prophet hood and divine revelation, and have a concept of moral responsibility and accountability. This hared perspective has been recognized by the notion of Abrahamic faith. Although major historic clashes and violent confrontations have occurred, they do not represent the total picture. Moreover, when clash theorists see religion as a driving force, they invariably assume that it will *lead* to conflict. But there are, of course, multiple reasons for conflict (I will sketch a counter-proposal in the next chapters). The ways in which people understand the nature of religion and the relationship of religion to civilizations and societies greatly determine their pre-suppositions, expectations, and judgments. Why has the continued vitality of religious revivalism *been* underestimated? Conversely, why does it continue to be primarily perceived and responded to as a threat?

Huntington's tendency to over- emphasize religious differences was also mentioned by John L. Esposito.

"In the past the role of religion and culture was ignored or underestimated. Yet today recognition of its significance in international affairs has led to an exaggerated belief among some in an impending clash of civilizations. The clearest, most provocative, and influential articulation of this position is Samuel P. Huntington's 'Clash of Civilizations' "⁷⁸

Rushton Coulborn clearly tells a very different story, about the role of religion in civilizations, from the one Huntington suggested.

"Religion was the positive, the human-mental, agency of the primary civilized societies, and it has been so in the creation, or re-creation, of all civilized societies."⁷⁹

77 Samuel P. Huntington interviewed by Amina R. Chaudary, "Clash of Civilizations Revisited," *New Perspective Quarterly*, 24.1 (winter 2007). http://www.digitalnpq.org/archive12007_winter114_huntington.htm

⁷⁸ John L. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat Myth or Reality?* 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 0992), 228.

⁷⁹ Rushton Coulborn, *The Origin of Civilized Societies*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), 174.

Christopher Dawson is of the view is that the great religions are the foundations of the great civilizations but t modern western civilization has lost its religion.

"We are only just beginning to understand how intimately and profoundly the vitality of a society is bound up with its religion. It is the religious impulse which supplies the cohesive force which unifies a society and a culture. The great civilizations of the world do not produce the great religions as a kind of cultural by-product; in a very real sense, the great religions are the foundations on which the great civilizations rest. A society which has lost its religion becomes sooner or later a society which has lost its culture. What then is to be the fate of this great modern civilization of ours? A civilization which has gained an extension and a wealth of power and knowledge which the world has never known before."⁸⁰

In 1990 Bernard Lewis declared the clash of civilizations as "irrational"⁸¹ clash and in 1993 Huntington isolated Religion from other cultural fields and studied its revival separately. Perhaps it ought to be emphasized that such a sharp delineation of the domain of religion is strictly a product of the theoretical approach to culture. Culture experiences no such sharp divisions. In the words of Karl Mannheim

"We find ourselves confronted by the problem of rationalism and irrationalism, or better, the question whether and how the a-theoretical can be `translated' into theory; this is the central problem of philosophy today, and, as we see, it is equally crucial for the methodology of the cultural sciences."⁸²

In fact, Religious phenomenon is neither theoretical nor irrational. As Karl Mannheim discussed that "Aesthetic and spiritual manifestations such as works of art and religious systems are a-theoretical and a-logical but not irrational (the latter is something entirely different from the former)."⁸³

Huntington's concern with and approach to clash of civilizations is conditioned by a perspective that sees religion in terms of sources of conflict and thus, in looking for the source of future conflicts. In terms of our conceptual framework, such a broad generalization -- if this ever was valid -- surely cannot stand the test of modern times. It would certainly be correct to say that major civilizations had been more or less profoundly influenced by major religions, but it would not be correct to see the clash of civilizations as simply an issue of religious discipline.

Huntington fails to address seriously the great diversity and differences that exist among contemporary civilizations. I think that the current social and political unrest around the globe, however, is caused less by a conflict of religions than by other factors. Civilizations and religions are evidently not identical. The basic ideas and values of all the contemporary civilizations are manifest not only in their religions, but in all the other aspects. Religion is only one aspect of the most of contemporary civilizations and cannot give its name to the whole; we are no more and no less entitled to speak of `Christian civilization' than of `Western' or `Hindu civilizations' than of `Indian civilization'. All the contemporary civilizations are not distinctively defined or established by its religion as it is with the Islamic civilization.

Within the history of religions, for instance, we have certain stages which enable us to say that there is a wave of resurgence; but if we want to account for the cause of the clash of civilizations, we must go beyond the "revival of religions". While in Huntington`s `clash of civilizations', certain experiential wholes, the comprehensive `wholes' of the civilizations, are necessarily neglected as a result of an overemphasis on the abstractive procedure of religious revival. According to Karl Mannheim;

"...for the cultural sciences, the concrete experiential wholes neglected in the interests of abstraction always remain a problem."⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Christopher Dawson, *The Dynamics of World History* ed. Mulloy, John J. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1956), 128.

⁸¹ Bernard Lewis, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," 60.

⁸² Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*, ed. Paul Kecskemeti (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 39.

⁸³ Ibid.41

⁸⁴ Karl Mannheim, *Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge*,36..

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