

Religions Radicalism Resurgence of Taliban and Curbing Militancy Implications for Pak – Afghan Relations

Dr. Lubna Abid Ali

Chairperson

Department of International Relations,

Quaid-i-Azam University,

Islamabad, Pakistan

E-mail: lubnaali54@hotmail.com

Abstract

Evolution of Pakistan's Afghan policy is rooted in the British historical perception of Afghanistan. According to which a pro-British Afghanistan was considered essential for India's security. Similarly Pakistan's military bureaucratic elite perceived a pro-Pakistan Afghanistan essential for Pakistan's defence. Historically relations between two neighbourly Muslim states had been marred over the issue of Durand Line. This roughly 2430 Kms long border between Afghanistan and Pakistan had not only been a line of demarcation but a frontier. This involved 1,90,000 sq. miles of territory claimed by Afghanistan as 'Pakhtunistan'. The British government consistently rejected this claim on the basis of well-known principle of international law: pacta sunt servanda, treaty agreements ought to be respected.¹

In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, and the U.S. unilateral intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistan took a U-turn in its policy towards Taliban. New inputs created a host of socio-political challenges with far reaching impact on bilateral and regional arrangements. President Hamid Karzai had not been able to establish government's writ beyond Kabul. Both the incumbent regime and the external forces exploit situation only to the detriment of Pak – Afghan relations. The aim of this study is to delineate such impediments; suggest means of achieving better relations, to establish peace in a war-ravaged region.²

Introduction

The study has been divided into five parts. It begins with an introduction that highlights the significance of the problem. Part two comprises theoretical framework and methodology of research. Part three consists of central questions that are addressed in this study. Part four gives a brief history of Pakistan & Afghan Policy. The Soviet invasion in Afghanistan that paved the way for Pakistan to play the role as 'front line State'. Pakistan supported the Peshawar based seven parties "Jihad" against Soviets in Afghanistan.³

After the Soviet withdrawal and the resignation of Najibullah government, with different factions vying for power civil war broke out in Afghanistan. Pakistan initiated peace efforts and architected the 'Peshawar Accord'⁴ and Islamabad Declaration⁵, but both failed to bring peace in Afghanistan. In that situation a new group emerged called the 'Taliban.' In fact, in the beginning two elements formulated the perception of

¹ For details see, Lubna A. Ali, "Pakhtunistan: The Frontier Dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan", *Central Asia* 25(Winter 1989): 37-47.

² Scott Baldouf, "India Pakistan Rivalry reaches into Afghanistan.", *The Christian Science Monitor*, <www.csmonitor.com>accessed 20-4-2007.

³ William Borders, 'Pakistan Dismisses \$400 million in Aid offered by the U.S. as Peanuts', *New York Times* (January 18, 1980), Dennise Kux, *The United States and Pakistan 1947-2000: Disenchanted Allies*, Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001,p.

⁴ for Peshawar Accord, 1992, see, *Pakistan Horizon*, 45 no.3 (July 1992): 2; *The News*, Islamabad (December 31, 1992)

⁵ Islamabad Declaration 1993, see, *The News*, Islamabad (March 10, 1993).

Pakistani decision makers Historically Pakistan's Afghan policy was formulated on the basis of strategic interests, particularly recognition of Durand Line as international boundary.

Later on the two new elements were introduced. One, 'strategic depth'⁶ in case of war with India and two, 'economic incentives of Central Asia'.⁷ Pakistan thus tried to install a pro-Pakistan government in Kabul by pushing Taliban on the political center stage of Afghanistan. Pakistan failed to achieve those objectives. Part five of the study suggests recommendations to revise Pakistan's Afghanistan policy. This is with the aim to achieve peace in the region as well as national interests of Pakistan.

Theoretical Framework and Methodology

The theoretical framework of this study is based on 'realist'⁸ assumptions and realist critique as well as the impact of variables in the foreign policy making 'choices'. Viewed from realist perspective, competition both at the unit level and the level of international structure create anarchy. Thus on the basis of self-help, military build-up, alliance formation and balance of power remain an ever-present reality of international system. Realism therefore defines the concept of interest in terms of power and 'infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics'.⁹

Neorealism emerged in the 1970's as a response to the challenges of interdependence theory and partly as a corrective to traditional realism's neglect of economic forces.¹⁰ Significant changes take place when the number of great powers is reduced. Thus states compete not only for survival and security but in advantage to each other as well. Structural changes thus affect state behaviour, bring changes in the nature of distribution of power among the major actors and also introduce new rules of international political system.¹¹

In the post Cold-War era structural change in the aftermath of 9/11 resulted in American "unilateral interventionsim" with an unprecedented show of power.¹² U.S. global hegemon policy considers South Asia as one of the most significant geo-political regions of the world. This is based on American foreign policy agenda to deal frontally with issues like international terrorism, non-proliferation and drug trafficking.¹³

The implications of this theoretical framework is based on the fact that Pakistan being a nuclear weapons state, with plenty of home grown terrorists, volatile border with Afghanistan and having serious disputes with two of its four neighbours faces challenges to its 'security'. President George Walker Bush made it amply clear that until the entire world's nations stop harbouring and supporting such terrorists within their borders...." U.S. would continue its war against terrorism.¹⁴

⁶ Mutahir Ahmed in K. Warikoo, ed. *The Afghanistan Crisis: Issues and Perspectives*, New Delhi: Bhavana Books and Prints, 2002, p.392.

⁷ Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in "Afghanistan"*, London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, p.157

⁸ E.H. Carr, *The Twenty Year's Crisis*, London, 1939, pp.1-14. A rigorous approach which emphasized the realities of power in international politics. Also see, Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, London: Macmillan, 1977. This is the scientific study of international relation's theory based on the evolution and function of the nation-state system; Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, New York, 1979, pp. 1-17 and 116-23.

⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations*, 6th ed., New York Knopf, 1985, p.3. Written in 1948 could rightly be called a realist text book. See his 6 principles of political realism, pp. 7-12. Morgenthau, 1985, p.5.

¹⁰ Scott Burchill and Andrew Link later, eds. *Theories of International Relations*, New York: St. Marlin's Press, 1996, p.83.

¹¹ Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War", *International Security* 25 no.1 (2002): 5.

¹² G. John Ikenberry, "America's Imperial Ambition", *Foreign Affairs* 81no.5 (2002): 46.

¹³ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, New York: W.W. Norton, 2001, p.386.

¹⁴ George W. Bush, "Warsaw Conference on Combatting Terrorism, 6 November 2001, www.whitehouse.gov

Second, the post 9/11 Pakistan was an internationally isolated state with political institutions in disarray after the dismissal of Nawaz Sharif's cabinet by Gen. Pervez Musharraf in 1999.

With a stagnant economy, a military government, some analysts of South Asia regional dynamics called it an international pariah state at that time.¹⁵ The significance of this theoretical force work is highlighted in the context that with terrorism as emergent threat to U.S. global interests the security paradigm changed. From focus on major powers the immediate concern was failing states that either harbour or could sponsor terrorists. With American Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) the strategic significance of Pakistan gained prominence.

In the war against terrorism Pakistan thus established the 'Tora Bora net' that enabled U.S. to capture 240 al-Qaeda operatives belonging to 26 different nationalities¹⁶. Pakistan thus committed more troops in the Global Counter Terrorism Force (GCTF) than any other nation. Similarly Pakistan's army and para military account for more casualties than any other US ally in war against terrorism.¹⁷

The purpose of theory is to explain, interpret and assist the prediction of recurrent patterns of behaviour. Various determinants of the foreign policy behaviour of states that do not change over a period of time could be the role of history, cognition, culture and ideology. Impact of variables that are not so enduring could be politics and economics, rules of international political system, press and media, technological development and the nature of distribution of power at the international level.¹⁸

As far as the role of major powers is concerned, with reference to our study the influence of neoconservatives on the American foreign policy makers and the U.S. unilateralist posture cannot be ignored. The term neo-cons. refers to the foreign policy inclinations of President George W. Bush and his advisors like Paul Wolfowitz or Richard Perle (Defence Policy Board Advisory Committee 2001 – 2003). Neocons emphasized a hawkish foreign policy to "dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing or equalling the power of U.S."¹⁹

Finally, from the perspective of strategic constraints, Pak – Afghan relations acquire a special significance since they share a volatile border. This trijunctional border connects Pakistan's NWFP and its largest province Balochistan as well as Makran Coast in Sindh with Afghanistan's Helmand Province and Seistan on the Iranian side of Balochistan (see map.1).

There exist historical complexity of ethnic, tribal and socio-political composition of people and centuries of cross-border interactions among them. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan have trouble in closing the porous but difficult terrain in the Durand Line where the landscape is such that it supports the hunted more than the hunter.²⁰

Completely sealing the border requires a "Berlin Wall Style construction and a half-a-million strong army to patrol 24 hours, seven days a week".²¹ President Hamid Karzai accuses Pakistan as "boss of the Taliban" and President Musharraf's claim that problem lies in Afghanistan and the solution lies in Afghanistan". Some analysts regard Pakistan not as solution but as part of the problem. To conduct research in such a significant issue requires both theoretical, empirical and methodological rigour.

¹⁵ Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pakistan*, Vanguard Books, 2005, p.90.

¹⁶ Pervez Musharraf, *In the Line of Fire: A Memoir*, New York: Free Press, 2006, p.264.

¹⁷ Syed Mohammad Ali Shah, "Pakistan and the War against Terrorism", *Pakistan Horizon* 60 no.2 (April 2007): 89.

¹⁸ For a discussion of relevance of these factors see Lubna A. Ali, *Post-Revolutionary Iran: Foreign Policy*, Lahore: Univ. of the Punjab, 2008, pp.34-40.

¹⁹ Stephen Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *America Alone: The Neo-Conservatives and the Global Order*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004, p.44.

²⁰ Bruce Berkowitz, "The great game and the end game in Afghanistan", *Orbis* 51 no.1 (Winter 2007): 165-166.

²¹ Kathy Gannon and Bill Roggio, "Is Pakistan doing all it should to secure its Afghan border?", Council on Foreign Relations, 2 March 2007, www.cfr.org

The aim of scientific methodology over her is to ascertain that “one set of conclusions is more probable than others and this is precisely the goal of valid interpretation”.²² Social Science is divided among a multitude of ‘core disciplines’ each having several sub-divisions.

“American political science association for example, recognizes 34 sections, American Historical Association over one hundred, American Economic Association over several hundred. These cubby holes define courses, jobs conferences, journal and scholarly activity through defacto boundaries of academic lines.”²²

Methodologically, the most crucial question raised in this study is: Can local knowledge be transformed or reorganized into general knowledge without losing contact with the work a day tasks of academic inquiry? According to Gerring, “diversity is a mark of disciplinary maturity, rather than as a mark of confusion and disarray.”²⁴

As stated by Max Weber, “progress of the social science is thus ineluctably tied to reconstruction of concepts through which we seek to comprehend reality”.²⁵ Thus advances in social science are tied to shift in practical cultural problems. In this context Pak – Afghan relations tied through trajectory of history, trade, culture, geopolitics and traditional affinities provide a unique case study.

The Central Questions addressed in this study are:

1. *How history shaped the basis of Pakistan’s Afghan Policy?*
2. *What were the main objectives of Pakistan’s Pro-Taliban Policy?*
3. *What had been the nature of domestic regional and international implications for Pakistan?*
4. *What could be the major impediments in smooth relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan?*
5. *Finally, recommendations to deradicalise religious extremism and curbing military.*

Historical Perspective

In the initial period after obtaining independence in 1947, security concerns became central theme to shape Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy. The Soviet and Indian support for Afghanistan’s irredentist claims against Pakistan’s territory in the NWFP region increased Pakistan’s perception of insecurity.²⁶ The issues of Pakhtunistan and Durand Line with Afghanistan and Kashmir dispute with India were the major concerns of national security agenda. (see map 2).

Sikander Mirza’s visit to Kabul in 1956 reciprocated by King Zahir Shah’s visit to Pakistan in 1958 restored transit facilities for Afghan trade route. Pakistan’s major objective was to pacify Afghanistan’s Pakhtun initiative and restore Afghan transit trade. Field Martial Mohammad Ayub Khan wanted to settle issues with Afghanistan Peacefully through negotiations. Therefore he held a meeting with Sardar Naim, the then Foreign Minister of Afghanistan and told him “if the old conquests were to be our guide, then Pakistan should have more interests in the future of Pathans living in Afghanistan”.²⁷

However, the failure of Ayub – Naim talks of 1960, further deteriorated Pak – Afghan relations. Afghan lashker of about 15,000 men entered Pakistan’s Bajour area. In 1961 heavy fighting erupted with constant border clashes.²⁸ Afghanistan severed diplomatic relations and border was closed in 1961.²⁹

²² John Gerring, *Social Science Methodology: A critical Framework*, Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2001, p.19.

²² John Dewey, *Logic: The Theory of Inquiry*, New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1938, p.509.

²⁴ John Gerring, *op.cit.*, p.5.

²⁵ Max Weber, *Methodology of the Social Sciences*, trans. and ed. by Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch, Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1949, 105-6.

²⁶ William J. Barnds, *India, Pakistan and the Great Powers*, New York: Praeger, 1972, p.124.

²⁷ Mohammad Ayub Khan, *Friends Not. Masters. A Political Biography*, London, 1967, p.175 – 176.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Khalid Mahmood Arif, *Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Indian Perspectives*, Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1984, pp.322-323.

After Daud's removal, the diplomatic relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan were resolved through the mediation of Shah of Iran in May, 1963. Pakistan improved relations with President Ayub's visit to Kabul in 1964 and again in 1966. During the 1965 Indo – Pakistan war, Afghanistan's attitude remained sympathetic towards Pakistan. After the elections in 1970, Pakistan under the leadership of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto pursued a "Forward Policy". In 1973, Sardar Daud after overthrowing the monarchy started supporting Baloch insurgents and Pakhtun nationalists. Kabul became the source of anti-Pakistan moves. Pakistan's 'Forward Policy' was based on support of the anti-Daud Islamist movement in Afghanistan in 1974.

The leading figures were Kabul university affiliated Tajik professor Burhanuddin Rabbani and the Pashtun professor Ghulam Mohammad Niazi. A strategy that Islamabad adopted two decades later with the Taliban³⁰. It was from this Islamist movement that Pakistan's intelligence agency Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) would introduce the US to such important later Mujahdeen figures as Burhanuddin Rabbani, Ahmad Shah Masud and Gulbadeen Hikmatyar. Afghanistan's warm relations with Iran contributed to improvement of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, Kabul visit was reciprocated by Sardar Daud in August 1976.³¹

However, before any agreement could be signed over the Durand Line, the PPP government was overthrown in 1977 and later on President Daud was deposed in 1978. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 and the two decades of fighting in Afghanistan that followed preoccupied successive Kabul governments. Though the claims for Pakhtunistan were not formally advanced yet whether the Taliban or Karzai government outwardly refuse to take cooperative measures that could suggest a recognition of Durand Line seem to be missing.³²

For President Zia ul Haq who had seized power in July 1977, the Soviet invasion offered a political reprieve. A key goal of his regime was to persuade the Americans to boost their aid to Pakistan and the anti-Soviet Afghan insurgency.³³ Shortly, after the Soviet invasion, Zia appointed a new Chief of the ISI, General Akhtar Abdur Rahman Khan, who remained the right arm of Zia in the Afghan Jihad until he died with Zia in a plane crash in 1988. Brigadier Yousaf was directly responsible for operations and Mujahideen attacks inside Afghanistan. As Director of the Afghan Bureau of the ISI he revealed the extent of financial, physical and logistical involvement of ISI.³⁴

The support lent by Zia to Afghan resistance in addition to 2.5 million Afghan refugees, produced a parallel arms and drug economy with serious implications for Pakistan's social fabric.³⁵ Furthermore, the stirred up religious groups as instruments to achieve strategic objectives made Afghanistan the epicenter of Jihadi groups in the post cold war era.³⁶ As a result of these various forces concept of Jihad was understood by a generation of Madrassa students as a violent struggle for imposition of an Islamic state upon society.³⁷ The Geneva Accords that began in 1982 and concluded on April 17, 1988 represent UN efforts to promote a political settlement. Agreement provided for the Soviet withdrawal of troops, the return of 5 million Afghan refugees and Pak – Afghan pledging non-interference in each other's affairs.³⁸

Zia ul Haq's death in 1988, the subsequent elections in November under the interim government led by President Ghulam Ishaq did not result in any change in Islamabad's Afghan policy. The new Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Baig alongwith the new head of ISI Lt. Gen.

³⁰ Barnett R. Rubin, *The Search for Peace in Afghanistan*:. From Buffer state to failed State, New Heaven and Yale: Yale Univ. Press, 1995, p.82.

³¹ Kabul Times, 23 August 1987.

³² Dawn, 6 July 2007.

³³ Dennis Kux, 2001, *op.cit.*, p.262.

³⁴ Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, *The Bear Trap Afghanistan's Untold Story*, Lahore: Jang Publishers, 1992, pp. 2-4.

³⁵ Kukreja Veena, *Contemporary Pakistan Political Process, Conflict & Crisis*, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003, p.101.

³⁶ Rizwan Hussain, *Pakistan and the Emergence of Islamic Militancy in Afghanistan*, London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd; 2005, pp. 123 – 124.

³⁷ Charles H. Kennedy, ed. *Pakistan 2005*, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006, p.232.

³⁸ Mehrun Nisa Ali, *Readings in Pakistan's Foreign Policy – 1971 – 1988*, Karachi: Oxford Univ. Press, 2001, p.384.

Hamid Gul, obtained the opportunity to attain strategic depth.³⁹ Pakistan's objectives in the period 1989 – 90 revolved around a persistent effort to install a pro-Pakistan regime in Kabul. During the first government of Nawaz Sharif 1990 – 1993, he went to Kabul in 1992 to demonstrate Pakistan's backing and support for Afghan interim government.⁴⁰ Peshawar Agreement of 1992 was maneuvered by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia leaving out both Iran and Pro-Tehran Parties.

Six months later Islamabad accord failed to resolve differences between both Pakistan linked Pakhtuns led by Hikmatyar and non-Pakhtun leaders led by Rabbani.⁴¹

November 1993 elections were won by People's Party and Benazir Bhutto became the Prime Minister of Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the second time. A Pakhtun journalist Rahimullah Yusufzai believes that Taliban movement was an indigenous creation. People of Afghanistan were fed up with Mujahideen and the civil war and Taliban promised peace. ANP Awami National Leader, Afsandiyar Wali Khan blamed Pakistani for the creation of Taliban.⁴² Pakistan remained the principal supporter of Taliban as has now been established by several scholarly and journalistic works.⁴³ The government of Pakistan under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif extended recognition to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan on 25 May 1997. However, the Taliban remained fiercely independent. The radical so called "Islamic" Taliban negative in Afghanistan refused to recognize Durand Line. On the other hand a Paradox remained within Pakistani establishment where army continued technical and military support to Taliban in defiance of political government. Pakistan's policy was criticized by Iran, India, Russia and Central Asia .

The US administration that had initially favoured Taliban an anti Iran force in Afghanistan also withdrew their support.⁴⁴ Taliban's hardline policies and the violations of human rights led to severe criticisms from UN, OIC and ECO.⁴⁵ Madeleine Albright, the then US Secretary State visited Pakistan in November 1997 and expressed her dislike for the Taliban regime. The cruise missile attack was launched by America against Osama bin Laden's bases in Afghanistan in 1998. It killed several members of Harkat ul Ansar Party, a militant organization active in Indian -controlled Kashmir.⁴⁶

When Musharraf stepped in as head of state on 12 October 1999 the seeds of religious fanaticism grown more than 2 decades earlier had come to confront him as fully grown trees. In his first major policy speech, he stated "Islam preaches tolerance not hatred" and categorically asked the clergy to "curb elements" that were exporting "religion for vested interests".⁴⁷ Pakistan was internationally an isolated state due to its support for Kashmiri insurgency and Pro-Taliban stance. In the midst of this a U.S. State Department Study entitled Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999 released in 2000 pin pointed S. Asia as the first major center of international terrorism. The US also urged Pakistan to close Madrassas that served as "conduits for terrorism". Thus the militant groups Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Mohammad were banned on 14 August 2001. Later on Sipa-i-Sahaba and Tehiriki Nifaz-e-Jafria were also banned.

Still national interest and strategic issues dictated Pakistan's pro-Taliban policy and that country could not afford a threat from Afghanistan's side in addition to the one in the east (India).⁴⁸ On the eve of 9/11, 2001 Pak was an internationally isolated state, with a stagnant economy, a military government international pariah status and political and social institutions in disarray.⁴⁹ A shift occurred in U.S. foreign policy as a result of 9/11 2001 attack on the World Trade Center. Foremost the U.S. needed a stable ally in South Asia.

³⁹ Barnett R. Rubin, *Foreign Affairs* Vol. 68 no.5 (Winter 1989/90): 164.

⁴⁰ *Pakistan Horizon*, 45 no.3 (July 1992): 2.

⁴¹ *The Nation*, July 3, 1994.

⁴² *The Frontier Post*, 20 October 2006.

⁴³ William Maley ed., *Fundamentalism Reborn Afghanistan and the Taliban*, New York: New York Univ. Press, 1998.

⁴⁴ Hassan Abbas, *Pakistan's Drift into Extremism: Allah the Army and America's War on Terror*, London: M.E. Sharpe, 2005, 155.

⁴⁵ Kaniz F. Yousuf ed., *Unipolar World and the Muslim States*, Islamabad, 2004, p.249-50.

⁴⁶ Hassan Abbas, *op.cit.*, p.164.

⁴⁷ Musharraf, Address the Nation 17 October 1999. *The News*, Oct. 1999.

⁴⁸ www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/1999report/intro.html.

⁴⁹ S. Stephen P. Cohen, *The Idea of Pak*, (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2005), p.90.

U.S. will not pursue a liberal strategy in which, democracy, and integrated markets reduce the importance of power politics altogether. As a result America will be global powerful hegemon, much more powerful than other major states thus we leaving everyone behind”.⁵⁰

Within hours of the terrorist attacks of 11 Sept. there emerged a the sweeping Bush Doctrine: “we will make no distinction between those who planned these acts and those who harbour them”. It was concluded that any counterstrike in Afghanistan would not be possible without the support and assistance of Pakistan.⁵¹ Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, Pak’s ISI Chief was on an official visit to the U.S. as a CIA guest. He told the CIA director George Tenet that Mullah Omar, the supreme leader of the Taliban was a religious man with humanitarian instincts and not a man of violence.⁵² This was hard for the CIA officials to digest. In order to make things clear, Richard Armitage, the then U.S. Sect of State told him to pass the word to Gen. Musharraf: “The Pakistani President – with us or against us”.⁵³

Demands that were crafted by Colin Powell Richard Armitage and Christina Rocca asked Pakistan, (i) to stop al-Qaeda operatives coming from Afghanistan to Pakistan, (ii) put an end to all logistical support for Osama bin Laden and Talibans, (iii) grant of landing rights to US air crafts and (iv) sharing of intelligence and immigration in formation. Collin Powell later told Musharraf that his general had already accepted these demands on behalf of the Pakistani government.⁵⁴

According to New York Times report, the size of ISI personnel was cut from 10,000 to 4,000 and were assigned to return to their parent units in infantry, armour or artillery.⁵⁵ Musharraf’s backing for the Bush administration’s action in Afghanistan made it possible for Pakistan to secure US economic assistance and military aid. Congress authorized a five-year, \$3 billion assistance programme for FY2005 through 2009 to be divided equally between economic and military needs of Pakistan.⁵⁶

The partnership between Pakistan and the US remains narrowly anchored in counter terrorism. This front line status has resulted in many problems for Pakistan domestically and contributed to instability and insecurity. This is one reason, Pakistan is said to have become the member of the “coalition of not so willing”.⁵⁷

The war on terrorism has moved to Pakistani territory. Military sweeps in Afghanistan have pushed Taliban and Al-Qeda escapees across the porous frontier into semi-autonomous tribal regions in northern-western Pakistani side, where they have found sanctuary. This has brought Pakistani forces into conflict with tribal populations in regimes traditionally off limits to Pakistani officials.⁵⁸ Moreover Kabul’s shaky control over Aghan territory augurs renewed meddling by Afghanistan’s neighbour’s at Pakistan’s expense. Thus, despite Pakistan’s utmost cooperation with post-Taliban Afghanistan a cloud of uncertainty still hangs over bilateral relations. Three factors need to be analysed. The first is the “do more” rhetoric. Since 2003, U.S. military commanders overseeing “Operation Enduring Freedom” have been complaining that renegade Al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters remain able to attack coalition troops in Afghanistan and escape into Pakistani frontier.

⁵⁰ David Skidmore, “*Understanding the Unilateralist Turn in U.S. Foreign Policy*”, at www.blackwell.synergy.com/doi/pag/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2005.0001x. (accessed 30 Jan 2007), p.208. Also see G. John Ikenberry, “Aea’s Imperial Aibition”, *Foreign Affair* 81 no.5 (2002), p.46.

⁵¹ Text of Preside Bush’s Speech on Sept 11, 2001, at www.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text. (accessed 15 Jan. 2005).

⁵² Bob Woodward, *Bush at War*, (London: Simont Schuster, 2003), p.47.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Hassan Abbas, *Pak’s Drift into Extension*, (New Delhi: Pentagon, 2007), p.221.

⁵⁵ *The New York Time*, 20 Feb. 2002.

⁵⁶ Task Force Report, “New Priorities in South Asia: U.S. Policy toward India Pak and Afghanistan”, Frank G. Wisner 11, Nicholas plattant others, at www.cfr.org/publication/6486/new-priorities_in_south_asia.html (accessed 24 May 2007), p.53.

⁵⁷ Polly Nayak, U.S. Security Policy in South Asian Since 9/11 Challenges and Implications for the Future, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, at www.apss.org/text/text-research-archive.htm(accessed 20 May 2007), p.4.

⁵⁸ Nayak, *op.cit.*, p.5.

President Gen. Musharraf rejected the allegations in his interview with CNN, 'They are unfortunate statements by any leader. I don't think any other leader has said that we are not doing enough and we need to do more. It is unfortunate that these statements come from the Afghan leadership'....we are fighting the same enemy. If we start throwing blame on each other, we weaken our positions.⁵⁹

Since mid 2003 President Musharraf has moved Pakistani troops that started combat operations against militants in Waziristan. In August 2004 President Karzai's visit to Islamabad, Musharraf assured him of Pakistan's support to dispatch additional 9500 troops to border areas to bolster security in 2005. Subsequently on Feb. 2006 trip to Islamabad Karzai presented Pakistani President with a list of names, addresses, and phone numbers of ranking Taliban fighters, more than implying that their presence and movements are with the knowledge to perhaps approval of ISI. Musharraf criticized Karzai when Georg W. Bush visited Pakistan in March 2006 he called upon Musharraf to do more.⁶⁰ To curb Islamic militancy and to stop cross-border infiltration of Taliban insurgents into Afghanistan.⁶¹

In the first half of the year 2007, three important decisions were made in the context of Pak – Afghan relations. President Musharraf in a press conference in Rawalpindi indicated to fence over 35 Kms of its border with Afghanistan in FATA, South and North Waziristan. Then in the second phase 250 Km of Pak - Afghan border in Balochistan would be fenced.⁶²

Second, in April 2007 with the help of Turkish President the leadership of Afghanistan and Pakistan signed Ankara Declaration. Both decided to work in cooperation with each other for peace and stability in the region. The third event was "Pak – Afghan Peace Jirga" which was held in August 2007. Around 700 people attended including Rashid Dostum, Rabbani, Rasool Sayyad, Pir Gillani as well as the President and Prime Minister of Pakistan and the members of civil society. The jirga condemned terrorism as a common threat to the security of both the countries and resolved to continue the war on terror.

The Current Situation in Afghanistan

Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad in May 2008 organized an international seminar on Afghanistan. The objective was to highlight the current scenario to make projections for peace and stability in the region. More than six years after the US invaded to establish a central regime in Afghanistan Zhou Rong, a Chinese scholar noted; first Hamid Karzai controls just 30% of the country, second Talibans control 10 – 11% of the country, three majority of Afghanistan's population and territory remains under local tribal control.⁶³

A second crucial problem is opium harvest which is so vast that some analysts suggest only lack of space prevents it from getting any bigger. According to the UN office on Drug and Crime (UNODC) 95% of the world's opium is produced in Afghanistan and accounts for over half of the country's total GDP.⁶⁴

Assumptive Mistakes

There are crucial mistakes related with the major assumptions underlying current situation in Afghanistan. First, the task is not one of 'reconstruction' in Afghanistan but rather it is the creation of altogether new institutions of state structure. This is due to meager institutional endowment in Afghanistan state.⁶⁵ Second, the 'frontier character of the state' which according to Professor Rubin places Afghanistan on ethnic frontiers of regional states. Ethnic composition is such that the 42% of population of Afghanistan are Pashtuns, Tajiks 27%, Uzbeks 9%. Hazaras 9% and Turkomans 3% and 10% would like to call themselves Afghans irrespective of their ethnicity.

⁵⁹ Musharraf Interview with CNN (London), Friday 23 Jan. 2004 at www.cnn.com

⁶⁰ Syed Adnan A. Shah, "Internal Dynamics of Afghan after the 2005 Parliamentary Elections and the Impact on the Region, *Strategic Studies xxv1 no.2* (Sept. 2006), 100 – 121.

⁶¹ *New York Times*, 4 March 2006.

⁶² *Dawn*, 3 February 2007.

⁶³ Personal copy of Zhou Rong's paper. See, *Washington Post*, Karzai controls 1/3 of Afghanistan". 28 February, 2008.

⁶⁴ See a report by John Lee Anderson, "Letter from Afghanistan: The Taliban's Opium War; The difficulties and dangers of eradication programme", *The New York*, 9 and 16 July 2008, pp. 60-71,

⁶⁵ See Barnett R. Rubin, "The Frontier of Afghanistan", *Parameters*, Spring 2006, pp. 4-17.

On the other hand in NWFP the Ahmadzai Wazirs of South Waziristan Agency, Usmanzai Wazirs of North Waziristan, Mangals of Kurram Agency, Shinwaris of Khyber Agency, Musakhels, Isakhels and Safis of Mohmad Agency and Momund and Salarzai of Bajaur Agency are called “Assured Tribes” living on both sides of the border. These provide an adhesive element in the interconnectivity between Afghanistan and Pakistan side of the Durand Line.

Third, a complete code of life is provided by Pukhtoonwali code. It is embodied in their social norms and embedded in their soul. The badla or revenge is an integral part of this code. Four, political relationship has historically been carried out by tribal elders, known as Maliks, Sufaid Reesh or Mashar. The Afghan tribes are perfect in striking out favourable deals even in most unfavourable circumstances. Keeping in view such attributes Professor Rubin concludes that it is no longer a buffer but an effective ‘connector state’.⁶⁶

Four, the term ‘Pukhtun’ is a geographical term. The people on Aghan side of the border like to call themselves ‘Aghans’. The people on the Pakistani side of the border call themselves “Pushtuns”. All Taliban are Pushtuns but all Pushtuns are not Taliban.

Five, the new Taliban insurgency is a battle not for international jihad but a struggle by tribes, factions and strongmen against an unpopular Afghan government. Taliban commanders who send young Talibs on suicidal missions are often local men, with local grievances and local ambitions. Pushtun code of honour as well as the provocation that foreign troops represent motivate such men. These Taliban without support of local population would rather flap around on dry lands.

Finally, as pointed out by Professor Laura Schurmans of Jakarta, the post-Taliban political set up in Kabul is favourable to Delhi and a serious threat to Pakistan’s geo-political interests. The Northern Alliance has strong ties with India, where many of its leaders have a second home. Major reconstruction contracts have been awarded to Indian firms. These being manipulated to Pakistan’s disadvantage.⁶⁷

The New Set-up in Pakistan

It is vital for Pakistan not to have unfriendly powers on both its eastern and western borders.⁶⁸ Realising the significance of Pakistan Afghanistan relations after the February elections in Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari invited President Hamid Karzai at his oath-taking ceremony. The criticism by certain elements of Pakistani society towards Pakistan’s role in countering extremism needs careful analysis of the issue: whose war is this..?

Extremists have no rules a war without rules is being carried out by killing fellow Muslims. The irony is this the same militants talk about damage caused by American forces. The Jammaat e Islami leadership recently gave a statement in Karachi: ‘Taliban are not against Pakistan’. There are some among us who still defend them. This is worrisome. Pakistan cannot ignore this problem. This is a war for our survival and our future generations. There is a constant fear at the back of our mind. The people and the government need to condemn the acts of terrorism. There is an urgency to highlight those who are behind such acts. The perpetrations of crime must be given exemplary punishment.

In 2002 there were 2 suicide attacks. And the number increased to 56 in 2007. In 2003 there were 41 bomb blasts that went up to more than 700 by the time of writing of this paper. Innocent men, women and children are being torn to bits ruthlessly. On 25 February 2008 Nawaz Sharif stated: “there was no reason not to engage in a dialogue with those involved in terrorist activities”.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ Personal copy of the Professor Barnett R. Rubin’s paper presented at International Seminar on Afghanistan, Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 12.05.08.

⁶⁷ Pakistan Security Research Unit. Dept. of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, U.K. Brief number 3 Pakistan, the *Taliban* and Dadullah by Syed Saleem Shahzad, 1st March 2007. [http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Domestic + Stability](http://spaces.brad.ac.uk:8080/display/ssispsru/Domestic+Stability).

⁶⁸ *International Herald Tribune*, Resolve India – Paksitan tensions, <http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/02/16/opinion/eddomandv.Ph.D>.

⁶⁹ http://thenews.com.Pk/arc_default.asp.

The next day Surgeon General of Pakistan Army, Lt. Gen. Hafiz Mohammad Mushtaq Baig was killed by a suicide bomber in the highly security area of Rawalpindi Cantt.

On 20 September 2008, Marriott was blasted while friends and colleagues were breaking their fast inside. Ten days later on Eid day message another political leader stated that the government should shun someone else's war. It is best to talk to the families of 'Wah' carnage on the families of Marriott dumper blast victims to define talibans as well as what constitutes being against Pakistan. On 6 October 2008, a suicide bomber attacked MNA Rasheed Akbar Nawani's residence that killed 20 people. He is from Mr. Sharif's own party. On 22 August 2008 The News editorial stated: This is a fight very much to the death-for our very way of life, to protect and preserve it from people whose 'qualities' include intolerance, bigotry, hatred and downright bestiality. The sooner this is realized by all Pakistanis, by the state and its institutions and by the present government the better.

Max Weber defined state as an institution that has a monopoly over means of violence. Viewed from this perspective the situation becomes alarming while Pakistani forces face tough resistance from Taliban fighters in NWFP and FATA region. The writ of the state being challenged by such acts as hoisting of Taliban flag, girl's schools being razed to ground, CD shops blown up and abductions of foreign emissaries, abduction and killing of security personal.

In Buner where people created local Lashkar to fight talibans has resulted in suicidal attacks on their heads also. The writ of the state is further eroded by frequent kidnappings in NWFP. Particularly, in Peshawar city which is historically known the gateway to Pakistan. For example the killing of 52-year old Stephen D. Vance, the American contractor for US AID. This jeopardizes 750-million dollar development project for FATA. Then, the kidnapped Afghan ambassador – designate to Pakistan Abdul Khaliq Farhi, since 22nd September 2008; the recently abducted Iranian diplomat and the Chinese engineers complicate Pakistan's relations with the country to which kidnapped belong. The drivers of both the Iranian and Afghan diplomat were shot dead by the kidnapers. This is inhuman, unethical and directly anti-state act that must be condemned nation-wide.

Curbing Militancy

By far the collected evidences from different blast sites prove that suicidal bombers are being recruited from tribal belt secondly belong to poor families and thirdly are indoctrinated in a jihadi agenda that is based on fierce anti-Americanism. This ideology must be countered by an opposing Islamic ideology, where the best jihad is directed against one's own self. This requires correction of one's own self in the light of teachings of Quran and the traditions of Holy Prophet (AS). The foremost requirement is to obtain knowledge and bear hardships to complete one's education.

A counter ideology with vocal support from civil society to de-legitimise suicide attacks must be initiated. There is urgent need to ban FM radios that propagate hate and sectarianism. Terrorist organizations be deprived of human capital by job creation to provide an alternative means of livelihood.

This brings us to the crucial question of combat operations that have taken resources away from providing development and social uplift. What ought to come first. We believe that security comes first. By security we mean that acts like blasts in schools, hotels, juice shops should not take place. Children could go to school without the fear of abduction and torture. Doctors and teachers could proceed to their professions without fear of being mutilated or killed on the busy roads: "I mean basic security, the conditions under which most people, most of the time, are able to go about their lives".⁷⁰

All this requires a comprehensive policy where security and development are the concurrent themes. To implement this policy Pakistan has initiated a three-pronged strategy: Peace, prosperity and political engagement.

⁷⁰ See Amitai Etzioni, *Security First*, New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2—07, pp. 2-37.

1. As highlighted by the prime minister of Pakistan military action alone will not be effective in permanently ending the menace of terrorism.
2. Pakistan is reaching out to tribal leaders and notables as part of the political element of its overall strategy to fight extremists. Political engagement is only possible with those who renounce militancy and violence.
3. Pakistan has disallowed use of its territory against any other country and would root out the foreign terrorist elements that find hide outs in its territory.
4. New government in Pakistan headed by President Asif Ali Zardari and Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani categorically disapprove Washington's policy towards Pakistan and its strategy on counter terrorism.
5. The US drone attacks started since September 2008 inside Pakistan's territory have been condemned by Pakistan's military and political leadership. These are considered to be against the sovereignty of Pakistan. While the US leadership declared to respect Pakistan's sovereignty yet never promised to halt such attacks.
6. In the light of the remarkable consensus resolution of Pakistani parliament a 17-member implementation committee has been constituted. This committee plans to follow a two pronged strategy:
 - i) Foreign office would reach out to the countries that support Pakistan on various issues.
 - ii) At the military level Pakistan will take up the issue in the tripartite forum of military commanders consisting Gen. Kiyani, Commander of NATO forces general Daniel Mc Kiernan and the Afghan army chief gen. Bismullah Khan Kakar.
 - iii) The stress will be on better coordination and enhancement of cooperation. International coordination where perhaps SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organization) and NATO both could come together.

As regards domestic reconciliation the Taliban controlling Pakistan's Swat Valley declared a peace deal with the government to impose Shariah that would lead to militants laying down their arms. Within days of the ratification of Swat Peace agreement with the leader of Tehrik-e-Nifaz-a-Shariat Mohammadi, Maulana Sufi Mohammad and his son-in-law Maulana Fazlullah the Taliban moved to project power into Bunner. A growing consensus emerged among Pakistani politicians and the civil society that Taliban had gone too far and military should act to contain the spread of suicide bombings and militancy. In order to curb militancy and restore the writ of government military operation Rah-e-Rast was launched in April – May 2009.⁷¹

As a result there were 2.5 million IDPs (Internally Displaced Peoples). The government announced Swat Development Package (July 2009 – June 2011) comprising development projects costing about Rs. One billion.⁷² As a retaliation to the successful army operation in Swat and in anticipation of military's anticipated assault on South Waziristan the stronghold of TTP (Tehrike Taliban Pakistan) there were a series of attacks. Six Pakistani soldiers, among them a Brigadier and a Lieutenant Colonel, embraced shahadat when militants disguised in army uniforms rammed into the entrance to 6HQ on 10 October 2009. 20 October'09 suicide bomber hit at the International Islamic University cafeteria and Shariah faculty department. The bomber was obstructed at the entrance of cafeteria by the university employee from the Messiah Community. Otherwise the death toll could have been much greater. Brig. Moinuddin Ahmed and his driver were shot dead in residential area of G/11 Islamabad on 22 October 2009.

Thus a major ground offensive was carried out in South Waziristan Rahe Nijat in October 2009. Abdullah Mehsud with Rs. 10 million head money was apprehended from Tank, 26 November 2009 during operation Rahe Nijat. The toughest operation was launched at Sarargha which had been the base providing training to the suicide bombers of TTP. By curbing militancy the superb professionalism of Pakistan's military forces and air-force received outstanding appreciation from the public. The sacrifices given by Pakistan's army won the hearts and winds of people.

⁷¹ Mathew Rosenberg and Zahid Hussain, *Wall Street Journal*, 28 April 2009.

⁷² [http://www.nwfp.gov.pk/nwfp.gov/white paper 2009-10](http://www.nwfp.gov.pk/nwfp.gov/white%20paper%202009-10)

By dismantling the infrastructure of Taliban leaders in South Waziristan the core objective of Operation Rahe Nijat was secured. The more enduring factor for peace and development in NWFP would be to establish political authority in partnership with the local tribal chiefs. The governance ought to be free of corruption and devoted to the welfare of the common man.

The TTP commander of North Waziristan Hafiz Gul Bahadur and the Swat Taliban head Maulana Fazlullah had evaded the security forces. Even if they craned over to Afghanistan definitely they had been on the run and lost their base.⁷³ While Pakistan army fighting the radicals in Orakzai Agency bordering Hangu. The US nonetheless chase to remove several check posts on the Afghan side of the border. Pakistani officials were dismayed. This could facilitate the movement of indigenous Taliban and their supporters across the border. Obama administration had been reformulating its Afghan policy. This was quoted by New York Times of 16 November 2009; 'America wants to transfer its war heritage to Pakistan'.⁷⁴

A section of Pakistan media, civil society and religious parties believe in a conspiracy theory being hatched against the security of Pakistan. President Obama's 'new' plan and statements made by General Petraeus about missile strikes in Baluchistan were thought to be a part of a plan hatched with India. The aim would be a truncated Pakistan by creating a corridor from Afghanistan to the Arabian Sea via Baluchistan. More so when the present regime being charged with corruption, bad governance and disrespect for merit. US also must dispel the impression that it is interested in targeting Pakistan's nuclear capability.⁷⁵

Regional Cooperation

Commitments made in the declaration of 11th SAARC Summit with regard to terrorism must be implemented. Counter terrorism strategies based on greater intelligence sharing to promote mutual confidence. The Tripartite commission must be made to play its role to restore peace and promote harmony. A joint Declaration issued by Dr. Rangin Daftar Spanta and Makhdoom Shah Mahmood Qureshi the foreign minister of Afghanistan and Pakistan respectively reaffirmed resolve to greater cooperation. SAARC is the platform to enable India, Pakistan and Afghanistan to improve connectivity through qualitative and quantitative improvement in infrastructure, transient and communication corridors connecting the entire region.⁷⁶

Conclusion

Due to my interaction with the students of Pakistan Studies at the graduate level classes at NUST Business School, I increasingly realized that our syllabus of Pakistan Studies at the under-grade level is basically flawed. It needs serious changes. More so today than at any other time of our history. In our introductory class the usual response to a question about understanding Pakistan is: "it is an ideological state". Or else, "it is an Islamic State". The consistent focus of the last three decades on building an ideological state has affected Pakistan negatively. Serious corrections are required. Quaid-e-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah did not create Pakistan for theocracy. Secondly, in his address to the Pakistan Constituent Assembly on 11 August 1947, Jinnah called for the establishment of a modern tolerant democratic state that guaranteed freedom of religion to all citizens.⁷⁷ 18 February 2008 polls gave a clear mandate against religious extremism. The societal aspects of the Pakistani people are rooted in traditions of diversity. Let me narrate here one such example from my native city of Lahore as mentioned in the Lahore number of Naqoosh magazine.⁷⁸ In fact Islam spreaded in the subcontinent from the spirituality of Sufis and Saints. Mausoleum of Data Ganj Bakhsh attracts people from across the continent even in pre partition times. Just across the mausoleum was located Mela Ranis factory.

⁷³ Rahimullah Yusufzai, "Where have all the Taliban Leaders gone", The News International, 29 November 2009.

⁷⁴ Baseem Javaid, "Quitting Afghanistan", The News International, 25 November 2009.

⁷⁵ Kamran Khan, "US told not to back terrorism against Pakistan", The News International, 5 August 2008. http://blogtaragana.com/n/us-seeks_greater_role_for_India_in_afghanistan.

⁷⁶ http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Release/2009/Jan/PR_14_09.htm (Jan. to June 2009).

⁷⁷ Eamon Murphy & Dr. Ahmad Rashid Malik, "Pakistan Jihad: The Making of Religious Terrorism", IRRI Journal, 1x no.2 (Summer 2009): 23.

⁷⁸ Mohammad Tufail, ed. Naqoosh, "Lahore Number", Vol.2, Idara Faroghe Urdu, Lahore, 1962, pp. 1153 – 1155.

His three sons; Flt. Lieutenant Roop Ram all had graduated from the Chiefs College, Lahore. In 1918, the influenza epidemic killed 2 crore people within 3 to 4 months in Lahore.

Unfortunately Roy Bahadur's three sons fell victim to the disease. They were being treated by the best of doctors like Col. Bholu Nauth, Col. Ameer Chand and Col. Sutherland the then principal of King Edward Medical College. The Hindu – Muslim and Sikh friends of Roy Bahadur would daily pray for the well being. However, there were no signs of recovery. Then one night while everybody was asleep Roy Bahadur noticed a white bearded man, attired in radiant dress, holding a bead in one hand reciting along the bedside of his son Gopal Das. He got frightened and asked who he was, but the holy person never interrupted and went to the bedside of Room Ram and prayed. He then went to the bed of the third son and offered his prayers. Afterwards he said to me: "I am your neighbour Ganj Bakhsh. Seeing you in distress I have myself come to pray. Now there is nothing to worry about. God would grant health to all of them."

In the morning it so happened that due to the prayer of the saint the fever went down. Then Roy Bahadur Seran Das went to the Mausoleum and asked the caretakers what could be the best possible way to pay homage. Thus he was the one who first provided electricity at the tomb of Ganj Bakhsh. This diversity and harmony is rooted in traditions of not only Lahore, but spread across Pakistan from Sindh to Peshawar. Thus counter-terrorism strategies based on intellectual interventions that exploit ideological rigidities within adherents would de-radicate society. It is indeed crucial to promote intellectual discourse based on opposing ideology for the sake of eventual disengagement.⁷⁹

Islamist political establishment in Pakistan, namely Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam and Jam aat-e-Islami is rooted in Deobandi cum-Wahabi Islam. This brand of Islam that is intolerant of diversity and fiercely anti-American projects mysticism and spirituality. Conversely the common man in Pakistan has its roots in a Persian – Indo civilization, and not a part of the Arabic zone. Thus the foremost attempt should be made to squeeze the financial sources of a host of Saudi funded religions seminaries that spread rigid Wahabi indoctrination.⁸⁰

At the state level we need to introduce comparative study of religion and theology in addition to the study of Dinyat at the both undergrad and post-graduate levels. Secondly, peace and harmony at the regional level would enable Pakistan to focus on youth welfare oriented programmes. India – Pakistan composite dialogue needs sincere discussions and practical outcomes. Aggressive statements from Indian military and political elites create an environment of distrust and hostility.⁸¹

Pakistan is apprehensive of the role of three Indian consulates in Afghanistan. These consulates provide cover for Indian intelligence agencies to min covert operations against Pakistan. These foment separatism in Pakistan 's Baluchistan province. Pakistan's fears of enrichment by India have been compounded by the new Indian air base in Farkhor, Tajikistan, write South Asia experts Raja Karthikeya Gundu and Teresita C. Schaffer in an April 2008 Center for Strategic and International Studies News letter. Moreover India is also building a port in Chakbahar in India, which could connect Mumbai to the Iranian hinterland and thereby transport Indian goods to Afghanistan, by passing Pakistan completely.⁸²

This provides reason for the militant safe havens alongside the border in both NWFP as well as Baluchistan. Finally the international community and particularly America needs to remain sensitive to the crucial aspects of Pakistan's security and territorial integrity. If each inch of Afghan territory has been respected by NATO or ISAF forces then Pakistan expects the same on the east of Durand Line.

⁷⁹ Tore Bjorgo and John Horgan, eds. *Leaving Terrorism Behind: Individual and Collective Disengagement* (London: Rotledge), 2009.

⁸⁰ Names of funding institutes are available at the website of the International Center for Religion and Diplomacy, Washington DC. [http://www.icrd.org/index.php?option=com_content & task=view+id=105&Itemid=104](http://www.icrd.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view+id=105&Itemid=104).

⁸¹ Shah Mahmood Qureshi's message to India ahead of forthcoming Commonwealth Meeting. "I am not interested in a mere photo session". The News International, 20 November 09.

⁸² http://www.efr.org/publication/17474/india_afghanistan_relations.html. Accessed on 14 August 2009. Also see, "India & Pakistan in Afghanistan: Hostile Sports", South Asia Monitor, 117 (3 April 2008).