

## Question of Strategy in Counter-Terrorism: “Turkish Case”

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### Abstract

Many academic institutions and individuals throughout the world studied the intellectual framework for developing counter-terrorism strategies in different countries. In the first quarter of the twenty-first century, international terrorism still remains as a vital threat to national and global security interests. Turkey has experienced sporadic and relentless subnational and government-sponsored terrorism for decades. Terrorism, which has been an instrument of foreign policy for a long time, now challenges the world's order and system, especially in and around the Middle East. Coping with all forms of terrorism requires effective national, regional, and global effort. Turkey has experienced terrorism from ideological, religious, and ethnic sources. The Kurds, Marxists, and Islamic fundamentalists have posed the main threats. In this study, we solely focus on the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), the greatest threat posed by terrorists in Turkey. The purpose of this study is to offer an alternative counter-terrorism strategy based on the soft-power approach by examining the Turkish case: the fight against PKK.

**Key Words:** Terror, Counter-terror, Strategy, Turkey, PKK.

### Introduction

After the Cold War, conventional threat was drastically removed from international agenda. Security challenges all around the world now mostly result from some global problems such as economic depression, political pressure, famine, high population increase, ethnic differences, environmental damages, terror, crime and illnesses<sup>1</sup>. Since 1980s, civilians have also been the targets of terrorist activities as in the example of the PKK. As it can be seen in the example of global terror, most of today's problems and threats do not have identity and they are unpredictable, unsolid, and unethical, without land and beyond borders. Starting from the 19th century until today, terror has certainly been increasing. There are two characteristics that differentiate terror in the second half of the 20th century from the terror types that have damaged the world before<sup>2</sup>. One of them is that terror has been predominantly used by separatists and extremists or by political movements.

The second characteristic is that terror holds a place as an intervention method on the international arena by enabling countries to intervene in the internal affairs of another country. Terrorism is a strategy that may be used by individuals, groups or states for different purposes. In other words, terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or a group, whether acting for or in opposition to established authority, when such action is designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group larger than the immediate victims with purpose of coercing that group into acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators.<sup>3</sup> As Mao states, every war has its own special conditions and success requires a strategy that is in accordance with these conditions<sup>4</sup>. Nevertheless, there are lots of common lessons that could be learned from war against terror. In this study, the aim is to explain theoretical foundations of the strategy problem within the concept of fighting against terror; this point will be set out by focusing on the relationship between terror and state; and terror and guerilla war. In addition, in this study, strategies that Turkey put in force against the divisive terror of the PKK and their results are evaluated. In the final chapter, beneficial results for countries are introduced within the concept of the lessons learned from the fight against terror. In this context, the importance of international cooperation is emphasized.

<sup>1</sup> Ken Booth: “Security and Setting Freedom (Güvenlik ve Özgürleş(tir)me)”, Euroasia File (Avrasya Dosyası) Periodical, Special For Security Sciences (Güvenlik Bilimleri Özel), Vol.: 9, No.: 2, (Ankara, Summer 2003), p.59.

<sup>2</sup> Yevgeni M. Primakov: “September 11 and the World After Iraq Intervention (11 Eylül ve Irak’a Müdahale Sonrası Dünya)”, Trans. Fatma and Serdar Arıkan, (İstanbul: Doğan Books, 2004), p.3.

<sup>3</sup> John Weinzieri: “Terrorism: Its Origin and History”, *Understanding Terrorism Threats in an Uncertain World*, Akorlie A.Nyatepe-Coo and Dorothy Zeisler –Vralstead ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2004) p.29-49.

<sup>4</sup> Mao Tse-Tung: “On Protracted War”, (Peking, China: Foreign Language Press, 1960); Mao Tse-Tung: *An Anthology of His Writings*, Anne Fremantle, ed. (New York: New American Library, 1972), p.2.

## 1. Turkey Fighting Against the Separatist Terror:

### *Turkish Case, PKK Struggle:*

The PKK (Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan or Kurdistan Workers' Party), led by Abdullah Ocalan (currently in custody), is an insurgent movement seeking to establish an independent Kurdish state in the southeastern Turkey. This terrorist organization claims to pursue the rights of Turkey's Kurds<sup>5</sup>. According to the PKK's party program, "Kurdistan" (the lands where the PKK hopes to set up an independent state in the future) is divided by four "colonizers", namely, Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, which are also "clients of imperialism" themselves. The aim is to destroy colonization and establish an independent, democratic, and united Kurdish state<sup>6</sup>. In the aftermath of its military defeat by Turkish security forces in 1990s, the PKK has somewhat changed its rhetoric from pursuit of independence to recognition of the Kurdish identity and limited autonomy<sup>7</sup>. Kurds are estimated to represent approximately 20 percent of Turkey's 70 million people. There are no legal or other forms of discrimination against Turkish citizens of Kurdish origin that have enjoyed full political rights under the Turkish constitution. Access to the system has never really been an issue. In this regard, Turkish Kurds have risen to high levels of government in both elected and appointed positions.

Because of the terror process which started in 1984 and went on by developing and becoming more disastrous, Turkey has been kept in conditions of low-intensity conflict for 30 years<sup>8</sup>. In this period which is described as "low-intensity warfare" Turkey usually won the fight on the military front, maintaining territorial integrity and the PKK could not reach the purpose of establishing an independent state by invading territory of east and southeast. Having lost the armed struggle, the PKK emerged in the political field with a different rhetoric. The separatist PKK, which intended to establish an independent Kurdish state before Abdullah Ocalan's capture, first changed its name to KADEK and then to KONGRA-GEL with the thesis of "Turkey with two international partners". In this respect, the PKK left the motto of 'Independency' with Öcalan's capture and adopted the motto of 'democratic union'. Their current aim was to guarantee the survival of Abdullah Öcalan, recognition of Kurdish identity and cultural autonomy, and they started to use the method of civil disobedience in order to reach these aims<sup>9</sup>.

### *Turkish Fight Against PKK:*

When the PKK first struck in 1984, authorities in Ankara dismissed its adherents as common bandits without increasing so much curiosity about their leadership, bases, and supporters. The civilian authorities were clearly unprepared to handle such a responsibility in a low intensity conflict environment before securing the efficient cooperation of the Turkish military<sup>10</sup>. It has been about 30 years since the PKK first started its actions. During this 30-year-period, 35,000 people have lost their lives in Turkey because of their attacks<sup>11</sup>. There are about 200,000 people who have been injured, crippled, and whose lives have changed dramatically because they were sent to prison during this time. As seen in Chart 3, the year 1994 marks the height of the PKK's campaign<sup>12</sup>. The struggle between Turkey and the PKK have occurred as low-intensity or unconventional clashes including such countries as Iran, Syria and Iraq to a certain extent. It is not an overstatement to say that what Turkey has gone through was a Proxy war<sup>13</sup>. The Turkish defense strategy against PKK can be classified as; the period of "terrorist" activity from 1984 to 1999, and the period of "political" activity, beginning with the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999 until today.

<sup>5</sup> Gunduz S. Aktan and Ali M. Koknar: "Turkey" in Yonah Alexander (Edt.), "Combatting Terrorism Strategies of Ten Countries", (The University of Michigan Press, 2005), p.262.

<sup>6</sup> İsmet İmset: "PKK" (Ankara: Turkish Daily News Publications, (1993).

<sup>7</sup> The latest statement on the PKK claims made by the Murat Karayılan the current PKK leader. He cites the PKK's position as; "We are no longer in the pursuit of neither a sovereign state nor a federation but live with equality and freedom. We want cultural rights with Kurdish identity." Milliyet (Turkish Daily Newspaper), 08-09 May 2009: Hasan Cemal's Talk to Murat Karayılan, "Notes For the Northern Iraq".

<sup>8</sup> Fikret Bila: "What PKK? (Hangi PKK?)", 3.Press, (Ankara: Ümit Publishing, 2004), p.9.

<sup>9</sup> Fikret Bila: *ibid*, (2004), p.124.

<sup>10</sup> Mehmet Ali Kışlalı: *Güneydoğu: "The Southeast: Low-Intensity Conflict (Dusuk Yogunluklu Catisma)"*, (Ankara: Umit Publishing, 1996), 8.

<sup>11</sup> Ümit Özdağ: "PKK Operations of the Turkish Army (Türk Ordusunun PKK Operasyonları)", 5.Edt., (Ankara: Pegasus Publications, 2007), p.7.

<sup>12</sup> Suat İlhan: "(Terror: Why Turkey? Teror: Neden Türkiye?) (Ankara: Nu-Do, 1998), p.319-20.

<sup>13</sup> Anthony H. Cordesman: "Military Balance in the Middle East XVI Weapon of Mass Destruction", (Washington D.C.: CSIS, 1999), p.9.

During the period when the PKK's terrorist activities increased, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), which had prepared for a conventional war; did not assume direct responsibility, but they reinforced the Gendarmerie. With the announcement of strict precautions in 1991-1992, the TAF took control of the armed power of the PKK. However, Northern Iraq became a new shelter for the PKK<sup>14</sup>. This terrorist organization has started almost every strategic activity from Iraq, and whenever they were destroyed in Turkey, they emerged safely in Iraq. Turkey performed various operations in Iraq with air forces and armoured troops, with 50,000 soldiers in total and eventually beat the PKK militarily until the capture of Abdullah Ocalan in 1999.

Chart 3. Terrorist Incidents in Turkey

Years	Number of Incidents
1985	489
1994	6,400
1995	4,000
1996	1,500
1997	900
2000	500

Source: Gunduz S. Aktan and Ali M. Koknar: "Turkey" in Yonah Alexander (Edt.), "Combating Terrorism Strategies of Ten Countries", (The University of Michigan Press, 2005), p.262.

### **Politicization of the PKK**

In order to obtain the objectives which they could not accomplish in military ways, the defeated PKK went into the phase of politicization by abusing the process of Turkey's accession to the European Union. Turkey has gone into general elections with some political parties since 1995 such as HEP, DEP, HADEP and DEHAP which were banned afterwards for their close relations with the PKK. DTP, which is currently regarded as the political extension of the PKK, gained 5.02% of overall votes in the local elections in 2009, mostly in the east and south eastern parts of Turkey, and they won 8 mayoralties or municipal presidencies<sup>15</sup>. It is interesting to realize that they collected 65% of the votes in Diyarbakır, %73 in Hakkari, 59% in Batman and 53% of the votes in Van. DTP is still acting as a political wing of the divisive Kurdish movement<sup>16</sup>. The votes that the DTP collected in the region are accepted as an indication of the formation of a political geographical location based on ethnic elements.

On the other hand, increasing votes can mean that people are displeased with the prevailing major parties. By means of such new politics, certain demands were put forward within the framework of human rights and some political and judicial grounds were established. The main objective was to get acceptance in the pursuit of independence both in political and judicial arena. The European Union imposed some of their demands and priorities about the PKK within this period on Turkey; and this caused some parties and public to think that EU gives support to PKK<sup>17</sup>. Hence, the tactic of putting the state and the public against one another is applied under the slogan of so-called "democracy" and "cultural rights". Despite the erosion of PKK's military power to a large extent, there is no giving up or end the dream of a Kurdish state under PKK's leadership, yet by means of changing the vehicles, politicalisation and thus some cultural rights have been tried to be obtained through political ways under the shield of European Union orientation period.

### **Counter-Terrorism Strategy Implemented**

Although Turkey has faced brutal urban and rural terrorism for a long time, it has managed to preserve its western-style parliamentary democracy and the rule of law under its constitution without making significant compromises that creates disadvantages. Since 1984, the Turkish military announced that nearly 4,000 officers, noncommissioned officers, enlisted men and the national police were killed in counterterrorism operations. The cost of fighting terrorism was a huge burden to national economy.

<sup>14</sup> Ümit Özdağ: *ibid*, (2007), p.19.

<sup>15</sup> Hürriyet (Daily Turkish Newspaper): "Results of Local Elections (Yerel Seçim Sonuçları), (March 31, 2009), <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yerelsecim2009/>, (Access: 31 March 2009).

<sup>16</sup> Fikret Bila: *ibid*, (2004), p.64.

<sup>17</sup> Nihat Ali Özcan, Ö. Rengin Gün: "PKK'dan KADEK'e: Değişim mi, Takıyye mi?", *Stratejik Analiz, Aylık Uluslararası İlişkiler ve Araştırmalar Dergisi*, ASAM Yayınları, sayı 25, Mayıs 2002, s.16.

Since 1984, Turkey has spent almost \$100 billion on fighting with terrorism and used capital to vitalize the local economy in the southeastern part of the country, where only 10 percent of the population lives<sup>18</sup>. Turkish government invested more than what it collected by taxes in the southeastern part. Turkish counter-terrorism policy's backbone is "no compromise" or "no negotiation" approach. However, after Ocalan's imprisonment, Western pressure on the Turkish government has increased; they wanted Turkey to start negotiations with the PKK. Fortunately, Turkey did not take such a step, thanks to its military success and to political determination of its successive governments<sup>19</sup>. Turkish government used the "repentance law", that was passed in the 1980s. Under this law, more than 2400 terrorists yielded to security forces in order to take advantage of reduced sentences. Many repentant terrorists were "turned" into informers and actively participated in counter-terrorist operations which gave positive results.

### ***Northern Iraq, the Heaven for PKK***

After the first Gulf War, with the creation of a no-fly zone above the thirty-sixth parallel, the PKK found a safe shelter in northern Iraq; and they began to operate from there. Between the two Gulf Wars, Turkey launched air strikes and cross-border operations against PKK targets in the northern Iraq and Iran on numerous occasions, destroying bases and training camps and forcing PKK units to more remote mountainous areas, making their supply lines long and arduous. After cross border operations of Turkey, a security zone with a certain Turkish military presence in northern Iraq is built<sup>20</sup>. This strategy decreased PKK's military threat. Turkey entered into agreements with Iraqi Kurdish groups especially with Iraqi Kurdistan Democratic Party (IKDP) of Masood Barzani and Jalal Talabani's PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan). IKDP's and PUK's fighters (*pashmarga*) participate in Turkish cross-border operations against PKK bases in the northern Iraq and deny the shelters that they give to PKK terrorists in their control zones. However, today there are more than three thousand armed PKK fighters in the northern Iraq. Ankara's major worry is that the PKK will probably take advantage of the post-war instability in Iraq, and this will negatively affect the fight in a big way. Despite Turkey's military victory, the PKK continues to exercise a certain amount of political influence in southern Turkey and northern Iraq.

### ***Turkey on the way to EU and the PKK***

Turkey was forced to give many privileges that PKK and its supporters asked for in order to prove the democracy during the period of application for full membership to EU. In 2002, capital punishment in Turkey was abolished in a way including Abdullah Öcalan within these regulations. AKP governments, currently in power, made some arrangements within the adaptation reform packages of EU accession process<sup>21</sup>:

- Broadcasting in different languages and dialects, including Kurdish, has started. TRT Shesh TV Channel, broadcasting in Kurdish, started in 2009.
- The way to giving Kurdish names to children has been opened in 2003.
- State Security Courts were abolished in 2004.
- Propaganda is to be accepted as a way of offence if it supported activities of violence and terror. Thus, some judicial cases about the leading characters of HADEP and DEHAP were dismissed.
- Within the regulations of the new government, the cases and investigations which were started against the villagers who applied to have Kurdish education and for those who supported the PKK terrorists with food and clothes were also dismissed.

Although the arrangements mentioned above were made in order to fill the missing points in the EU Improvement Reports based on the Copenhagen criteria, it was a period for legalising PKK and seemed to be an advantage on the political field and to be a way to create the basis of legality according to "cultural rights". But then it turned out to be that whatever Turkey tried to do for EU, it resulted with an advantage for PKK<sup>22</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> Necip Torumtay: "Turkey at the Center of Changing Strategies (*Degisen Stratejilerin Odaginda Turkiye*) (Istanbul: Milliyet, 1996), p.233.

<sup>19</sup> USIP (U.S. Institute of Peace), Special Report: How Terrorism Ends, (Washington D.C.:USIP, 1999), p.2.

<sup>20</sup> Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu: "Experience In Counter-Terrorism: The Relevance Of The Classical Strategic Thought", Proceedings of the First International Symposium on the Global Terrorism and International Cooperation, (Ankara, March 23-24, 2006), Turkish General Staff, COE-DAT, (Ankara, 2008), p.86.

<sup>21</sup> Fikret Bila: *ibid*, (2004), p.172-173.

<sup>22</sup> Fikret Bila: *ibid*, (2004), p.167.

AKP government started an unofficial negotiation with PKK through the Kurdish groups in the northern Iraq under the pressure of U.S.A. and EU in 2008. It seems to be that these negotiations will go on in a Kurdish Conference in 2009 and PKK will try to gain new concessions like political remission to the terrorists, Kurdish language and identity in exchange for leaving the weapons<sup>23</sup>.

### ***International Cooperation in Fighting Against the PKK***

Turkish security agencies cooperated closely with their counterparts abroad, especially in the United States, Germany, and Israel. Turkish intelligence also conducted its own HUMINT gathering missions in neighbor countries and Europe, where the Kurdish terrorist organizations are the most active. These covert missions often helped to detect signals of planned terrorist activities in Turkey beforehand such as suicide bombings. Since 2008, both the support of “real time intelligence” contributed by the U.S.A. and The Turkish Air Forces’ victorious air operations based on the security intelligence of that kind have been an effective element of oppression, especially in recent times, by restricting the activities of PKK in northern Iraq. However, the terrorist attacks in Turkey have been unfortunately increasing since Iraq was invaded by the U.S.A. in 2003.

For years, the U.S. government has been understood and appreciated by the Turkish government. Turkey’s European allies didn’t have the same opinion on the issue of the PKK terrorism. Thanks to the symbolic ban in Germany, the PKK continued to operate freely in Western Europe. On the other hand, several European Union states were reluctant to see the PKK in blacklist, but while the EU announced the PKK as a terrorist organization, it ignored the PKK’s political wing. The PKK earns about \$10 million from donations, extortion, and drug dealing in Europe every year. Turkey advised its NATO allies that the PKK uses bank accounts in Switzerland, Jersey Island, Sweden, Belgium, Denmark, and Southern Cyprus to launder its money. Despite various attempts of Turkey, Denmark has tolerated the TV broadcasting (e.g. Roj TV) of PKK in the country.

## **2. Lessons Learned**

### ***Lessons Learned From the Turkish Experience***

Thanks to these experiences, Turks learnt some lessons that might be useful in similar situations in future. One of the most important of all these lessons is that determination is the key factor in fighting with terrorism. Even when the PKK was at the height of its campaign during the mid-1990s, the Turkish government did not consider entering into negotiations with the terrorist group except for Ozal’s attempts speculated in Turkish media. This determination paid off later; the terrorists’ strength decreased. By providing money, intelligence and training possibilities, state sponsored terrorism is extremely dangerous and destructive for the victim state<sup>24</sup>. Turkey was only able to stop the support that Syria gave to PKK by showing its determination through using its self-defense rights. Military force is useful and, under certain circumstances, necessary for an effective fight against terrorism. The Turkish experience showed that the use of military threat can be successful to compel and stop states that support terrorism. However, it is extremely difficult, indeed impossible, to eliminate terrorism by using only military force. Any strategy of counter-terrorism should be taken into consideration such as the implementation of non-military measures (political, socio-cultural, and economic)<sup>25</sup>. While having a struggle with terrorism, a holistic way of combating which includes all units of the state can be a useful tool to get rid of all causes of terrorism.

Some of the tactics that the Turkish government applied in its counterterrorism efforts did not result as hoped and caused severe shortcomings in certain areas. These shortcomings included the lack of coordination among various Turkish intelligence services, the failure of the correctional system, the inability to apply capital punishment, corruption among security personnel, and insufficient government response to new forms of violence. Coordination and information-sharing among various intelligence and security services in Turkey, especially in 1980s and early 1990s, were far from satisfactory, resulting in a duplication of efforts and setbacks for the aim. Today, Turkish intelligence services have begun to take steps in order to overcome the deficiencies in foreign intelligence services. Turkey has not been very successful in curbing the undergrounds of financial supports of criminals.

<sup>23</sup> Fikret Bila-Murat Yetkin: “Backstage of Ankara (Ankara Kulisi)”, NTV TV Political Debate Programı, (05 April 2009, 22.30-24.00).

<sup>24</sup> Sertaç Başeren: “Terrorism With Its Differing Aspects”, Proceedings of the First International Symposium on the Global Terrorism and International Cooperation, (Ankara, March 23-24, 2006), Turkish General Staff, COE-DAT, (Ankara, 2006), p.17.

<sup>25</sup> Ali L. Karaosmanoğlu: *ibid*, (2008), p.88.

The PKK has increased its profit and has transferred funds in and out of Turkey by getting into narcotic business. There appeared a corruption among security forces engaged in the fight against terrorism. All the experiences of Turkey showed that combating terrorism requires strong intelligence, effective crisis management, information-sharing, interagency coordination at national and international level, sustainable security measures against terrorism, effective control of entry into/exit from the country, and international cooperation. Fighting terrorism requires cooperation and coordination nationally and internationally, besides trust of the public<sup>26</sup>. The institutional cooperation shouldn't be limited only to the military perspective; aim of the struggle shouldn't be limited to punishing the terrorist action; and the institutional cooperation must be shaped in order to stop the terrorist actions.

To promote effective action against terrorist organizations and the states that support them, a permanent, international anti-terrorism institution must be established and authorized in order to identify nations and organizations that are suspected to be involved in terrorism, and determine sanctions and actions to be taken against them; and on the basis of their findings, it should publish an annual list of nations that supports terrorism. This organization should involve experts from different countries who studied global terrorism. International sanctions should be adopted on the countries in that list in accordance with the scope of their support, so as to force them to stop or limit their involvement<sup>27</sup>. Some goals can be achieved through the establishment of a "League of Nations Fighting Terrorism" by a few countries. It is a fact that the collective nations like United States will stay only at the written norm level; so it is necessary to consider this subject in the frame of an alliance. This attitude requires an approach to the counter-terrorism as a collective defense rather than international security perception and it is compulsory to fulfill the points that the idealism can not reach by means of realist practices.

### **Lessons from Other Countries**

Fighting against terrorism requires having strong economic and military infrastructure in order to use sophisticated methods or to develop advanced technology. Moreover, it is required to equip the armed forces with capabilities in order to support the counter-terror operations. Besides regular army, states should organize some special forces in order to prevent and destroy terrorist organizations. One of the most popular tactics in counter-terrorism is suggested by Samuel Griffith, which is called "three-stage fight"<sup>28</sup>; *localization, isolation, and eradication*. Initially, to defeat the aggressors, it is important to identify the places of terrorists in terms of time and location; and in order to do that it is required to have an organization that is capable of giving early warning, gathering information, and analyzing data. The United Kingdom fought a long and difficult battle against the terrorism of the Irish Republican Army (IRA). Between 1966 and 1999, during some of the most heated phases of the conflict, violence took the lives of 3,636 individuals of the region. Tom Parker argues that the "success or failure of British counter-terrorism policies has depended heavily on the state of relations between London and Dublin" and that the "eventual resolution of The Troubled Ireland hinged crucially on a close political alliance" between them<sup>29</sup>. In this conflict, identity politics had a profound impact on Anglo-Irish security.

In the postwar period, France has faced a number of terrorist groups including Algerians in 1950s, Palestinians in 1970s, and Islamist extremists in 1980s and 1990s. France has shaped its judicial system to the terrorist threat that it faces. France set up a system of specialized investigating magistrates, led initially by Alain Marsaud and then Jean-Louis Bruguiere, who use a wide range of powers to pursue all terrorists cases in the country<sup>30</sup>. Where they find the evidence of criminal activity, they hand the case over to the normal French legal system and judges make the ultimate decisions. Despite its successes, human rights groups are very skeptical of the French system, arguing that it allows the authorities to round up large numbers of suspects though often no charges are filed against them. The US currently defines its main terrorist threat as coming from al Qaeda. Although the US has scored some successes, particularly in toppling the Taliban regime and capturing some top al Qaeda leaders, the situation in Afghanistan remains extremely unstable. Iraq campaign was a distraction from a real effort to address the US's terrorist threat.

<sup>26</sup> Andrew Mango: "Terrorism: Learning By Experience", Proceedings of the Second International Symposium (Ankara, 10-11 March 2008), (Ankara: TGS, 2008), p.18.

<sup>27</sup> Boaz Ganor: "Terrorism In The Post-Cold War Era", Proceedings of the First International Symposium on the Global Terrorism and International Cooperation, (Ankara, March 23-24, 2006), (Ankara: TGS, 2006), p.31.

<sup>28</sup> Samuel Griffith: "Mao Tse-Tung on Guerilla Warfare", (Wesport CT: Praeger Publishers, 1961), p.112.

<sup>29</sup> Tom Parker: "The Fateful Triangle: Identity Politics, Security Policy and Anglo-Irish Relations", in R.Orttung and A. Makarychev (Ed.): Proceedings of NATO Advanced Research Workshop on National Counter-Terrorism Strategies, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006), p.79-88.

<sup>30</sup> Marc Perelman. "How The French Fight Terror", Foreign Policy, January 2006.

Iraq has been turned into a training ground for a new generation terrorists who targeted western interests. In its response to the terrorist threat, the US made a variety of institutional changes to better coordinate the fight against terrorism, including establishment of the Department of Homeland Security, and National Counterterrorism Center and a new Director of National Intelligence. The US has also used a variety of forceful and controversial strategies, such as holding prisoners without trial at the US facility on Guantanamo, setting up a secret network of prisons to hold suspected terrorists from a variety of countries, employing torture to obtain operational information, and eavesdropping on US phone calls to foreign countries<sup>31</sup>

Until September 11, 2001 the Western strategy of fighting with terrorism focused on a type of intervention called 'fisherman' which is based on intervention method after an attack. After September 11, that strategy is changed into another one called: 'hunter' which is based on information and destruction of the cells<sup>32</sup>. Based on their experience in Chechnya, the previous minister of foreign affairs of The Russian Federation, Yevgeni Primakov, suggested more optimum strategies to distinguish the civilian from terrorists. According to Primakov, the terrorists outside the slots must be localized and the politicians also should take the responsibility for a solution in own dimension<sup>33</sup>. Another statesman, Richard Perle offers three things that should be done in order to prevent terrorists from attacking<sup>34</sup>; (1) to prevent them from entering the country (2) to reduce their mobility in the country (3) to deprive them of financial and moral support from the country.

### ***Findings Revealed By Recent International Studies***

According to Andrey Makarychev, states can respond to terrorism in three different ways: political, criminal, or clinical. In the political sphere, the state defines the terrorists as an enemy, an act which justifies extremely aggressive response. In the criminal sphere, the state can try to deprive the terrorists of their political standing and paint as mere criminals who have no legitimate or just goals. With a clinical response, the state labels the terrorists abnormal and deviants, identifying them as people who need medical treatment<sup>35</sup>. Asymmetric threats focus on the differences between terrorists and states in terms of resources, strategies, and tactics. Looking in particular at the three approaches defined above, the terrorists always try to present their actions in a political framework, while the state can attempt to politicize, de-politicize, criminalize, or medicalize the terrorists.

Many governments have failed to appreciate the extent and implications of the terrorist threat to modern societies. As a result, a large number of countries, including Western democracies, have not developed strong commitments to deal effectively with the challenge. Terrorism is a cost-effective tool of low intensity conflict that projects psychological intimidation and physical force in violation of law, has ancient roots. Undoubtedly, conflicts emerging from ideological, religious, and national animosities will continue to make terrorism a global problem well into the twenty-first century. Understanding the methods of operation employed by terrorists, identifying the threats and specific targets both present and future, and knowing the damage and consequences that may result from acts of terror violence will assist governments in responding to the reality of terrorism. Studies on case studies leads to three important conclusions. First is the centrality of the organized crime-terrorism nexus in the struggle against terrorism. Terrorists and organized criminals are distinct. Terrorists are pursuing political or ideological goals, while the criminals are motivated by money. The US is the only country that is failing to pay attention to the terror-crime nexus in a serious way. Second is the need to better coordinate state agencies to address terrorism. That implies soft-power approach presented in this paper. Third is the focus on the tradeoffs between greater security and protecting individual civil liberties in society<sup>36</sup>. Target states should advance different counterterror policies, to safeguard rights in the face of threat we must analyze the influence of differing rights values, legal regimes, incorporation of international norms, and legitimacy base of the exercise of authority<sup>37</sup>. So that they constitute an integral part of a sustainable defense of the citizenry and the democratic political community.

<sup>31</sup> Louise Shelley: "Countering Terrorism: The Fallacy of Ignoring the Crime-Terror Nexus", in R.Orttung and A. Makarychev (Ed.): Proceedings of NATO Advanced Research Workshop on National Counter-Terrorism Strategies, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006), p.203-205.

<sup>32</sup> Rohan Gunaratna: "The Changing face of Terrorism", (Singapore, Marshall Cavendish Academic, 2005), p.20.

<sup>33</sup> Yevgeni M. Primakov: *ibid.*, (2004), p.177-185.

<sup>34</sup> Richard Perle, David Frum: "End to Devil, How To Win A War Against Terror? (Şeytana Son, Terörle Savaş Nasıl Kazanılır?)", (İstanbul. Truva Publications, 2004), p.126-131

<sup>35</sup> Robert Orttung and Andrey Makarychev (Ed.): "Introduction: Comparing National Counter-Terrorism Strategies", pp.1-13 in "National Counter-Terrorism Strategies", Proceedings of NATO Advanced Research Workshop on National Counter-Terrorism Strategies, (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2006), p.3.

<sup>36</sup> Eli Karmon: *ibid.*, (2005), p.10.

<sup>37</sup> Alison Brysk, Gershon Shafir: "National Insecurity and Human Rights: Democracies Debate Counterterrorism", (London: University of California Press, 2007), p.1.

To promote effective action against terrorist organizations and the states that support them, a permanent, international anti-terrorism institution must be given the authority to identify nations and organizations considered to be involved in terrorism, and determine sanctions and actions to be taken against them. This institution would operate on the basis of a clear and approved mandate. It would include experts from different countries who should study global terrorism and on the basis of their findings, would publish an annual list of nations supporting terrorism. International sanctions could then be adopted against countries included in that list, in accordance with the scope of their support, so as to force them to stop or limit their involvement. Some goals can be achieved through the establishment of a "League of Nations Fighting Terrorism" by a few countries, with others joining later on<sup>38</sup>. The United Nations should fulfill this role, but past experience shows that it cannot be expected to lead an effective campaign against international terrorism, and certainly not against specific sponsors of terrorism.

### **3. A New Approach: Soft Power in Combating Terrorism**

#### ***Effects of Globalization on the National Unity***

In the aftermath of the Cold war in 1989, the world has entered into a rapid period of change accelerated by the fact of globalisation. Scholars generally consider globalisation as the world wide expansion of some economic systems, social and cultural norms. From the cultural point of view, globalisation is evaluated as a progressive process weakening of homogeneous structures and national unity. With globalisation, we witness the rise of 'the conscious of being an individual'; individuals are pushed to organize within sub-identities or organs like 'ethnic and cultural rights'. In this sense, terms such as mosaic, hybridization, and articulation are deployed to define the process of globalisation<sup>39</sup>.

The first years of the globalisation period were marked with new types of conflicts with ethnic, religious, and tribal characteristics not seen in the Cold War period. The priority issues of international security in the period of globalisation have predominantly been terrorism and organised crime executed by non-state groups but supported by some states in pursuit of their national interests<sup>40</sup>. Ethnic and religious issues are getting more exploited within the concepts of democracy, human rights, and the war on terror. Putting democracy and democratic rights on the national agendas brings up new political questions such as minority rights, the right of various identities to express themselves, and protection of their cultures in related countries.

Transnational social and religious movements challenge national security. National unity is under the threat of demands for religious diversity and autonomy from the state. In short, the nation-states need to undergo reconstruction and reconsider their roles, and develop new methods and instruments for national security and power utilization. The nation-states must perceive the threats and their sources directed to them in order to make and implement right policies at national and international level; they must foresee the opportunities and threats they face to make an accurate analysis and react with appropriate instruments.

The new security concept of the nation-states should focus on the transformations to protect the nation-state structure, national identity and unity. The September 11 attacks in 2001 were a crucial event affecting future formations of nations for the history of power policies. While terror emerges as a power utilization method of the weak in asymmetrical power balance; fragmentation, uncertainty, doubt, and fear have started to dominate this new system. In the age of globalisation, war is usually performed in the form of unofficial, prevalent, and unnamed conflicts with special and proxy wars, covert operations, and propaganda struggles based on a global intelligence network. The fact that nation-states need to transform to some extent in the globalising world has become a source of insecurity and brought about the sense of losing control.

#### ***The New Power Categorization and Soft Power***

Power in international relations is the influence a nation exerts on another in order to force that nation to do something that it does not do or does not want to do under normal conditions<sup>41</sup>. This power is the unique instrument of a state to implement a policy in international relations.

<sup>38</sup> Boaz Ganor: "Terrorism In The Post-Cold War Era", Proceedings of the First International Symposium on the Global Terrorism and International Cooperation, (Ankara, March 23-24, 2006), Turkish General Staff, COE-DAT, (Ankara, 2006), 31.

<sup>39</sup> Şen, Y. Furkan, (2004), "Nationalism Trends and the Nation-State in the Globalisation Process (*Globalleşme Sürecinde Milliyetçilik Trendleri ve Ulus Devlet*)", Yargı Yayınevi, Ankara, 197

<sup>40</sup> Milli Güvenlik Akademisi. (2004), "Terror and Counter-terror (*Terör ve Terörle Mücadele*)", Yayın No:10, Ankara, 38-39.

<sup>41</sup> Tezkan, Yılmaz. (2005), "From Jeopolitics to National Security (*Jeopolitikten Milli Güvenliğe*)", Ülke Kitapları, İstanbul, 137.

There is a direct relationship between the implementation of national security policies in a successful manner and national power and the utilization of that power effectively<sup>42</sup>. As well as strengthening the nation state formation and its structural power, it must also gain immunity against the effects of external powers. For this reason, the nation-states should restore their own structure on the basis of independent thinking and implementation. In 1990s, Joseph S. Nye's classification of hard, economic, and soft power has been popular as a new approach in current arguments. Nye states that 'hard power' is the ability of coercion stemming from the national military and economical power. According to Nye, soft power is the capacity of attraction to ensure your will instead of coercion and money. Soft power derives from the attractiveness of a national culture and political ideas. You will not need to spend money for the 'sticks and carrots' to force the others into your way when they want what you want. If the other nations see your policy as legitimate, that means your soft power is high<sup>43</sup>. In that respect, the nation-states should develop a new security mechanism; combining hard, economical, and soft power instruments.

As many scholars recognize, there is an essential optimal balance to be maintained between the hard and soft power. Overuse of hard power, like the USA has done recently, may kill the chance of soft power utilization. In other words, the more difficult a superior military force compels you to use hard power, the more difficult it will be to mobilize real social potential. The skill to unite hard and soft power is 'smart power'<sup>44</sup> (Nye, 2006). Results taken by using pressure and fear can not be permanent and they also legitimate acts of retribution. What's more, the state using them in an area will not have the persuasive skills in order to act softly in other areas because successful utilization of soft power requires consistency and conviction.

Aware of structural considerations, the political body should develop the conceptual and institutional infrastructure which will execute essential power elements, predominantly soft power, and methods. Putting aside the current security concept which is based on the national security index, reactive and dependent on the deterrence of hard power, nation-states need a new security mechanism with a 'sophisticated power projection' harmonising the soft, economic and hard power elements together. Owing to regional conditions, nation-states have to make immediate and radical changes in their policy formation and implementation in terms of structural, methodical and political instruments.

The promotion of nation-states is related to obtaining new missions in shaping their own geography and security environment by developing and harmonising the political, economic, and social actors within the soft-power projection. To this extent, it should strengthen institutional formations, staff, and capabilities in order to produce short, middle, and long term projections and alternative strategies. The 'warriors' of the new power policies will be the structural and institutional elements and processes that the state acts effectively with. These include civilian society organisations, NGOs, corporations, international organisations. A national system should be set to combine the structural and institutional power elements in accordance with national interests. This also dictates the multinational cooperation, such as setting the contact groups, regional alliances, or strategic partnerships in soft power area.

### ***Soft-Power as an Instrument of Counter-terrorism***

It has long been understood that a country would not be able to get a result while fighting against terrorism by using solely military force, which is seen in the examples of Turkey against the Kurdish movement, and the USA in Iraq. In this age of global knowledge, power itself, especially in developed countries, is seen as a less tangible and compelling quality. Soft power can call forth much more effect and possibility of control than the traditional one can. According to Joseph S. Nye, who is the originator of the concept, when your policies become legitimate in the others' eyes, your soft power improves<sup>45</sup>. On the other hand, international relations which is quite unpredictable and ambivalent, soft power based on knowledge, thoughts and ideals will allow political actors to accomplish their objectives<sup>46</sup>. In the 21st century, usage of power will be based on a combination of both hard and soft instruments.

Today the methods to counter terrorism are in the way to punish the ones who realizes the games and in the way to annihilate them. This doesn't cause a result no more than the theater being watched with much more pleasure and the reaction reaches a point that even the terrorists can't imagine.

<sup>42</sup> Sarkesian, Sam C. (1995), "U.S. National Security: Policy Makers, Processes, and Politics", Sec.Ed., Lynne Rienner Publishes, Colorado, 25.

<sup>43</sup> Nye, Joseph S. (2004), "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy", Political Science Quarterly; 119, Research Library Core, 256.

<sup>44</sup> Nye, Joseph S. (6 Eylül 2006), "Need For More Soft Power (Daha Çok Yumuşak Güce Başvurmalıyız)", The DailyStar, (Çev. Radikal Gazetesi, 08 Eylül 2006).

<sup>45</sup> Joseph S Nye Jr.: "Soft Power and American Foreign Policy, Political Science Quarterly; Summer 2004; 119, 2; Research Library Core, p.256.

<sup>46</sup> Andreas Wenger: "The Growth of Soft Power and the Challenges of Global Governance", Information & Security, Volume 7, (2001), p.5-11.

The aim of the struggle shouldn't be limited to punishing the terrorist action and the institutional cooperation must be shaped to lessen the merging impacts and in this way to inactive the terrorist actions. The institutional cooperation will not be limited only to the military perspective. It is necessary to accept that terrorism is a complex structure that can't be handled solely from a military perspective and that has social, economical, cultural reasons. Thus, besides intelligence, police and the military forces, it is mandatory to use the non-governmental organizational and socio-cultural instruments together. Impact management is more prior than the supervision of effect. A multi-dimensional coordination is compulsory. The cooperation in which multilateral companies, dominant companies of communication industry, non-governmental organizations will also take part may be more efficient than the alliances among the states. In this framework, it is appropriate to use the phrase "agreement between the actors" instead of the phrase "international compromise and cooperation".

However, there are many troubles to use of soft power. First of al, they are mostly out of government control. Secondly, they function indirectly and sometimes having expected results takes long years. As another hardship, it requires detailed analysis about targeted nations and coordinated use of sources since its effects mainly depends on the conviction and perception of the people selected. All activities of state elements and civilian organizations in the context of soft power should be planned, managed, and monitored in harmony. Additionally, planning regarding the use of soft power should be based on the analysis of targeted people; in application, aftermath of each activity, changing behaviors of nation should be scaled and provided effect should be reassessed.

In order to have persuasive sources of soft power, the Turkish Republic may decisively continue to struggle with separatist, religious, and subversive elements which threaten her integrity and constitutional order and remove them from national agenda to do so, and should empower internal stability and peace environment. In resolution of internal and external problems of Turkish security, it is evaluated that the activation and efficient use of her softer power sources are to be beneficial; and those sources have to be planned, monitored, and coordinated by a special government unit.

#### ***Soft Power Model for Turkish-USA collaboration***

In the post cold war period, among the methods of security strategies applied by the states in international arena, instead of hard power use based on the military force, political, economical, and socio-cultural institutions and assets are predominantly utilized as soft power instruments in power applications. In that context, in order to shape either domestic or external security environment along with national interests, the nations proactively apply soft power as less costly and humanistic method. In parallel with this understanding, they try to reach their goals with "conviction" and "perception" method using civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, foundations, associations, banks, corporations, universities, media, think-tank centers, religious, and cultural institutions instead of using hard power.

Utilization of the soft power against terrorism and developing a mechanism to support the cooperation, both nationally and internationally, should be taken into consideration as a new approach to the subject. The vital point is the style of the counter-terrorism approach from a soft-power perspective. In this sense the southeastern part of Turkey, including northern Iraq extensions, can also be considered as a region to activate a soft-power strategy for the counter-terrorism. As a war strategy against terrorism, a multi-dimensional coordination is compulsory. This means that the political, social, cultural, and economic structure should be organized to overcome terrorism. For instance, in the political dimension, in order to democratize the region, soft power will first shape the democratic culture, which should be followed by the preparation of the infrastructure and become operational with its institutions and regulations.

From the international perspective, the problem of terrorism that Turkey faces today is a result of state-supported terrorist attempts which is also the cause of the security problems in the Middle East. Because of this, a new approach and alliance structure should be developed by including soft-power. It is crucial to develop collaboration in order to gather all political, economic and socio-cultural instruments into one concept of soft-power on the basis of counter-terrorism in the international arena. In this respect, it is important to create collaboration between the U.S.A. and Turkey. This collaboration will lead Middle Eastern people to adopt themselves into modern values and contribute to the economic development. This model can be a milestone in creating a culture of collectivity and improving cooperation against international terrorism.

## Conclusion

In the past three decades, the Republic of Turkey has faced many difficulties because of terrorism. However, the Turkish government's determination against terrorists, who wish to change the Turkish regime, have prevailed. While fighting against terrorism, Turkey organized its political and military institutions in order to protect its territorial integrity, secularist and unitary structure. Turkey was physically attacked by terrorists whose ideas were based on a political Kurdish ethnic-based movement. This political formation was supported by the EU and *de facto* Kurdish settlement in northern Iraq and had the demand of establishing a federation or/and an independent Kurdish State. The future of both this *de facto* statement, which has begun with the invasion of Iraq by the U.S.A. and Turkey's accession process to the EU, is one of the most crucial ways of Turkey's combat against terrorism. From the very beginning, Turkey is worried about the fact that these terrorists can politically and physically harm the country and an independent Kurdish State can be established in northern Iraq. The fundamental problem of Turkey today is the technique of dissolving this structure both inside and outside the country through the low intensive war.

It is necessary to accept that terrorism has a complicated structure that can't be understood and solved only through a military perspective; it has political, economical, socio-cultural grounds. Thus, besides intelligence, police and the military forces, it is a must to use non-governmental organizations and socio-cultural instruments together through a soft-power perspective. Firstly, Turkey should determine its political, economic and socio-cultural approaches in order to fight against terrorism which has been spreading from the southeastern part to the western parts. An efficient and persuading political pattern might be imposed upon the citizens' ways of thinking by defining the theoretical background of soft power.

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