

Analysis of Corruption from Sociocultural Perspectives

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Abstract

Since the 1990s, corruption has increasingly attracted global attention. Scholars often attribute the root causes of corruption to manifold reasons, including government bureaucracy, corporation monopolies, opaque government incomes, weak accountability, and lack of strict law enforcement and necessary public supervision. However, deeper sociocultural factors behind corruption are less examined and often underrated. This paper aims to explore the relationship between corruption and cultural psychology by examining Chinese society. The influences of sociocultural factors on corruption are investigated from two diverse viewpoints: (a) unique features of Chinese culture, including social relations, favors, face, and office standards; and (b) Hofstede's cultural dimensions as a comparative Western framework. In addition, the paper includes a novel meta-analysis of convicted corrupt officials from China, revealing that the majority of corrupt officials have less privileged or low-income agrarian family backgrounds (Appendix: Table 1). This paper postulates that an individual's negative experiences in childhood (e.g., poverty, hunger) combined with a collectivist agrarian tradition likely have a strong impact on future corruption. By exploring the seldom discussed aspects of cultural psychology on Chinese corruption, this paper seeks to shed new light on corruption etiology that goes beyond traditional Western schools of thought.

Keywords: Corruption, sociocultural factors, Chinese culture, relationship-centered society, Hofstede's cultural dimensions

1. Introduction

Corruption is a widespread phenomenon that is raising global concern. According to the world's largest public opinion survey on corruption by Transparency International, regardless of the corruption level of the country, participants from all countries felt to some degree that corruption was wrong (Hess and Sauter, 2013).

There are varied definitions of corruption across different academic fields that significantly influence how it is measured and studied. Nye's (1967) definition of corruption is "*behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role because of private-regarding pecuniary or status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding interests.*" Transparency International (2014) defines corruption as the "*abuse of entrusted power for private gain,*" differentiating between grand, petty, and political corruption. A simpler definition from the World Bank is "*the use of public office for private gain*" (Tanzi, 1998). Corruption can be classified into categories that roughly include graft, bribery, embezzlement, and prebendalism (patron-client relationship) (Luo, 2005).

China is a highly fitting state for studying corruption. Although the People's Republic of China has more than 1,200 laws, rules, and directives against corruption, implementation has been generally ineffective, with the odds of a corrupt official going to jail less than three percent (Pei, 2007). Previous literature has focused more on corruption in Western nations, and there is scant research that examines the cultural causes of corruption in China as this paper seeks to do.

2. Methodology

This paper utilizes information from Chinese and English language sources, with a combination of scholarly journals and news media that provided historical context and anecdotal evidence.

Official reports and documents regarding corruption were drawn from online websites of the United Nations and official Chinese websites, including those of the China Supreme People's Court, the Supreme People's Procuratorate, and the National Bureau of Corruption Prevention. The data for Chinese corrupt officials and their family backgrounds were collected from Chinese official media. Original documents in Chinese were translated to the best of the author's bilingual knowledge. It should be noted that officially released reports of corruption may be distorted in China and fail to reflect the complete picture.

3. Etiology of Corruption

Analyzing the reasons behind corruption is important because it leads to discourse regarding anti-corruption policies. The examination of corruption and state crime is still underdeveloped, as acknowledged in the Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Maguire, *et al.*, 2012). Nevertheless, multiple corruption theories already abound. Oftentimes, distinct corruption theories tend to overlap as well, making it difficult to test hypotheses (Pinto, *et al.*, 2008).

While literature on the particular area of state crime and corruption, and more so Chinese corruption, is not abundant, there is a detectable difference between general Chinese explanations for corruption and Western theoretical ideas behind corruption. The main reasons for corruption provided by the Chinese state and even Chinese media and civilians are not theoretical ideas of criminology or psychology, but rather practicality and personal interest, relevant to Chinese cultural norms.

Existing etiology research is stretched far and wide, incorporating different schools of thought including: popular game theoretic models of corruption (Dong *et al.*, 2010; Aidt, 2003; Aidt, *et al.*, 2008; Myint 2000) and economic explanations of rational choice theory (Chan 2004; Liu, 2004); sociological approaches (Fabre 2001); broken windows theory (Alford 2013); political theories regarding democracy (Sun and Johnston, 2009); social control and disorganization theories (Tang 1997); psychological and cognitive social theories (Pinto, Leana, and Pil, 2008); and social learning theory (Meng and Friday, 2010). Empirical analyses also exist, which generally test multiple variables through a game theoretic equation (Tresiman, 2000).

4. Cultural Factors in Corruption

Culture and corruption are closely interrelated, as studied by many researchers (*e.g.*, Husted, 1999; Lambsdorff, 2006; Cameron *et al.*, 2009; Barr and Serra, 2010). Hofstede (1980) proposed that culture is “the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one human group from another,” so that culture is shared among group members that have common values and beliefs. Culture interacts with corruption through formal institutions and social norms, both of which can differ across countries (Banuri and Eckel, 2012). Therefore, when studying the influence of cultural factors on corruption, it is important to identify unique features in that specific culture.

There are four specific elements that play critical roles in Chinese society: social relationships (*guan xi*), favors (*renqing*), face (*mianzi*) and office standards (*guan ben wei*). Each of these will be addressed in the following sections.

4.1 Relationship-Centered Chinese Society

Oftentimes Western theories are adopted in cross-national studies on different societies. However, distinctive features of Chinese society may be overlooked this way. In examining Chinese culture, the “differential mode of association” proposed by Xiaotong Fei (1947) must be explained in detail. This theory describes the pattern of interpersonal closeness in China. Unlike Western societies where individuals form organizations with a strong group mentality, traditional Chinese society is symbolized as “circles that appear on the surface of a lake when a rock is thrown into it. Each person stands at the center of the circles produced by him or herself” (Fei, 1947). Each web of social relations has an individual as its center and everyone's circles are interrelated (Fei, 1992). The structure of social relationships in traditional Chinese society is shown in Figure 1. For a relatively closed rural society, most social interactions occur in its core, *i.e.*, between individual to family and family to local community.




Figure 1: Theoretical Structure of Chinese Society Based on Fei's Theory

Fei's theory provides a theoretical basis for understanding Chinese culture. Thus, in China individuals seek connections in higher places and do things for the sake of friendship and connections, while in the West, people place an emphasis on struggling for rights and equality of specific groups. China has long been a relationship-centered society that emphasizes interpersonal relationships and interactions due to historical agrarian-dominated economy and self-containment. Differential associations with random acquaintances integrate individuals into a society with social networks (Wu, 2011). In a relationship-oriented society, there are fuzzy boundaries between gift-giving and bribery. After observing bribes in foreign investment in China, Smart (1993) pointed out that gifts, bribes, and commodities are not real entities that can be scrutinized, fitted to a formal definition, and labeled.

The formation of social relationship networks is greatly affected by the Chinese special kinship culture of *guanxi*. Based on Chinese traditional culture, which does not clearly separate public and private life, a network of personal ties is used for public business (He, 2000). A member of the *guanxi* network has an obligation to help and give resources to certain family and group ties. A series of reciprocated behaviors generally build this *guanxi* to a strong relationship. *Guanxi* can serve as transparent communication networks that allow for covert exchanges, facilitating corruption; as a trusted network, it can also lower the risk of detection (Zhan, 2012). As an interpersonal organization, the *guanxi* network can also influence behavior through psychological peer pressure or social learning and contagion theories. Moreover, the authority of *guanxi* also establishes a form of criminal legitimacy. Thus, the lack of separation between the public and private spheres through a *guanxi* network is a contributing factor to corruption. Research has suggested that in traditional societies where separation is ambiguous and gift giving is not clearly distinguished from bribery, the social stigma of corruption may be low or non-existent (Myrdal, 1970). On the other hand, there is strong evidence that the process of economic development reduces corruption as it separates public and private roles and spreads education (Treisman, 2000).

These ideas are similar to a 'clashing moral values' theory (Graaf, 2007) where officials feel obligated to fulfill important personal connections after requests from close friends and family. In fact, favors (*renqing*) are a central concept in Chinese culture and function as a lubricant to maintain social harmony of the society. The depth of favors is directly proportional to the closeness of interpersonal relationship. Common practices for enhancing interpersonal relationships involve gifts and banquets as well personal favors. Obligatory reciprocity to maintain these relationships helps continue existing corruption. Under such cultural environments, some officials find it difficult to reject offers from others. In addition, the theory of bounded ethicality (Chugh, *et al.*, 2005; Darley, 2005) may be relevant too; helping close friends and neighbors out may not seem wrong, but rather an inherent part of Chinese societal norms.

The concept of “face” (*mianzi*) in Chinese culture is also salient. Face is a difficult concept to translate into Western terms, and can encompass dignity, honor, reputation, and respect. Yang (1989) pointed out: “Face is especially important in Chinese culture because it is not only a matter of prestige, but an emblem for personal identity...A face intact is a source of a sense of well-being, self-respect, and security.” One who has a reputation for having a great ‘face’, and therefore, networks that can be used to accomplish a great deal, becomes someone worth networking with. This symbolic capital makes it easier for such people to develop relationships with any particular individual (Smart, 1993). In China, harmony is usually achieved by giving face to others. People also expect others to reciprocate the level of face they gave. Declining a request, offer, or invitation directly may be considered as not giving face to others. Refusing gifts or banquet invitations may cause humiliation (*i.e.*, “losing face”). Therefore, corruption is often excused as “courtesy demands reciprocity”.

In addition, historical tradition such as the “office standards” (*guan ben wei*), which began during the centralized bureaucratic hierarchy of the Qin Dynasty (221 BC to 206 BC), encourage corruption. “Office standards” refer to the cultural and political phenomenon that prioritizes state official rank as the primary measure of social status (Lu, 2000). China’s civil service examination system spanned 1,300 years and encouraged intellectuals to pursue careers as imperial court officials. Acing the exam to become an imperial official was so important to daily life that it was considered one of the traditional “*four greatest happiness*.”

This heritage of personal rule dominating over the rule of law, with the emperor and high officials acknowledged as ‘above the law’ (Zhu, 2012), extends to today. Government posts are still highly coveted for their stability and benefits—an ‘iron rice bowl’ that can feed one for life. In 2012, more than 1.6 million people registered to take the civil service test in China to fill about 20,800 jobs (Roberts, 2012). The psychological power given to government officials by Chinese civilians provides fertile ground for corruption. In an office standard dominated society, there is a low level of respect for law and a weak tradition of public supervision. In such a society, establishing and maintaining political and economic orders relies on officials rather than legal systems. Therefore, it strengthens privileges and immunities of officials and opens up the potential for public corruption.

4.2 Cultural Dimensions Explanation of Corruption

There are multiple frameworks in Western cultural psychology that seek to explain cross-cultural differences, such as Hofstede, Trompenaars, and the GLOBE study. In addition, a Confucian Dynamism survey (Hofstede and Bond, 1988) also indicated unique cultural value orientations in China, especially Confucian work dynamism that was later integrated by Hofstede as long-versus short-term orientation (2001). Much of Hofstede’s framework (1980, 2001), including power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism, and most significantly long-versus short-term orientation, can be applied to Chinese corruption etiology. Masculinity-femininity and indulgence-restraint, however, are not highly relevant. This paper finds that Chinese culture can be delineated by traditional Western frameworks that further help explain causes of corruption.

Power distance in a society refers to “the extent to which a society accepts the fact that power in institutions and organizations is distributed unequally” (Hofstede). Davis and Ruhe (2003) found that power distance is positively correlated with corruption. China is one of the highest power distance index (PDI) countries. This indicates that inequalities among people are commonly accepted by the Chinese society. Based on Confucianism, there is utmost respect for age and hierarchy in China. Furthermore, due to the lack of equality, superiors are better able to conceal their transactions as they are not required to make their transactions transparent (McLaughlin, 2013).

Uncertainty is referred to a state where outcomes and conditions are unknown or unpredictable. The uncertainty avoidance index (UAI) is based upon “a society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity.” In low UAI countries such as China, ambiguity and adaptability regarding laws and rules to fit situations make corruption more likely.

Individualism refers to a loosely knit social framework in which individuals rely on personal efforts to achieve success. In contrast, collectivism is characterized by a tight social framework in which people distinguish between in-groups and out-groups. China ranks lower than any other Asian country in the individualism factor. This may be attributed to traditional Confucianism as well as the current political beliefs of the PRC state. As mentioned before, China has historically been a rural agrarian nation with an emphasis on collective forces of family and farm (Gallo, 2009). Thus, the importance placed on social networks contributes to corruption.

Finally, China’s emphasis on Confucian dynamism, or long-term orientation, further promotes the importance of fulfilling social obligations.

This includes establishing *guanxi*, giving favors of *renqing*, and reciprocating when needed to preserve *mianzi*. The long-term outlook of Chinese culture fosters the importance of maintaining relationships, which often involve corrupt activities.

Hofstede's other dimensions of masculinity-femininity and indulgence-restraint are not clearly associated with corruption. In some studies, a positive correlation has been found between masculinity and corruption (Getz and Volkema, 2001; Seleim and Bontis, 2009; McLaughlin, 2013). Robertson and Watson (2004) pointed out that the masculine values of assertiveness, aggressiveness, and materialism tend to be associated with a higher degree of corruption. With a success-oriented tradition, China has a masculinity index value of 66 (Hofstede *et al.*, 2010), which is in the high range. This may provide a good explanation for the high corruption level in China today. However, it does not explain how many countries with high masculinity index values, including Japan (95), Austria (79), and Switzerland (70), have lower levels of corruption. This indicates that masculinity-femininity cannot fully be attributed to corruption and requires further research.

5. Discussion of Meta-Analysis

Historically, China has been a self-sufficient agrarian society. Due to the low product efficiency of the peasant economy, most families, especially those in rural areas, suffer from poverty and hunger. Furthermore, each farm is the basis of a strong collectivist community, as discussed earlier. This study indicates that negative psychological effects of poverty from childhood combined with traditional societal norms maintained in agrarian communities may contribute to corruption in adulthood.

A widely espoused theory suggests that adverse family environments have detrimental effects on childhood. According to Freud's psychoanalytic theory of personality (Fancher, 1973), childhood memories may be preserved in the unconscious mind and affect thinking and behavior during adult life. While corruption is often cited as causing poverty, this study reveals that poverty and oftentimes ensuing hunger are the most prominent negative experiences related to ensuing corruption.

While previous research has examined the detrimental effects of poverty on children's physical health, achievement, and behavior, few studies measure the influence of poverty on children's psychology. Based on the data of nationally representative surveys, Brooks-Gunn and Duncan (1997) found that poor children suffer from emotional and behavioral problems more frequently. The results of their study suggest that living in poverty exacts a heavy toll on children. Other investigators have pointed out that the timing of poverty is also important. Poverty during the preschool and early school years exhibits the strongest correlation with low rates of high school completion, as compared with poverty during the childhood and adolescent years (Baydaret *al.*, 1993; Duncan *et al.*, 1998).

Moreover, poverty and hunger are often interrelated. Weinreb *et al.* (2002) studied the impact of hunger on children's physical and mental health. They found that school-aged children with severe hunger were more likely to be homeless, have low birth weights, have more stressful life events, and have higher levels of chronic illness, when compared with those with no hunger. This study shows that for both preschoolers and school-aged children, severe child hunger is associated with higher levels of internalizing behavior problems. Research has revealed that childhood hunger can significantly influence adult personality (Galler, 2013). After evaluating the mental statuses of the once-starved children, the researchers found that at 40 years old, these individuals scored five-time higher on tests that measure neuroticism, which is associated with negative emotions and distress.

From a psychological perspective, Chinese officials from less affluent families such as those with agricultural backgrounds are more likely to expend greater effort to obtain promotions than 'old money' or powerful families that have passed down leadership through generations. Traditional concepts such as office standards and collectivist social networks hold greater weight in these conformist families. Additionally, these officials may harbor an "owe and compensation" mentality (Liu, 2013); they believe that because society owed them before, they should be compensated by society. A survey of 30 corruption officials that were sentenced to death or death with two-year reprieve indicates that 83.33% of the corruption officials were from poor peasant families, 11.11% from worker families and 5.56% from intellectual families (Ding *et al.*, 2010). Another survey for 373 low- and middle-level corruption officials show that about 55.5% of corruption officials come from peasant families, 34.0% from working families, and 10.5% from high-ranking officer families (Guo and Xue, 2013). The analysis results suggest that in descending order of influence factors that affect corruption are: official rank, educational background, growth environment, age and type of duties.

The meta-analysis compiled by the author (Appendix: Table 1) of 104 high-level officials convicted of corruption offenses in China since 2000 shows that the majority of corrupt officials came from less affluent and socially marginalized 'peasant', 'worker' and 'civilian' families (73.08%), compared with those from government/CPC official (16.35%), staff member (0.96%), intellectual (0.96%), rich (1.92%) and unknown (6.73%) family backgrounds. It should be noted that most of these corrupt officials were born or grew up during times of material shortages and poverty, including the severe hyperinflation period (1947-1949), Great Famine (1959-1962) and Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). This also suggests that Durkheim's anomie and Merton's strain theories, where social disintegration and structural inequality contribute to crime, may be applied to Chinese corruption. Given difficulties in gathering accurate data from official state media, further research is needed to determine if poverty and agrarian collectivist environments foster corruption in China.

6. Conclusion

This study aims to explore the relationship between corruption and unique aspects of culture and psychology. Key features of Chinese culture, including relationships, favors, face, and office standards, have built the foundation of social relationship-centered Chinese society. These cultural features blur the boundary between normal interpersonal relationships and corrupt behaviors, making corruption an inherent aspect of traditional Chinese society.

Four of Hofstede's cultural dimensions, including power distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism-collectivism, and long-versus short-term orientation, seem to help explain Chinese corruption. Unlike previous studies (Getz and Volkema, 2001; Seleim and Bontis, 2009; McLaughlin, 2013), masculinity/femininity cannot be clearly said to cause corruption.

Finally, the meta-analysis of corrupt officials demonstrates the strong association between negative childhood experiences and corruption, as well as the influence of a traditional agrarian collectivist family background. The collected data indicates that the majority of corrupt officials came from poor rural backgrounds in farming communities. Both Western traditional frameworks such as Hofstede's cultural dimensions and unique aspects of Chinese culture can be incorporated into this theory. Due to the clandestine nature of official Chinese data, future research would most likely need to be conducted in the field to investigate rural Chinese views on tradition and corruption, along with wider access to corruption data, and if feasible, interviews with convicted Chinese officials.

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Appendix

Table 1: Survey of 104 High-Level Officials Convicted of Corruption Offenses in China Since 2000

Name	Previous position	Family background	Status	Time
Meng, Qingping	Vice Governor, Hubei Province	Poor peasant	10 years	Jan. 6, 2000
Hu, Changqing	Vice Governor, Jiangxi Province	Poor peasant	Death	March 8, 2000
Geng, Yongxiang	Head, Hangzhou Customs	Peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	July 6, 2000
Chen, Kejie	Vice Chairman, NPC	Minority (Zhuang) Poor peasant	Death	Sept. 14, 2000
Xu, Yunhong	Vice Governor, Zhejiang Province	Peasant	10 years	Oct. 17, 2000
Yang, Qianxian	Head, Xiamen Customs	Senior official	Death	Nov. 8, 2000
Mu, Suixin	Mayor of Shenyang, Liaoning Province	Senior official	Death with two-year reprieve	Oct. 10, 2001
Li, Jizhou	Vice Minister, PRC Ministry of Public Security	Senior official, PRC Ministry of Public Security	Death with two-year reprieve	Oct. 22, 2001
Ji, Shengde	Deputy Minister of Intelligence Dept., General Staff Dept., PLA	Senior statesman of CPC	Life imprisonment	Jan., 2002
Liu, Zhibing	Vice Chairman, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	Poor peasant	15 years	June 24, 2002
Wang, Leyi	Deputy head, PRC General Administration of Customs	Poor peasant	13 years	Sept. 6, 2002
Zheng, Guangdi	Deputy Minister, PRC Department of Transportation	Senior officer, famous reporter	5 years	Sept. 27, 2002
Gao, Yan	GM, State Power Corporation Secretary of Yunnan Province	Peasant	Escaped overseas	Sept., 2002
Zhu, Xiaohua	Chairman of board, Hong Kong Everbright Group	Civilian family	15 years	Oct. 10, 2002
Pan, Guangtian	Vice Chairman of CPPCC Shandong Province	Small business owner	Life imprisonment	April 23, 2003
Cong, Fukui	Vice Governor, Hebei Province	Poor peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	April 29, 2003
Li, Jiating	Governor, Yunnan Province	Minority (Yi) peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	May 9, 2003
Tian, Fengqi	President, Liaoning Superior Court	Poor peasant	Life imprisonment	May 15, 2003
Cheng, Weigao	Governor, Hebei Province	Peasant	Expelled from CPC	Aug. 9, 2003
Li, Zhen	Head, Tax Dept. of Hebei Province	Senior officer	Death	Nov. 13, 2003
Wang, Xuebing	President, Bank of China	Senior officer	12 years	Dec. 10, 2003
Mai, Chongkai	President, Guangdong Superior Court	Orphan	15 years	Dec. 24, 2003
Wang, Huaizhong	Vice Governor, Anhui Province	Orphan, beggar	Death	Feb. 12, 2004
Liu, Fangren	CPC Secretary, Guizhou Province	Poor peasant	Life imprisonment	June 29, 2004
Xiao, Zhanwu	Commissioner, IRS, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	Poor peasant	Life imprisonment	July, 21, 2004
Wang, Zhonglu	Chairman, ITIC of Zhejiang Province, Vice Governor	Not available	12 years	Aug. 31, 2004
Liu, Ketian	Vice Governor, Liaoning Province	Civilian family	12 years	Feb. 4, 2005
Lv, Debin	Vice Governor Henan Province	Poor peasant	Death	Oct. 17, 2005
Han, Guizhi	Chairwoman of CPPCC, Heilongjiang Province	Peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	Dec. 15, 2005
Tian, Fengshan	Governor, Heilongjiang Province	Peasant	Life imprisonment	Dec. 27, 2005
Li, Dachang	Vice Governor, Sichuan Province	Bank stuff	7 years	April 4, 2006
Wang, Shouye	Minister of Infrastructure Barracks Dept., General Logistics Dept., PLA	Poor peasant	Life imprisonment (final sentence)	May 10, 2006
Hou, Wujie	Deputy Secretary of CPC, Shanxi Province	Peasant	11 years	Sept. 18, 2006
Zhang, Enzhao	President, China Construction Bank	Worker	15 years	Nov. 3, 2006
He, Minxu	Vice Governor, Anhui Province	Middle level of CPC official	Death with two-year reprieve	Dec. 27, 2006
Wang, Zhaoyao	CPC Deputy Secretary, Anhui Province	Poor peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	Jan. 12, 2007

Qiu, Xiaohua	Head, PRC National Bureau of Statistics	Peasant	1 year	March 20, 2007
Song, Pingshun	Vice Mayor of Tianjin	Poor family	Suicide during investigation period	June 3, 2007
Zheng, Xiaoyu	Director of China's State Food and Drug Administration	Worker in hospital polyclinic	Death	July 10, 2007
Duan, Yihe	Director of People's Congress Standing Committee of Jinan, Shandong Province	Poor peasant	Death(Murder and corruption)	Sept. 5, 2007
Du, Shicheng	CPC Secretary and Mayor of Qingdao, Shandong Province	Peasant	Life imprisonment	Feb. 5, 2008
Chen, Liangyu	Member of CPC Politburo Mayor of Shanghai	Comprador	18 years	April 11, 2008
Liu, Zhihua	Vice Mayor of Beijing	Uprising officer of Kuomintang army	Death with two-year reprieve	Oct. 15, 2008
Chen, Tonghai	Chairman of board, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation	Senior official of CPC	Death with two-year reprieve	July, 15, 2009
Sun, Yu	Vice Chairman, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	Minority (Zhuang) Civilian family	18 years	Aug.31, 2009
Sun, Shanwu	Vice Chairman of CPPCC, Henan Province	Poor peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	Feb. 10, 2010
Huang, Songyou	Vice President of Supreme Court	Poor peasant	Life imprisonment	March 17, 2010
Wang, Yi	Vice President, National Development Bank	Minority (Bai), Local government officer	Death with two-year reprieve	April 15, 2010
Zhu, Zhigang	Director, Budgetary Work Committee of NPC	Not available	Life imprisonment	May 10, 2010
Mi, Fengjun	Deputy Director of Standing Committee of People's Congress, Jilin Province	Minority (Hui) Not available	Death with two-year reprieve	May 28, 2010
Wen, Qiang	Head, Dept. of Justice, Chongqing	Store employee	Death	July 7, 2010
Chen, Shaoji	CPPCC Chairman, Guangdong province	Peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	July 23, 2010
Wang, Huayuan	Secretary, CPC Zhejiang Commission for Discipline Inspection	Not available	Death with two-year reprieve	Sept. 9, 2010
Kong, Rixin	CPC secretary and GM, China National Nuclear Corporation	Peasant	Life imprisonment	Nov. 19, 2010
Huang, Yao	Chairman of CPPCC, Guizhou Province	Minority (Buyi) Poor peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	Dec. 9, 2010
Song, Yong	Deputy director, Standing Committee of People's Congress, Liaoning Province	Worker	Death with two-year reprieve	Jan. 30, 2011
Li, Tangtang	Vice Chairman, Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region	Peasant	Life imprisonment	April 8, 2011
Xu, Zongheng	Mayor of Shenzhen, Guangdong	Railway worker	Death with two-year reprieve	May 9, 2011
Xu, Maiyong	Vice mayor of Hangzhou, Zhejiang Province	Poor peasant	Death	July 19, 2011
Jiang, Renjie	Vice mayor of Suzhou, Jiangsu Province	Peasant	Death	July 19, 2011
Zhnag, Jiameng	Deputy director, Standing Committee of People's Congress, Zhejiang Province	Peasant	Life imprisonment	Dec. 20, 2011
Song, Chenguang	Vice Chairman of CPPCC, Jiangxi Province	Peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	April 27, 2012
Song, Yong	Vice Chairman, Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	Worker	Life imprisonment	July 2, 2012
Jiao, Li	Deputy head of GAPP, Head of CCTV	Peasant	Under investigation	Oct. 16, 2012
Liu, Zhijun	Minister of Ministry of Railways, PRC	Poor peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	July, 8, 2013
Huang Sheng	Vice Governor, Shandong Province	Officer	Life imprisonment	May 3, 2013
Bo, Xilai	Member of CPC Politburo, CPC Secretary of Chongqing	Senior statesman of CPC	Life imprisonment	Oct. 25, 2013
Tian, Xueren	Vice Governor, Jilin Province	Not available	Life imprisonment	Nov. 1, 2013
Zhou, Yizhong	Mayor of Kaifeng, Henan Province	Peasant	Life imprisonment	Jan. 18, 2014
Jin, Daoming	Deputy Director, Shanxi People's Congress	Minority (Man) Officer	Under investigation	Feb. 27, 2014

Zhou, Zhenhong	Head, United Front Dept., Guangdong Province	Poor peasant	Death with two-year reprieve	Feb. 28, 2014
Gu, Junshan	Deputy Minister of Infrastructure Barracks Dept., General Logistics Dept., PLA	Peasant	Public prosecution	March 31, 2014
Guo, Yongxiang	Vice Governor, Sichuan Province	Poor peasant	Arrested	April 9, 2014
Li, Chuncheng	CPC Vice Secretary, Sichuan Province	Peasant	Sent to judiciary	April 29, 2014
Su, Rong	Vice Chairman of CPPCC National Committee	Poor peasant	Under investigation	June 14, 2014
Ling, Zhengce	Vice Chairman of CPPCC, Shanxi Province	Middle level official	Under investigation	June 19, 2014
Du, Shanxue	Vice Governor, Shanxi Province	Civilian family	Under investigation	June 19, 2014
Xu, Changhou	Member of CPC Politburo Vice Chairman of Central Military Commission of PRC and CPC	Staff of street resident committee	Arrest	June 30, 2014
Song, Lin	Chairman of China Resources Group	University teacher	Under investigation	April 17, 2014
Guo, Youming	Vice Governor, Hubei Province	Not available	Arrested	April 23, 2014
Tan, Li	Vice Governor, Hainan Province	Paper mill worker	Under investigation	July, 8 2014
Jiang, Jiemin	Director of SASAC	Peasant	Arrested	July, 13, 2014
Wang, Yongchun	Vice GM, CNPC	Peasant	Arrested	July 13, 2014
Li, Dongsheng	Vice Minister, PRC Ministry of Public Security	Civilian family	Arrested	July, 13, 2014
Wang, Suyi	Head, United Front Work Dept., Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region	Peasant	Life imprisonment	July17, 2014
Ji, Wenlin	Vice Governor, Hainan Province	Poor peasant, illiteracy	Arrested	July 17, 2014
Wu, Changshun	Vice Chairman, CPPCC of Tianjin	Civilian family	Under investigation	July 20, 2014
Yao, Mugen	Vice Governor, Jiangxi Province	Peasant	Arrested	Aug. 5, 2014
Zhu, Zuoli	Vice Chairman of CPPCC, Shanxi Province	Civilian family	Arrested	Aug. 6, 2014
Shen, Peiping	Vice Governor, Yunnan Province	Civilian family	Arrested	Aug. 6, 2014
Tong, Mingqian	Vice Chairman of CPPCC, Hunan Province	Civilian family	5 years	Aug. 18, 2014
Ren, Runhou	Vice Governor, Shanxi Province	Coal minor	Deceased during the investigation	Aug. 29, 2014
Li, Chongxi	Chairman of CPPCC, Sichuan Province	Civilian family	Arrested	Sept. 11, 2014
Wan, Qingliang	CPC Secretary of Guangzhou, Guangdong Province	Poor peasant	Arrested	Oct. 9, 2014
Li, Daqiu	Vice Chairman of CPPCC, Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	Poor peasant	15 years	Oct. 13, 2014
Chen, Tiexin	Vice Chairman of CPPCC, Liaoning Province	Not available	Arrested	Oct. 28, 2014
Zhu, Mingguo	Chairman of CPPCC, Guangdong Province	Peasant	Under investigation	Nov. 28, 2014
Zhou, Yongkang	Member of CPC Politburo Standing Committee	Poor peasant	Arrested	Dec. 5, 2014
Liu, Tienan	Head of National Energy Administration	Worker	Life imprisonment	Dec. 10, 2014
Han, Xiancong	Vice Chairman of CPPCC, Anhui Province	Peasant	Arrested	Dec. 11, 2014
Ni, Fake	Vice Governor, Anhui Province	Worker	First instance	Dec. 15, 2014
Ji, Jianye	Mayor of Nanjing, Jiangsu Province	Poor peasant	Public prosecution	Dec. 17, 2014
Shen, Weichen	CPC Secretary of China Association for Science	Carpenter	Arrested	Dec.22, 2014
Ling, Jihua	Vice Chairman of National CPPCC	Middle level official	Under investigation	Dec. 22, 2014

Note: CCTV – China Central Television
 CNPC - China National Petroleum Corporation
 CPC - Communist Party of China
 CPPCC – Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference
 GAPP – General Administration of Press and Publications
 IRS – Internal Revenue Service
 ITIC - International Trust and Investment Corporation
 NPC – National People's Congress
 PLA – People's Liberation Army
 NDRC - National Development and Reform Commission
 PRC – People's Republic of China
 SASAC - State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission