

## **Medieval Perspectives: Jean de Waurin and His Perception of the Turks in Anatolia in the Late Middle Ages**

**T. Tolga Gumus (Asist. Prof.)**  
Mersin University  
Faculty of Science and Humanities  
Department of History  
Çiftlikköy Kampüsü  
Mersin/Turkey

### **Abstract**

*This article investigates Jean de Waurin's perception of the Turks in his account of the expedition in Anatolia in fifteenth century. The first part gives a brief account of Jean de Waurin. The second part analyses in detail his perception of the Turks, his expedition to Anatolia and his reasons for writing his account of the crusade of Varna. Then, Waurin's perspective about the Turks is compared with various views of some other sixteenth century accounts. By doing so, the differences and similarities of the European perception of the Turks of the two centuries in question are discussed. It is argued that Waurin saw the Turks firstly as an enemy and then as 'the enemy of the Christian faith'. This study also discusses why Waurin wrote this account. The reason was that this account was a crusading propaganda. What Waurin was making in his expedition was clearly a 'crusade' and accordingly religious tone in his account is something to be noted.*

**Key Words:** Jean de Waurin, Turks, Crusade of Varna, Humanist Crusading Propaganda, Walerin de Waurin, European Perception of the Turks.

### **1. Introduction**

This paper discusses the reasons Waurin wrote his account of the crusade of Varna and Walerin de Waurin's expedition into the Balkans, which was later published within his history of Britain and how he perceived and accordingly presented the Turks to the renaissance readers. His primary aim in writing his history was probably to demonstrate that the Duke of Burgundy was a key figure in helping the Christians in their quest of crusade and the Burgundian forces were very effective and useful in the service of Christianity. This Burgundian interest of military expedition against the Ottomans was by no means new as it went down to the time of Philip's father John the fearless (Chasin, 1989, p. 289). Waurin occasionally denigrated the foe, the Turks probably for raising interest in the reader. In this respect the work is a typical humanist crusading propaganda in its narration of the events between the Christians and the Turks. Then Waurin's perception of the Turks is elaborated by referring to some examples in his chronicle. Lastly, the historical significance of his work is discussed.

### **2. Waurin and his Account of Varna**

Jean de Waurin [Waurin] Seigneur de Forestel, (b. 1399/1400, d. in or after 1473/4) served as ambassador and counselor for Philip the Good, duke of Burgundy (d. 1467). His political career was far more remarkable than his military career as after ending his military career in 1436, Duke Philip. He was actively enrolled in the crusading campaign against the Turks as he was accordingly sent to the pope Pius II to discuss the matter in 1463 (Visser Fuchs, 2004-2005).

Waurin's practice of writing collections of the chronicles of history goes back to mid-1440s as his original aim as a pro-English member of the Burgundian court was to write a full-length history of England after his nephew Waleran de Waurin's proposal. His initial plan was accordingly to write a history of England from the arrival of Albina to the accession of Henry V in 1413. However he decided to continue and added further material the last two volumes of Hardy's publication, extending his work up to 1471 to Edward's return to the throne. He also added another section in which he narrated his nephew Valerin's expedition of Varna against the Ottoman Turks.

One possible reason for this decision may be that he was perhaps affected by the new discourse of this newly flourishing crusading literature of renaissance humanism. Therefore one major aspect of the motives behind his history writing was to help his court's political aims by manipulating the past in accordance with the political conditions of his time. Whenever he was close to England he wrote an English history, and whenever he was a proponent of the crusade he wrote a history related to the crusades against the Turks. A practice of manipulating the past for the contemporary political needs which originally goes back to even Venerable Bede's time.

Before elaborating the significance of Waurin's original contribution, it is worth discussing the development of the complete work in a little bit more detail. Historians were well aware of the fact that most, if not all, of Waurin's account was by no means original as the title of the work already suggested, (*Recueil* meaning 'collection') but greatly based on various other chronicles sometimes as verbatim copies. He first extensively used the *Brut*, a verse chronicle of the legendary history of England for the earlier part of his work and for his history of England to the beginning of the fourteenth century. He then based his account mainly on Jean Froissart's *Chroniques*, which covers the history of Western Europe from the early fourteenth century to 1400, roughly the first half of the Hundred Years Wars. Waurin completed these four volumes by 1455. The work so far covered the events from Albina, the legendary founder of Albion, to the death of Henry V in 1422. Then, for 1400 to 1443, he furthermore relied either on Enguerran de Monstrelet's *Chronique*, which merely reflects the Burgundian view of the events between 1400-44 or on a common source. The date of publication of this last volume is however significant. He wrote this volume after 1461 where the humanist crusading literature against the Turks boosted probably due to the fact that Constantinople fell on the Turks and John Hunyads was no more a secure buffer zone for preventing the Western Europe from the Turkish threat. For his last volume, he sometimes drew on the *Arrival of Edward IV*, [an apparent Tudor propaganda strongly favoring the house of Lancaster and copied almost verbatim its opposing counterpart, the *Chronicle of the Rebellion in Lincolnshire* essentially a Yorkist propaganda claiming that the Duke of Clarence and Earl of Warwick conspired against Edward (Matheson, 1988 p. 22; Thomson, 1971, pp. 84-93; Holland, 1988, p 851). However, he also added his own observations and oral information he gathered. For instance Waurin possibly profited from the information he received from Antony Woodville the brother of Elizabeth Woodville, the Queen of England, whose connections may have been established in 1467 in a tournament in England (Marchandise, 2006, pp. 507-27). Accordingly, this last volume is perhaps the only part of his work which possesses substantial valuable original material which may also shed some light on the Ottoman Serbian affairs between 1442 and 1443 so far unattested. Therefore, it deserves special attention.

Fifteenth century also witnessed the rise of the propaganda histories. Polydore Vergil was simply a Tudor propaganda, another chronicle the *Arrival*, was a Yorkist propaganda, Lincolnshire rebellion was again a Yorkist propaganda and there are other propaganda works. Similarly this work of Waurin is almost the same. It is in priority a Burgundian propaganda narrating the duke Philip's impact on the crusades against the Turks (Waurin, 1864 Chapter 6). At least the last volume of Waurin's work is an example of the new current of the history writing of the fifteenth century Burgundian court. Devaux argued that the history writing in Europe was dominated by the Burgundians by the second half of the fifteenth century especially by the particular efforts of Philip the Good (Devaux, 2006, p. 467-76). Waurin possibly wanted to convince his readers that the events he narrated actually happened. His work is a good example of the typical Burgundian history writing genre "orientée tout entière vers l'actualité", (Devaux, 2006, p. 473) representing an instance of a new form of historiography "fondée sur l'expérience personnelle du narrateur" (Devaux, 2006, p. 473). It is in prose form as verse forms were perceived largely fictional, the actuality of the text appeared warranted by the usage of the prose form (Devaux, 2006, p. 469).

L'une des grandes spécificités de cette production historiographique tient toutefois à l'essor d'une école de chroniqueurs orientée tout entière vers l'actualité. L'on voit éclore, par ailleurs, avec le genre des mémoires, une forme nouvelle d'historiographie, fondée sur l'expérience personnelle du narrateur (Devaux, 2006, p. 473). le narcissisme chevaleresque constitutif de l'identité bourguignonne (Devaux, 2006, p. 475). Plus que jamais, l'histoire s'impose, au XVe siècle, comme un instrument de légitimation, ainsi qu'en témoigne la querelle de succession qui se fit jour au lendemain de la mort du Téméraire (Devaux, 2006, p. 472).

The chronicle is a blend of fact and fiction but a very skilful one. As one historian has already noted for the Burgundian historians of the period in general: "The Burgundian princes had for some years seen the value of investing in historiographers who, with Tacitean sophistication, put across the Burgundian view of events in a disarmingly frank manner." (Holland, 1988, p. 868).

One other aspect of Waurin's importance lies in the fact Waurin was one of a few lay Western Europeans who wrote a history of the Ottoman Turks and his narration was accordingly relatively less bereft from the ethical and theological implications of the Christian views of the time. That different from some other European chronicles such as an anonymous chronicle of *Chronique du Religieux de St. Denys*, which interprets the Turks from a theological and in a way ethical perspective and concludes that the reason for Beyazit I's victory over the Crusaders was the result of the vengeance of the God in return for the sins of the Crusaders and their act of disrespecting the Church authority, this chronicle as well as two others has a more unbiased account against the Turks as it narrates the events in much more secularly focusing the events as what it actually happened (İnalçik, 1994, p. 1-13).

Most of Waurin's account regarding Ottoman-Hungarian and Ottoman-Serbian affairs is based on the testimony of his nephew Walerin de Waurin who was himself the captain of Burgundian fleet that participated to the operations around Danube against the Ottoman forces. Thus Jean de Waurin probably profited from the information he received from an eyewitness that he himself participated to the wars (İnalçik, 1994, p. 1-13).

### 3. Waurin's Perception of the Turks

This part of this study investigates how Jean de Waurin perceived the Turks and how he presented them to the Christian readers. Waurin's meticulous selection of proper adjectives in depicting the Turks and Murad II is consistent with his broader aim of stirring up the necessary public resentment against the Turks and leading way to a new crusade. The Turks according to Waurin were first of all *felons* and *Beduins* and committers of *faulses enterprinses* in their atrocities. They accordingly deserved to be killed *comme bestes mues*. Murad II was not only the *Grant Turcq annemy de la foy crestienne* but was also depicted as a coward who would *sen fuy villainement* and his religious otherness was emphasized by attributing him a quasi-pagan vesture reminding of the Europe's past atrocities of the old barbarians believing to their polytheistic religions. After the defeat, he was flying by praying to not to his God but *ses dieux de ceste misadventure*.

In accordance with his ultimate aim of making a crusading propaganda Waurin depicted the Turks as 'the other' who has to be feared. As his enemies, perhaps expectedly, he portrayed them as coward warriors. In this respect, his image of the Turks both as the other and the enemy is clearly negative. By the very beginning of the treatise Waurin defined the Turks as the rival, the other. The introductory subject matter in the beginning of Waurin's account is significant as Waurin first, ties even the very beginning of the story related to the general invitation of a new crusading campaign to the incoming of the Turkish threat. Second, according to Waurin, it was even evident that the King of Poland's restoration to the Hungarian throne was mainly due to the Turkish threat. The foe, ie. the Turks, as he explained in chapter V, the Hungarians believed, greatly harmed them and what they needed was a powerful saviour like the King of Poland. The Hungarians accordingly requested from the king of Poland to come and take their throne *En luy priant humblement que ad ce se voulsist liberalement consentir et hastivement venir en Hongrie pour les conduire et secourir contre lez Turcqz mauvais et felons quy desja par leur courses avoient fait a eulz de grans dommages* (Waurin, 1864, p. 14).

The response of the king of Poland is also significant as *Les trios estas de son* (king of Poland's) *pay* advised the king of Poland to accept *tel et si noble* office, and to show them that he was enthusiastic *de les ayder contre les Beduins de Turquie*, (Waurin, 1864, p. 14). Both the Hungarians and the king of Poland agreed that the Turks were malicious. After the coronation ceremony the new king aimed to decide what to do by getting the advise of the Transilvanian nobles. He accordingly decided to make a gathering comprising of the grand seigneurs of the Vallacia *adfin davoit advis et deliberation comment pour lez mieulz on se pourroit doresnavant conduire pour resister aux faulses enterprinses du Grant Turcq*, because the king of Hungary was certain that *le felon Turcq called Moradbay* *assamblloit grant puissance* (Waurin, 1864, p. 15).

Then they also decided for both making their men more courageous and find the finances of the war against the Turks to send an ambassador to the Pope 'pour luy signifier la bonne, grande et digne voullente que ce nouvel roy de Hongrie avoit de resister auz enreprinses dudit *Grant Turcq annemy de la foy crestienne*.'

(Waurin, 1864, p. 15). When the preachers of the Pope preached the graces of the Pope the hearts of the people were filled with devotion and “plusieurs prennent les armes pour aller personnellement et à leurs propres dépens combattre les Turcs infidèles et défendre le sainte foy chrétienne, et les autres y donnerent or et argent pour gens de guerre sauldoyer” (Waurin, 1864, p. 16-7).

Afterwards the forces of the King advanced towards Sophia where they thought Murad II was staying there. The Turkish forces which according to Waurin outnumbered the Hungarian forces preferred to stay in plain open land while the king stayed in a narrower passage with the advice of his councillors. Finally the war broke, the Turkish forces could not move in this narrow passage and Hungarians and Poles resisted very well and they killed many of the Turks *comme bestes mues*. Waurin's depiction of Murad II's personality is also significant: he flees villainly “par tel résistance qu'ilz les accraventoient *comme bestes mues*, pourquoi les premiers entrez vouloient reculer et ceulz de derrière vouloient eulz advanchier et aller avant, siques à pou de perte et petite résistance furent Sarazins descomfis et le Grant Turc sen fuy villainement foursenant et maugreant ses dieux de ceste *misadventure* (Waurin, 1864, p. 18). After this victory the Hungarian and Polish forces had to decide whether to continue to follow the Turks or to turn back to their country. They finally decided to come back to their country with the treasures they collected from the Turks. This decision according to Waurin was *lequel conseil ainsi conclu à depuis porte grant prejudice et dommage à la cristienneté comme cy après porrez oyr*, (Waurin, 1864, p. 18). because if they would pursue their victory instead of turning back home, they would be probably successful as the *Turquie trambloit de paour, memorant les nouvelles victoires chrétiennes* (Waurin, 1864, p. 18).

In referring to the events after the battle of Varna, In 1445, After Seigneur Waurin and sire Pierre vast say goodbye to each other, Waurin sailed to the Black sea in order to find out the Turks and fight them. He reached to Moncastro, Catetea-Alba, Akkirman. He could not achieve to find out Turkish naval forces then he turned back to the port of Brilago. He decided to send Pietre Vast to go to the Hungarians and coordinate an expedition composed of the Hungarian forces and the Burgundian ships. He went there and negotiated with the Hungarians. They accepted Vast's offer and also included that he must also go to Poland and ask whether they may give additional military force. The king also accepted the offer on condition that he must have sent his own son to the commander of the Burgundian ships and he sent him. Then Waurin wrote a letter to the Cardinal of Venice to inform him that both Hungarians and Poles agreed to send military help. He requested him also to participate to the expedition by sending as much galleys as he can (Waurin, 1864, Chapter 16). The key role was played by Waurin in collecting a united force composed of the Hungarians, Wallachians, and Venicians. They decided to attack to all of the cities and fortresses between the points where the son of the Lord of Wallachia stayed and Nicopolis. These were respectively the Triest, Tour Turcain (Turtakan), Georgye (Guirgui\Yergöğü), and Rossico (Ruse\Ruscuk) (Waurin, 1864, p. 72).

They first went to Triest in order to attack there, but they realized that an important Turkish force was ready. For this reason they retrieved their ship to the out sea. Meanwhile, the Turks realized that their trap was defunct and started to fire at the Waurin's forces. By luck, the navy was not harmed. There a certain *Savci* decided to contact the Turkish forces and suggested that he was in fact the real sultan. However, his offer was rejected by the Turkish forces for the reason that they had already one sultan and they would not want two sultans at the same time. Immediately after the negotiations ended, the Turks started to fire to the ships of the allies. And the allied ships fired them back. At this point:

Et lors incontinent le parlement fine, les Sarrazins commencerent à gecker canons contre ceulz des gallees, lesquelz pareikkement en geckerent en la bataille des *Turcz qui sen fuyrent autant qu'ilz peurent par grans tropaeulx comme moutons* quant le leu se frappe au milieu (Waurin, 1864, p. 78).

Here the main concern of Waurin was to underlie how coward the Turks were. The reason why he tries to depict Turks in such a manner is the fact that he was actually making a war against them.

In some occasions Jehan de Waurin uses the term “Villain” in order to describe the seemingly low behaviours of the Turks. For instance, when he narrates the events related to the capture of the Turquant Castle by Waurin's forces, the allied forces captured the castle easily *au tres villain reboutement des Turcz*. The allied forces decided to advance to the Turquant\Tutakan castle. On the way, the ship of the Cardinal lost the control and the load of the ship had to be emptied and reloaded. Turks saw this event and they thought that this was probably a trap, and that the allied forces sent two ships out for misdemenouring the Turkish forces and when the Turkish forces would leave the city, the allied forces would capture the city.

Therefore the Turkish forces waited in Triest in stead of following the allied forces. By this means the allied forced captured Turquant castle easily. *Au tres villain reboutement des Turkz* (Waurin, 1864, p. 82). In the detailed description of the castle Wavrin also denounces the Turks as when he attacked them with his crossbows and canons, 'ou chascun tyra si raddement *quil ny avoit layans Turcq si hardy quy si ozast tenir*' (Waurin, 1864, p. 82). Here again the cowardice of the Turks was underlined. The allied forces did such a hard arrow throwing that the Turks could not hold their position due to the success of the arrows. The castle was captured except the main tower where a group of Turkish forces were still attacking the allied forces. Due to a certain technical difficulties, capturing the main tower was quite difficult. At this point:

Et toutefois les Turcqz parlemoient auz Vallaquez par samblant fainct deulz voulloir rendre, mais ce nestoit que pour faire cesser lassault, *car ilz ne tenoient chose quilz promeissent*; si sembloit bien quilz atendissent aucun secours briefment, parquoy ledit capitaine eut conseil avecques les Vallaques...(Waurin, 1864, p. 83).

The remaining Turks appeared to try to negotiate with the Wallachians but Wavrin warns that one must have been very careful to this manover as they were never holding their promises. And after all they appeared waiting a help which might have come anytime. Accordingly the allied forces had to take the control of this tower. They made the necessary technical arrangements and they made it easily because: '*Turcque ny avoit si hardy qui se ozast amoustrer* auz deffences ne tenir es galleries pour les canons et culverines quy y frapoient, et si navoient autre lieu pour deffendre ladite tour' (Waurin, 1864, p. 83). Again the cowardice of the Turks have been emphasized by Waurin. The Turks 'had no hearth' to stay in the galley which was under fire or leave beyond the defence line.

Waurin sometimes gives the descriptions of his rivals. It may be suggested that he usually depicts them with a particular intention. His portrayal of the remaining Subasi is accordingly significant. After the Turks saw that there was no hope for them, a Subasi:

vestu dune robe drap Damas vermeil a ung collet de janne abatu sur les espauls *marcha tout asseurement* dehors en regardant les Christiens *de felon visage*, et lors *tout de froit sang, sans mot sonner*, prinst les deux pans de devant de sa robe si les boutta en sa chainture et sacqua lespee (Waurin, 1864, p. 84).

and afterwards tries to attack to Seigneur Wavrin but was killed by his men. The Subasi's description of his face as a 'felon' and his behaviour depicted herein is clearly an attempt to denigrate the foe by using negative attributes to the rivals ie. the Turks. This is clearly a part of his crusading propaganda.

For Waurin, the courage of the allied force was something to be demonstrated. But sometimes the error of the Turks was leading to the victory. In an account about his expedition, he gives the following example. After leaving the Turquant castle, the allied forces went to capture the Guirgevo Castle which was according to Wavrin by far a much stronger castle than the former (Waurin, 1864, p. 92). The allied forces saw that it was impossible to capture the castle by mortar alone. After a number of trials they decided that they must use the same plan they did when taking the Turquant castle. Accordingly they collected woods and put it at the bottom walls of the castle and fired them. The Turks were defeated, the castle was evacuated by the Turks, Here one example showing that Wavrin was not that subjective is the fact that he gives the credit of the victory to the error of the Turks but not to the courageous success of the allied forces.

Ce fut trop tard, combien que se ilz eussent gecte feu des le commencement que on gectoit le bois contre la muraille, jamais la place neust este prinse car a mesure quon y eust sceu apporter (Waurin, 1864, p. 98).

Afterwards, in accordance with the treaty made with the Vallachians the allied forces had to send the remaining Turks to Bulgaria with their possessions through the river of Danube. However, at this moment the son of the lord of Wallachia contacted to Seigneur Waurin and stated that he was planning *en son courage une entreprinse contre lez Turcqz* as his father requested him to achieve his vengeance. Accordingly he was to wait the Turks two kilometers behind and make an ambushade to them and kill them all. To this, Waurin said nothing neither positively nor negatively. His emotions are ambivalent as while on the one hand, he depicts the Turks on their passage in the river by showing their enmity by the expression in their face as '*felon*' and '*mauvais courage*', he is at the same time, not that condoning the murder of them all, as he depicts the scene where their death bodies were exhibited as something curial.

The readiness of the Turks to make war whenever necessary is also mentioned in the account. When the Turks were passing to their galleys the depiction of the Turks is significant. According to Waurin, the Turks were not passing to their ships ordinarily but they were holding their arches ready to fight and the expression in their face was similar to that of an angry enemy:

Et en autrez bateaulz manocques enterent les Turcqz avec toutes leurs bagues, mais au passer devant les gallees regarderent les Christiens *dun felon et tres mauvais courage*; si porterent les arcqz tendus, la fresche en la main et les targes au col en moustrant samblance que se on leur disoit riens ilz estoient prestz a combattre, et en cest maniere passerent la dite riviere de la Dunoue, si entrerent ou pays de Vulgarie (Waurin, 1864, pp. 101-102).

The Turks were accordingly ready to fight. They were courageous but their courage was not an ordinary one but a *felon et tres mauvais courage*.

Immediately after their defeat, the Turks were about to move but the son of the lord of Wallachia stopped them by an ambush and killed them all. Waurin tends to condemn violence from the allied forces to the Turks whenever he is dubious about the necessity of it. For instance Waurin's lack of comment about the aforementioned plan of the son of Wallachia suggests that he did not see the Turks as a type of enemy to be abolished in all circumstances. He does not have an *a priori* belief that the enemy must be crushed by all means. He was probably not clear about the ethics and the necessity of the ambush. Moreover:

Et sitost que les Vallaques eurent prinses toutes les despouilles des diz Turcqz ilz les arangerent tous nudz sur le rivage de leaue, *quy estoit cruele chose a veoir a ceulz des gallees quant ilz passerent devant* (Waurin, 1864, p. 102).

He clearly saw the ambush as 'a cruel thing to see'. Thus cruelty is not something solely attributed to the Turks. This aspect of Waurin's account suggests that the writer of the account sometimes purported his own observations without the intention of making a crusading propaganda. His main intention was thus sometimes, to portray directly what he saw either from the Turks or from the allied forces. Then the allied forces went to a less powerful and smaller Roussico Rustchuk (?) castle situated some six miles behind the Guirgevo Castle in the Danube River. The forces under the command of the Cardinal reached to the Rustchuk castle in less than two hours. They did not face any opposition there as:

Les Turcqz quy veyrent venir les gallees, et quy bien savaient les nouvelles comment les chasteaulz Turquant et de la Georgie avoient este prins et tous les Sarrazins y estans mors, cremirent grandement les Christiens, pourquoy, eulz voians venir les gallees, *si grant paour les sourprinst quilz bouterent le feu au chastel et par tout village, puis sen fuyrent...* (Waurin, 1864, pp. 103-104).

Afterwards the allied forces went to Nicopolis where they met with the Hungarian forces. They decided to attack to the Nicopolis tower with a similar tactic as they still fired the tower from the bottom however, it proved to be ineffective, then they decided to mine the bottom of the tower with the expectation that when the Turks see that the tower would be demolished and that they would go out, but it did not happen as the allied forces expected and the Turks *anchois se moustrerent aussi orgueilleux comme paravant* (Waurin, 1864, p. 111). After this the allied forces understood that capturing the tower would take time, and they decided to leave. Here again in accordance with his plan of depicting the foe as someone who deserves to fight, Waurin tries to underly the negative aspects of the Turks as they continued their 'old arrogance' and that they were in great fear when they saw the coming of the galleys. Thus the implicit message is that someone must stop the Turks for their arrogance and accordingly a crusading campaign was a necessity.

A similar element is also available in the following instance. The forces accompanied by Waurin started to sail in the river in order to reach to the mouth of Danube river in Erdel. The naval force was regularly escorted by the Hungarian forces which followed them at the "one side" of the sea while the Turkish forces were following them at the other side of the same river. Each night, the allied forces were camping in the riverside, and the Turkish forces which outnumbered the Hungarian land forces were also camping right at the opposite coast of the river. They were making a camp fire of roughly a mile which made them appear bigger than they actually were. Some sort of psychological war was continuing between these two forces.

One day Sire Regnault de Confide came to captain and told his plan to weak up the Turks in their sleep. By this plan, Confide said ...*oncques ribaux Turcqz neurent plus belle paour quilz auront a ceste fois* (Waurin, 1864, p. 113).

‘This time onward no stupid Turk would fear as they fear now’. Captain agreed and sent a man to the Cardinal in order to request the necessary materials to which Cardinal replied positively. The plan proved to be effective and the Turks fled.

The last part of this chapter actually aims to provide a legitimate argument for the reader for suddenly ending the expedition at this point without the decisive victory. The reason was the Turks were ‘Et est necessite de combattre les Turcqz subtillement et malicieusement quy les voelt vaincre, car ilz sont gens cauteleux’ (Waurin, 1864, p. 116). ‘Those who want to conquer the Turks must do it by means of deceit and cunningly because they are crafty people’. They were subtle and malicious in their manovers therefore, they must have been behaved accordingly. Jehan de Waurin reports John Hunyade’s (Menczer, 1966, pp. 178-79) speech to Cardinal and Valerin de Waurin: According to John Hunyades therefore, the expedition must have ended at this point because the Turks already fled and the pursuit of the enemy was dangerous: if Hunyades would follow them they ‘tousjours fuiront devant moy, adfin de me tyrer parfond en leur pays et moy enlorre a leur advantage telement que je ne men scauroie retraire sinon au grant peril et dommage’ (Waurin, 1864, p. 116). He was clearly fearing of the pursuit of the Turks because if he would follow them into the Turks’ homeland he was aware of the fact that it would probably be harmful to him. He particularly stresses that although both the Cardinal and Valerin de Waurin disliked the idea of return without the decisive victory, they had to agree as the winter conditions dictated. Therefore tactical decisions were also an important consideration in the war against the Turks Hence the war against the Turks was not something to be done without a plan. He was stressing the fact that the Turks were subtle and the war had to be planned accordingly. Hence, in making the crusading propaganda the positive aspect of the enemy was also occasionally underlined.

Despite the fact that Valeran de Waurin, the nephew of Jean de Waurin actively enrolled in the crusades made against the Turks, and thus was by no means an indifferent eye, it is usually hard to spot his particular animosity or partiality against them. Although Waurin perceives the Turks clearly as the *others* and defines them as non-Christians and thus the enemies of the Christian faith throughout his chronicle, he shows no sign of a special or ostensibly direct animosity against them (Waurin, 1864, p. 39). He *in priority* sees them as simple enemies to fight, *then* the enemies of the Christian faith. Because whenever he reports his direct fight contact between the forces he himself appeared and the Ottomans, he depicts the scene roughly in the same way he would depict a war scene between two Christian forces (not that differently than he would describe his fight against a Christian,) except the fact that he constantly uses the phrase, ‘the Turks the enemy of the Christian faith’. He does not give much detail about his particular feelings of the Turks (if any) and rather describes the general happening of the fight and then outlines the losses of two parties.

#### **4. The Chronicle and its Historical Significance**

Traditional medieval crusading propaganda was a clerical and papal activity in which writing and distributing the encyclical letters and arrangements of regional councils, sending of legates and contacts with the secular lords were made by the popes. Various religious sects Cistercians, Dominicans, Franciscans, and Dominicans preached the crusade and raised money from the Christians. The humanist crusading literature on the other hand was less dominated by clerical writers and clerical point of view. Humanists preferred to return to the ancient Roman literary genres. Sometimes “Sallust and Livy were popular models for humanist histories of recent wars with the Turks, as well as for Benedetto Accolti’s history of the First Crusade” (Hankins, 1995, p. 116). Waurin’s related part is therefore an example of the above mentioned literary genre. Waurin was clearly influenced by the movement which was based on the revival of the classical literature. The dominant motives of the recent wars against the Turks were repeated in Waurin’s account.

Kelly DeVries argued that one reason for the lack of western military response to the Ottoman invasions of the Eastern Europe after the battle of Nicopolis was the fact that the kingdom of Hungary provided ‘a buffer zone of military contact’ and there was accordingly ‘no reason for the west to engage in military conflict with them’ (DeVries, 1999, p. 555). This thesis may be further supported by the fact that after the Ottomans conquered the Hungary, ie. after ‘the buffer zone’ fell, the crusading literature suddenly boosted in Western Europe.

As James Hankins has recently showed ‘there is an enormous body of humanist crusading literature, most of it strongly favorable toward the crusading projects of the period’ (Hankins, 1995, pp. 111-2). However this explosion only started after the fall of Constantinople but not the battle of Varna. But the bulk of the crusading literature begins only after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 (Hankins, 1995, pp. 112).

This is also the time where the Latin West had closed itself off from the Islamic culture it had earlier found so stimulating (Archibald, 1990, p. 841). Accordingly Waurin’s account is also important because it was written before the boom of the crusading literature and thus it is among the earliest examples of the secular humanist crusading accounts.

In redefining the periodisation of the Ottoman Empire in the Southeastern Europe, Peter Sugar defines the period of 1413-81 as the period of the second conquest and consolidation of power (Sugar, 1977, p. 14). The chronicle roughly refers to the same period. Accordingly, the events purported in the chronicle are directly relevant to the second conquest and consolidation era. In this respect the chronicle is an important source as it tells some details of how the Ottomans consolidated their power. On the general accounts of the early history of Turkish conquests in Eastern Europe see the followings (İnalçik 1994, pp. 3-16; McCarthy, 1977 pp. 33-50; Sugar, 1977, pp. 3-30). And for the particular chronology of the two years 1443-5 see: (Imber, 1988; Uzunçarşılı, 1988, pp. 419-26; Chasin pp. 276-310; Babinger 1992, pp. 3-63).

The meaning of the war for those who participated to the crusade of Varna without risking their lives was not simply agreeing to the appeal of crusade but to use this idea of crusade in their internal politics. By this means they would be able to get advantage in their domestic affairs. For the Ottoman Empire the importance of the ‘crusade’ was the fact that the empire was representing the all Islamic world. By this means the importance of the defence against crusade was both symbolic and a means of prestige. At this point there is a parallelism with what Philip the Good did. He also used the idea of crusade as a means of political prestige among other European leaders. Being a part of a expedition against the infidels was a good proposition to impress the domestic parties in Western Europe. Thus Philip the Good used this accordingly.

The concept of tyranny which was widely used during the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries for depicting the nature of the Ottoman government was already a current theme by the fifteenth century before its replacement by the term despotism in the 18<sup>th</sup> century (Cirakman, 2001, p. 49). Waurin uses the term ‘Tyranny’ about Murad II in a number of occasions in his work (Waurin, Chapters 3, 5, 8). According to him Murad II is clearly a tyrannic despot. Thus the roots of the idea that the easterners and particularly Turks were highly connected with tyrannic despotism goes back at least to the fifteenth century.

It has been suggested that “At any rate, the authors of *Türkenbückleins* had little interest in accuracy; they were committed *a priori* to the belief that the Turk was an arch-enemy of Christendom, and they used any convenient "evidence" to prove their point.” (Bohnstedt, 1968, p. 18) A similarity with the *Türkenbückleins* and the Waurin’s account of the crusade of Varna is therefore clear. The author of the Recueil tends to prove that the Turks were the enemy of the Christian faith and the work is depicted accordingly. He regularly mentions this point. This is why the work is a humanist crusading propaganda work. Therefore Waurin’s account is somewhat the prior example of the *Türkenbückleins*. However, Waurin’s depiction of the events is more clear. Furthermore, “This anti-moslem prejudice determined their image of the Turk down to the last detail. In all the Turk's actions, in all his customs and institutions, they saw proof of a mortal hostility to the Christian faith and its adherents.” (Bohnstedt, 1968, p. 19) This facet of the work is also clear in the Waurin’s recueil.

One difference between Waurin’s crusading propaganda and various *Türkenbückleins* lies in the fact that the latter “regarded the Turkish danger not merely as a political and military problem but as an aspect of the moral and spiritual crisis of their age” (Bohnstedt, 1968, p. 11). Parallelism between Waurin’s account and the *Türkenbücklein* is the fact that both Waurin’s account and “The pamphlets are full of descriptions of the inhuman cruelty displayed by the Turk in his warfare against the Christians” (Bohnstedt, 1968, p. 19). The concept of tyranny which was widely used during the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries for depicting the nature of the Ottoman government was already a current theme by the fifteenth century before its replacement by the term despotism in the 18<sup>th</sup> century. Discuss waurin’s speech about Murad II tyran (Cirakman, 2001, p. 49).

## 5. Conclusion

It is indeed evident that Waurin's account was clearly a crusading propaganda. The primary reason for writing a crusading propaganda work was to create in the reader the negative feelings against the rivals. Accordingly in order to incite negative feelings against the foe, Waurin had to denigrate the rivals ie. the Turks. Therefore Waurin's perception of the Turks is clearly negative. Humanist crusading propaganda literature boosted after the conquest of the Constantinople by the Turks.

Waurin's chronicle is however was written in an earlier date. Accordingly, this work is important as it is among the first instances of the humanist crusading propaganda. There is a clear similarity between Waurin's account and *Türkenbücklein* as they are both interested in depicting the Turks as the enemy of the Christian faith. The theme of tyranny has been used both in Waurin's work and the *Türkenbücklein*. Waurin saw Murad as a Tyrant. Thus some parallelism between Waurin's work and *Türkenbücklein* is clear. The work written by Waurin is also important as it gives important historical evidence for the events the chronicle tells.

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