

SOCIAL EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION POLICY IN INDONESIA

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Abstract

This paper will discuss the social position of the “lower Indonesia,” which consists of peasants, workers, and informal sectors, or 70% of Indonesia’s 240 million people. During the Dutch colonial era, Indonesians were excluded and deemed as a third stratum below the Dutch/Europeans along with the Arabs and Chinese. This is due to the fact that a caste-like stratification system prevailed throughout that era. Recently, there has been an alteration regarding the opening of social stratification. However, the majority of people remain excluded. With enactments of policy inclusion, such as quotas, that would provide sufficient access, the majority and lower Indonesia will always stay marginalized in rigid social stratification. This social condition might result in improper implementation of social justice.

Keywords: Exclusion, Marginalization, Inclusion Policy, Quota, Vertical mobility, Social Transformation

1. Introduction

In their histories, numerous societies experience a social process that results in social exclusion, for example slavery or colonialism. Social exclusion often involves the state with its rules and organization, which leads to difficulties eliminating such exclusion. Social exclusion in developed countries is mostly directed toward minorities (the poor, immigrants) (Byrne, 2005) while in developing countries it occurs to the majority at the bottom of the social pyramid (see also Sen, 2000; Saith, 2001). This paper will focus on social exclusion experienced by the majority of Indonesian people, which is the lower strata (peasants, laborers, informal sectors) that comprises approximately 70% of the Indonesian people in relation to their access to welfare. It will also concentrate on furthering the aspirations of these people as well as their representation in politics and social life. This situation of social exclusion is shown in the low vertical social mobility, where social positions in the middle and upper strata are mostly filled by those with middle and upper strata backgrounds. Social exclusion in Indonesia is influenced by the historical-cultural factors and social structure which created the lower strata with a low quality of life. The following discussion will illustrate how the historical, ideological and structural aspects of Indonesian society can result in a complex configuration that prevents the inclusion of the majority lower strata.

2. Historical and Cultural Factors

Historically, Indonesian society is a merger of local society and culture with several major societies and cultures, such as Hindu-Buddhist, Chinese, Islamic, and Western/European. This mixture makes Indonesia a “Carrefour” of cultures. (Lombard, 2000a, 2000b, 2000c). The formation of society was further crystallized with the large influence of the Dutch, which resulted in caste-like stratification (especially in Java) with the Dutch/Europeans as the higher strata, Orientals (Chinese & Arabian) as middle, and the locals as the lower strata (Wertheim, 1956, pp. 135-140). This situation ended in 1942, when the Dutch were defeated by Japan, and Indonesia declared its independence in 1945. Aside from the transformations of society and culture, competition among various ideologies has also arisen since the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, there was competition among the secular nationalist, communist, and Islamic ideologies; each of these ideologies was equipped with its own social organizations, including political parties.

The three ideologies have their own specific views on the social groups in the society. For example, the nationalist group was more inclusive and often shared a different view from the exclusive Islamic group. This group put less emphasis on the vertical aspects, such as social class, despite an opinion by their prominent figure, Sukarno, who had divided the society into two groups: the not-poor and the poor (*Marhaen*) (Sukarno, 1970, pp. 154-161). The poor category was based on his views of small farmers or “petite bourgeoisie,” and the scope was extended to cover all the poor people. However, there was no systematic strategy for social transformation even though Sukarno thought that the enemy comes in the form of neo-colonialism and neo-imperialism. Meanwhile, the Islamic groups were initially transnational, welcoming Moslems from other (colonized) countries.

The conception of these Islamic groups was more horizontal, with an in-group and out-group that is based more on religion (Islam) than social standing. They emphasized less the vertical aspects, such as strata, even though the marginal groups had in fact gained their attention. In the 1920s, the dominant Islamic organization (League of Islam) was infiltrated by the communists, breaking them into two groups with the name of League of White under Cokroaminoto's leadership, which remained Islamic, and League of Red, a pro-communist group (Shiraishi, 1990).

The communist groups, especially the PKI (The Indonesian Communist Party), always utilize class in their activities. They set up political parties that consist of disciplined cadres as well as a number of mass organizations. In line with their ideology, they performed radical activities and experienced conflict with the state. In 1926-1927 they rebelled against the Dutch government in Java and West Sumatra (McVey, 2006). It was an unsuccessful attempt, resulting in the dissolution of the PKI and actions taken against the members. During the Japanese colonialism (1942-1945), the PKI was not included, along with the nationalist and Islamic groups, in the preparation for the independence of Indonesia. Moreover, the PKI's rebellion and coup d'état efforts also occurred in 1948 against the Indonesian government, which at that time was fighting against the Dutch, who intended to colonize the country once again (Kahin, 2003: pp. 256-303). Although this coup d'état failed, the PKI gained amnesty and they were allowed to resume their political activities. In the first general election in 1955, the PKI became the fourth largest party after the PNI (Nationalist), NU (Traditional Islam), and Masyumi (Modernist Islam).

Following the independence of Indonesia, there were competitions between various groups and organizations that can be classified into three types: nationalist, Islamic, and communist. However, following the PKI's failed coup d'état in 1948, the Indonesian government grew cautious about the PKI and communism. Nevertheless, strata or vertical politics were overshadowed by spatial politics or local central integration issues through the influence of various states, such as efforts of the Dutch to weaken Indonesia. At that time, state policies emphasized more the need of national unity, and an "invention of history" was conducted in order to enforce unity. The first effort was by commemorating *Hari Kebangkitan Nasional* (National Awakening Day) in 1948 even though that term refers to the official announcement of Budi Utomo (A Javanese organization) in 1908. This effort was carried out as the result of tension between the PKI and non-PKI groups (Toer et al., 2003, pp. 188-189; Abdullah, 2001, p. 26). Moreover, commemoration of *Sumpah Pemuda* (Youth Oath) in 1958, which referred to an event that took place in 1928, was also conducted (Foulcher, 2000, p. 28).

In 1928, various local youth organizations in the Dutch colony made an oath that they were one nation, one fatherland, and one language—that is *Bahasa Indonesia*. Various state policies in 1950-1960 were also filled with military operations to avoid separatism and primordial conflicts (Kuntjoro-Jakti and Simatupang, 1987). At that time Indonesia, like other new states, experienced competitions and conflicts based on primordial sentiments in the context of "The Integrative Revolution" (Geertz, 1973, pp. 255-310). Aside from history, Indonesia's vertical social structure, which is based on religion and ethnicity, also contributed to minimizing the role of vertical groups. In the political field, religious (Islamic) or nationalism (elitist, not populist) political parties played a dominant role compared to strata-based political parties (peasants and labors). This situation is similar that of other countries with Islam as the majority. In various general elections, non-Islamic groups (Protestant and Catholic) often merge in a number of secular nationalist parties.

3.State Policies

During the era of Dutch colonialism, efforts to support the aspirations of the lower strata were carried out on a minimum level despite the fact that the lower strata had been extended to cover all indigenous people, excluding the aristocrats and the Christians. Furthermore, suspicions remained strong with the presence of mobilization and rebellious efforts by the PKI during 1926-1927, which supported class politics. Additionally, horizontal movements by Islamic groups such as Sarekat Islam (League of Islam), which gained support from the lower Islamic groups such as farmers and traders, have made the Dutch more resistant to them when compared to the local intellectual group, which gained limited support. The Dutch conducted a "containment strategy" for Islamic communities by supporting customary community and laws (Hefner, 2005, p. 90). This Dutch strategy resulted in the exclusion of Moslems, who were the majority consisting mostly of peasants and laborers. The following state policies still emphasize less vertical inclusion in politics by the government, especially president Sukarno, who had two big projects. First was the integration of Papua, which was still under the Dutch colony in 1962-1963.

The next project was the resistance against Malaysia, which was considered a British puppet country in 1964-1965. These national projects that might be able to increase nationalism dominated the end of President Sukarno's government. At that time state politics also had a strong class dimension with the Land Reform Act despite the large number of obstacles. The Indonesian Communist Party, or PKI, which supported class politics at that point, performed a "revolutionary gymnastic" and took the opportunity to exploit the land reform issue (Mortimer, 1974; Tornquist, 1984). The PKI's vertical efforts faced resistance from the non-PKI, and this resulted in a horizontal conflict between the PKI, which was viewed as atheist, and the non-PKI, which was led by Islamic political parties and mass organizations. In a number of local areas that were not dominated by Islam, such as Bali, horizontal conflicts occurred between the PKI and the PNI, or nationalist party.

The political and social configuration changed drastically with the failed coup d'état attempt in 1965 that resulted in a politicide of the leaders and members as well as the sympathizers, or those who were accused of being PKI, and also the dissolution of the PKI. In President Suharto's era (1966-1998), anything related to the PKI and communism was restricted and violators were subjected to punishment. At that time, even the concept of class was considered a political taboo. If one talked of class it meant communism, PKI, and this could lead to political and legal problems. Even the translation of Ralf Dahrendorf's book *Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society* was translated in Indonesian as *Conflict and Conflict in Industrial Society*.

State policies in Suharto's era had not only restricted class politics but they also limited Islamic parties, allowing only one Islamic party that is controlled by the government. However, there were state policies related to the lower strata in Suharto's era. First, there was a co-optation of the lower strata through the state corporatism strategy such as a farmer's association (HKTI) and a labor union (SPSI). These organizations had symbolic representatives, including in parliament, but they were controlled by Golkar as the ruling party and led by Suharto. Second, there was also a semi populist strategy that supported health and education for the lower strata as well as poverty reduction. These policies were considered successful as they had decreased the number of poor people and had increased the level of education and health services for the lower strata.

In every development there were successful results, but direct efforts to lift the lower strata as the majority are still insufficient. This development policy is still more technocratic or elitist, unresponsive to the majority. This occurred as a result of an indistinct state welfare strategy, whereas the private sector, as well as the market, was unable or not willing to implement this issue. State policies in the Reform Era still have not discussed inclusion of the lower strata and focus more on decreasing the role of the presidency, which was regarded as too powerful during the time of Suharto and Sukarno. This situation can be illustrated in the four amendments enacted from 1999 to 2001. Unlike the transformation in the political sphere, the transformation in social structure was a non-issue in the four amendments. The issue of social inclusion is often related to social justice and welfare. In the Constitution of 1945, social welfare is mentioned in Chapter XIV, especially in section 34 (in the fourth amendment, 2002). This issue also includes access and opportunity for many groups in the society to have a better quality of life. In general, the amended Constitution of 1945 is less inclusive because it does not explicitly state the vertical and horizontal social groups. Inclusion would show that these groups are acknowledged and respected.

Although the majority of Indonesian citizens lives in villages and work in the agricultural sector (60%), the concept of peasants or farmers is not mentioned in the Constitution of 1945. In fact, this condition is not much different than the constitutions of other countries, with only 9% of them (13 out of 138) stating the term "farmers" and only 4% (6 out of 138) stating "peasants" (Sudjatmiko, 2007). The inclusion of a farmer's group and village community in the Constitution will help boost the urgency to create various policies which aim to improve their quality of life in economic, legal and political aspects. The terms labor or worker are not stated in the amended Constitution while they are stated in many constitutions: 73% (92 out of 126) use the term *labor* and 31% (40 out of 126) use the term *worker*. A new regime after the 1998 reform changed authoritarian presidentialism to a democratic form but with less power. The current democracy, with a legislature heavy with fragmented parties and loose coalitions, resulted in many deadlocks. Moreover, the decentralization that gives more power to regencies is more elitist than populist, and in regions the lower majority is still excluded.

An attempt to build political parties based on peasants or labor was unsuccessful. In the 2001 and 2004 general elections there were labor parties but none of them got their share in parliament. The free general elections in 2001 and 2004 were similar to the election of 1955 when labor parties lost to parties based on Islam and Nationalism.

This is a general phenomenon in countries with Moslem majorities where vertical solidarity and identity based on Islam are stronger than those of class (communism). The social inclusion of the majority is historically hampered by the horizontal structure where religion or “stream politics” is more dominant while vertical or class politics becomes a peripheral phenomenon. In a more democratic Indonesia since 1998, the roles of existing parties (Nationalist secular and Islam) experienced and preserved oligarchic tendencies. This situation resulted in the exclusion of the lower strata in both the nationalist and Islamic parties. To sum up, horizontal identity and solidarity with religion (Islam) is stronger than vertical attachment to class and general elections and formal politics based on class always lost in Indonesia. Moreover, the absence of the lower strata in politics and political parties is still apparent. For example, most of the dominant parties do not have a division of political wings that consists of peasants, labor or informal sectors despite the fact that they have strong youth or women’s divisions. This also occurs in major Islamic organizations such as NU although during the conflict with the PKI in the 1960s, the NU had peasant and labor wings. It seems that there should be efforts to include vertical politics in dominant political parties and social organizations.

A similar situation happened in other institutions such as schools and workplaces where free education and the labor market do not provide quotas for the lower strata. It is similar to a free but unfair market where the small-scale actors should be protected and the big ones (monopolies) should be prevented. Moreover, the existing dominant policy is poverty eradication without systematic efforts to support social climbing to the lower strata. Although the number of the poor has been significantly reduced, they are still in the lower strata and their social climbing (intragenerational mobility) or their children’s (intergenerational mobility) have not significantly increased (Sujatmiko, 1996). Presently, Indonesia is experiencing a situation where the middle and upper strata have greater access while the lower ones are excluded.

4. The Inclusion Policy

The previous discussion shows that historical and structural factors in Indonesia contributed to the persistence of the exclusion policy of the lower strata. The avoidance of vertical classes, which is always associated with communism or PKI, has hampered social inclusion of lower strata. Moreover, the existing state ideology (*Pancasila*) still does not offer a systematic model or indicator and is considered technocratic or even elitist. Another model offered by some Islamic groups has begun to offer models to assist the lower strata (particularly the Moslems) through an economic system such as *Syariah* economy. Indonesia can reduce social exclusion by recognizing that the lower strata are not always associated with communism. With the fall of communist ideology and the availability of noncommunist paradigms, such as populism and socialism, aiming to make structural transformations, the negative views on class should be abolished. Moreover, Indonesia has to redefine the state ideology of Pancasila (the five principles, One God, Humanism, Unity, People Sovereignty or Democracy, and Social Justice). There should be emphasis on the social justice principle, which is now always narrowly defined as social welfare, by stating that social justice includes social inclusion and vertical social mobilization.

In order to include the majority of Indonesian people, there are some important points to be considered: first, the strategy of polarization, contradiction and violent revolution conducted by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) or similar models will not work, considering its social context and moral implication; second, the existing status quo policy since the era of Sukarno and Suharto which ignored the inclusion and vertical mobility of the lower majority that sustained social exclusion and discrimination should be discontinued; third, a model and policy that give a proportional share as well as a win-win situation, such as a quota or affirmative action for lower Indonesia, can become a realistic and workable solution. To a certain extent these policies have been applied in India (Kolenda, 1985) and Malaysia (Borthwick, 1992) even though these countries had to make some adjustments during their implementations. The issue of social quotas is controversial and there are arguments for supporting and opposing this affirmative action philosophy and policy (see Beckwith and Jones, 1997).

In this situation, the middle and upper strata can still have their access to social resources, but they have to provide most of them to the majority, particularly for positions in state universities and state bureaucracy. The policy should also be applied in political parties and mass organizations in order to provide more access and to support social mobility and transformation. This proportional model avoids violence and is similar to the principle of sampling in statistics. It might result in social transformation with social continuity as well as order for the whole society, and this vertical inclusion can reduce horizontal primordial tensions and conflicts. Moreover, this policy is not contrary to meritocracy since it is an “empirical meritocracy” based on the real and measurable capacity of individuals’ social position (stratification).

It is similar to athletes in boxing competitions who are divided and awarded medals according to their real capabilities (body weights). Thus, athletes who have gained more weight should move to the upper class and compete with those who are in that class. Following the 1998 reformation, there was actually a chance to create state policies that grant opportunities to this group, such as:

4.1. Constitutional Inclusion

As a comparison, the issue of lower strata inclusion as shown in constitutions has been applied in India and Malaysia. The Indian Constitution gives opportunities to the lower strata (“Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, and Backward classes”) as mentioned in Part XVI (section 330 to 342). In the constitution, this group has its own quota (in accordance to their proportion in state) for a place in the parliament, bureaucracy and university (Government of India, Ministry of Law and Justice, 2007, pp. 200-211). In the Malaysian Constitution (section 153, article 2) the quotas are granted to the majorities in the lower strata who are mostly Malays and the natives of Sabah and Sarawak to safeguard the special position of the Malays and natives of any the States of Sabah and Sarawak and to ensure the reservation for Malays and natives of the States of Sabah and Sarawak of such proportion as he may deem reasonable of positions in the public service (other than the public service of a State) and of scholarships, exhibitions and other similar educational or training privileges or special facilities given or accorded by the Federal Government and, when any permit or license for the operation of any trade or business is required by federal law. (Office of the Commissioner of Law Revision, 1988, p. 145) Discussions of the opportunity of vertical mobility through quotas in the Constitution will transform the society into a more open structure. In this matter, the role of the Constitution is crucial as a guide for a community structure transformation that will move toward a new and better community. An analysis by Chua (2004, p. 10) indicates how the presence of democracy and the development of a market without an improvement in the community structure will bring a backlash to marginalized groups, both the minority as well as the majority.

4.2. Political Inclusion

Inclusion of the lower strata in the Constitution should be followed up by granting members of those strata the opportunities to be represented in political parties and parliament. Actually, in 1946, president Soekarno included and gave quotas for “large groups” (peasants and laborers) in the Indonesian parliament (KNIP). The peasants got 30 seats while the laborers had 40 seats; however, this effort did not result in a significant impact to those groups (Noer & Akbarsyah, 2005, pp. 94-95). Moreover, it is necessary in the parliament to set up a commission that specifically discusses this group as the presently existing commissions are more sector based. Regarding this issue, large-scale political parties are advised to grant opportunities to their cadres that belong to the lower strata. Ever since the 2001 and 2004 general elections in the Reform Era, the number of national parliament members that came from the lower strata was extremely small, less than 5%. Furthermore, it is necessary for political parties to set up a wing or division as a representation of their group, such as a youth or women’s wing, that are usually present in political parties. Political parties’ budget and agenda must also focus on this lower strata group.

4.3. Mass Organizations Inclusion

The lower strata inclusion should also be applied to social organizations in Indonesia, especially Islamic organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah with members numbering around 60-70% of the Indonesian Moslem. Up until now, organizations in these groups are based more on scholars, youth, and women. Therefore, the lower strata also require attention from the budget and agenda of this social organization. This situation can strengthen and support the political system as previously discussed. In other words, aside from the supra structure the political interest of the lower strata can also be represented in the infrastructure.

4.4. Economic Inclusion

Those in the lower strata can be included in the economic field; laborers can be granted access to capital in the ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Program). A similar pattern is also valid for landless peasants with the land reform program or economic cooperation between small and big companies. Indigenous or local people may also be included by granting those shares should there be natural resources around their community, such as oil and mines. Up until now, they are excluded from opportunities of gaining benefits from the natural resources surrounding them. In many cases, they are included through community development programs where there are changes *in* community, but not *of* community. The programs serve the community with support and facility only, but do not transform their status from non-owners to owners. In this case, a vertical social mobility did not occur, where they (or their children) will have better access to ascend to higher social strata.

4.5. Education and Job Inclusion

Inclusion of the lower strata needs to be implemented in the education and job fields, which can function as social escalators. Without granting equal opportunity, an unbalanced competition similar to the economic market that cannot protect the small traders or limit large scale companies could happen. Competition in quota should be balanced just like boxers that fight according to their class (weight), not in a free class where everyone has an opportunity to win. The priorities of this opportunity (quota) are state universities and jobs in the government, such as in the bureaucracy and state corporations. This idea can also be recommended to private universities and corporations, but they can still have the power to consider the commercial aspect and competency of the candidates. The primary criteria in this quota are the social stratum that can be combined with gender, religion or ethnicity. Nonetheless, this opportunity must be made with a specific time span, say 10 years, before adjustments are made.

4.6. Media and Literature Inclusion

The situation of the lower strata that experience limited access in various fields can actually be presented by media, especially television. The lives and difficulties of the lower strata as well as the absence of state policies supporting them can be seen through the media. However, up until now the media do not have an agenda to support the social inclusion of these lower strata groups. Their appearance in the media acts more as a background and complement to the actors in a community context that is dominated by the middle and upper strata. In this case, the media have failed to provide a sense of urgency that social inclusion and transformation of the lower strata majority need. Moreover, issues of social exclusions are not widely discussed in the literature or social novels which can actually provide information to shape the consciousness of people, particularly children. Learning about social exclusion and the gap between social classes will raise awareness of children of the middle and upper strata concerning the issue that they have to face in the future. Hopefully, they will then think and act to alleviate this social gap by providing quotas in their future corporations or organizations. On the other hand, social-gap awareness in children of the lower strata will result in some efforts toward social improvement through a number of existing inclusion policies and programs. These children will become more optimistic and aware in demanding their rights of an equal opportunity as well as open stratification for their future social life.

4.7. Policy Study Inclusion

Many studies in public policies focus more on programs that do not pay much attention to structural transformation or a just access to resources for the lower strata. To date, policy programs aim more to fix social actors/groups without accompanying them with efforts for a distinct structural transformation. The “structural adjustment” concept is more popular than “structural transformation” that grants opportunities to the lower strata. In various programs, the main subject is often the less fortunate marginal group (such as the poor group), yet they do not cover the majority group that may not be categorized as poor but are relatively little above the poverty line. A similar situation occurs in universities, where inclusion of the lower strata is not widely discussed—compared to the explanation of social stratification—in teaching, curriculum, books and research agenda.

4.8. International Support

The domestic weaknesses related to macro social inclusion are less supported by the international community, both by the foreign countries as well as international agencies/institutes such as the World Bank, IMF or UNDP. Most of their development programs are often more technocratic, moderate and safeguarded from radical transformations that might disturb these programs. Development programs such as good governance can be said to improve the situation of social actors or groups but support the status quo social system or community structure. Up until now, there has not been a long-term agenda from programs of foreign agencies to increase the inclusion of the lower strata or to implement structural transformation. Thus far, programs from international agencies still focus more on social inclusion of the minority group. In other words, it seems as if globalization does not systematically contribute to vertical social inclusion and structural transformation that aim to give the lower strata a bigger participation in all aspects of society.

Indonesia has experienced decolonization, industrialization, urbanization, globalization, and information eras; however, without an inclusive policy supported by the state and social organizations, Indonesia will not have a real social transformation and social justice. There is still a rigid social stratification that discriminates and hampers freedom, democratization, economic progress, ethno-religious harmony, and human development.

5. Concluding Remarks

The previous discussion on social exclusion and policy inclusion in Indonesia can enrich our understanding of those two concepts. There are four important remarks: first, inclusion must be seen in a long historical context that includes the precolonial era, colonialism and the formation of nation states. Second, the theoretical analysis of exclusion and its subsequent policy recommendation are mostly concerned with minority groups and this focus should be extended to majority groups. Third, exclusion has also a regional dimension where the central state (capital, Jakarta) has more power to exclude local states in regard to natural resources and local political parties. Fourth, inclusion policies should integrate the vertical, horizontal, and regional dimensions. The policy choices are not easy since Indonesia and many developing countries simultaneously experience social transformation and conflicts after decolonization.

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