

## US Hegemonic Leadership and its Geopolitical Codes

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### Abstract

*This paper seeks to explore the relationship between geopolitical codes and hegemonic cycles as two crucial concepts in the context of the geopolitical world order. The US geopolitical codes are analyzed in different stages of the US hegemonic cycle. The US has been selected because it is the most notable, unique case and the last hegemonic power in recent time. This analysis covers the period of the emergence of the US as a hegemonic power until its decline. This paper concludes that there is a strong relation between the two important concepts, namely geopolitical codes and hegemonic cycles and this conclusion is arrived at by analyzing the characteristics of hegemonic powers of the United States.*

**Key words:** Hegemonic Cycles, Geopolitical Codes, Geopolitical world order, The US hegemonic power, American values

### Introduction

This paper seeks to explain the relationship between geopolitical codes and hegemonic world leadership to analysis the geopolitical world order developments. This refers to this important point that, the hegemonic cycles represent management of a hegemonic power in the global context in various political, economic and cultural aspects, as well as this concept in a coherent connection is associated to concept of the geopolitical world order. On the other hand, the geopolitical codes have been defined as the building blocks and foundation of geopolitical world orders(Flint & Taylor, 2007). Therefore, both hegemonic cycles and geopolitical codes fall in arguments related to geopolitical world order. The study on the US geopolitical codes and its hegemonic world leadership was selected because the US is the last hegemonic power in the hegemonic cycle. In understanding this, the paper will examine selected presidential speeches and government documents that help define the US geopolitical codes. The paper will also examine the tendencies of the American political leaders to promote their countries' hegemony. This tendency is fuelled by its world geopolitical vision which is basically the '...product of national history and culture and a synthesis of the views professed by various strata of the political elite, the academic experts, the creative intelligentsia and public opinion as a whole...' (Kolossoff, 2003: 5).

In this regard, this paper examines the US geopolitical codes by focusing on the world leadership and its importance for the US during the period until disintegration of the Cold War geopolitical world order. As a background, it is useful to examine some important historical-cultural values of the United States. In this context, some themes which are important in relation to the content of speeches and related concepts are also discussed. These concepts are analyzed in the framework of some geopolitical discourses using a qualitative content analysis. In addition, this paper pays attention to hegemonic powers' characteristics and in this respect it uses some related scholars' ideas. As a background, this paper discusses briefly the process of the emergence of the United States as hegemonic power and how political, geographical, economic and cultural factors have helped to shape this hegemonic power. This helps to reveal the influence of American geopolitical culture and its principles over political decisions as well as the US practices.

### *Geopolitics of a 'New World' and emerging a hegemonic power*

Two factors have been known to be important for the emergence of the United States as the unchallenged power in the world particularly within the capitalist world; namely 'a huge economic base that had been ruthlessly and efficiently developed following the civil war; and two world wars that together revolutionized the US economy while destroying or undermining any potential rival' (M. Cox, 1990: 25). Examining these developments, it needs to review some parts of American culture, in particular, American freedom as a central element in this distinctive culture, which refers to a form of 'free business activity' and 'the political conditions necessary for this' (O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992). It relies on the American liberal thought, also a tendency towards formation of this state as a powerful country and subsequently a hegemonic power. Liberalism has been known as an American tradition and it is an important element of American life.

The ‘...individual interests, the privileging of private property rights, and the limiting of the sphere of government...’ have always been basis of the political, social and legal system in this country (Agnew, 1993: 210). These principals are also called ‘individual freedom’ and ‘democracy’, and they form the ‘American way of life’. Moreover, this unique geographical place that in the American discourse has been introduced as ‘New World’, pursued the geography of universal, and ‘Its concern was with “the earth”, the “laws of Nature and of Nature’s God”, and all of “mankind” ’(O’Tuathail & Agnew, 1992: 197). In addition, there was, in this geographical area, a tendency to ‘geographical expansion’, and this could be seen within the North American continent in the US movement towards Canada and Florida and start of the War of 1812 with Britain. The rebellion of American settlers in Texas in opposition to the Mexican government also had a similar origin. As a result of this expansionism, it formed the effective incorporation with new territories and this begun the economic activities in the world economy.

It also attracted British capitals, particularly investment into railroad transportation. This American thought or ‘expansionism’ became a crucial issue in American geopolitics especially after the American Civil War (1861-1865), so much so that ‘control of the Caribbean and the Pacific became the focus of the United states’ geopolitical code’ (Flint, 2006: 67). This started the shift from a territorial to an international mode in relation to access to other parts of the world and increasing the geographical sphere of the US interests from the continental to a hemispheric and subsequently, to a global level (Agnew, 1992). With the end of the civil war the United States started to modernize its economic characteristics from agriculture to an industrial one. By 1890 industry exceeded agriculture, and the industrial productions became more than twice that of agriculture in 1900. Finally, by 1913 the United States’ manufacturing produced almost one-third of the world’s total production. This economic development could be interpreted from world-systems theorists’ perspective for becoming a hegemonic state, so that it could be considered as starting point of gaining ‘primacy in production efficiency’ over rivals(Taylor & Flint, 2000) and beginning of the agro-industrial stage (Wallerstein, 1984).

At that time, the tendency for expansion into other geographical areas and a desire to expand overseas were vigorously pursued through political and economic actions. It seems that Mahan’s theory concerning the importance of sea-power, especially the influence of his thoughts on President Roosevelt, was very effective in the United States’ moving to globalism. This really was beginning of the transition from ‘isolation’ to ‘involvement’. It is important to note that, overseas expansion and crossing from ocean to ocean needed to justify domestically and internationally. Clearly, it was done by extension of “business activity abroad” and was justified “in terms of spreading American culture and values”. In other words, ‘unrestricted trade and investment, free enterprise, and free flow of cultural exchange became the intellectual rational for American expansion’(Agnew, 1993: 214).

### ***‘Economic Expansionism’ and ‘Hegemonic Victory’***

Entering of the United States to First World War resulted a victorious America and in fact the main winner of war, in 1920, was the United States, because Germany was defeated, Britain was economically weak and became also a debtor to powerful creditor; the United States. These developments were coupled with disintegration of ‘world order of the British succession’ and an important time period, which was called as ‘hegemonic victory’ in the American hegemonic cycle (Taylor, 1993a; Taylor & Flint, 2000). This period (1913-1920) was formed after the geopolitical rivalries among the core states for succession of Britain for the world leadership. This competition was mainly between the United States and Germany, what in the end of the first world war altered to a defeated Germany and a collapsed British free trade system (Taylor & Flint, 2000: 72). The political-economic successes of America provided an appropriate condition for the economic activities of American business in other states’ markets, and imposing these activities to world-economy became known as a commitment for political and economic leaders. But due to the competitive economic nationalism of the 1920s and as a result of collapsed American economy between 1929 and 1933, the United States was not able to stay as a world leadership.

In this respect, although the results of first world war and subsequently, the winners’ decisions has been mentioned as a main reason to outbreak the second world war, there is this belief that, it occurred due to vacuum of world authority and unresolved hegemonic leadership in the first war. And therefore, Germany continued its attempt to attain world leadership against those countries that were the pretenders of world leadership: Russia, the united states, the united kingdom, France and Japan (Modelski, 1978; O’Loughlin & Wusten, 1993). In fact, the first world war was not able to transfer global power from the former world power to the new one, what has been defined as succession stage in long cycles of Modelski’s model (Modelski, 1978). The US geopolitical code, however, seems was based on globalism and expansion of its influence realm and finally gaining the world leadership position from the American civil war until the beginning of the cold war era.

It was started from control of the Caribbean and the Pacific geographical territories, was continued with the defeat of Spain and also construction of the Panama Canal as well as control of the Philippines, Hawaii and Cuba in order to control of central and South America. Furthermore, going to two global wars are evidences for this code. 'Expansionism' was pursued via expansion of the regional economy, altering the economic activities from agriculture to industry, encouraging of the business activities overseas, American openness to foreign investment in the United States, pressuring foreign governments to facilitate the American firms' activities, constructing the trans-states institutions, and finally straightening of military capability and using force. Indeed it refers to second stage from process of formation hegemonic state. According to world-systems theorists it is enabled with commercial edge (Wallerstein, 1984), or when the hegemonic state's merchants build a commercial advantage (Taylor & Flint, 2000).

### **'High hegemony' and 'Regionalism' orientation**

The result of the Second World War revealed the beginning of the second phase of the United States' hegemonic leadership, which coincided with the beginning of the cold war geopolitical world order. And for this reason the twentieth century was called as 'American century'. It is important to mention that in fact gaining the world leadership was main goal of three main competitors during the Second World War, those countries that had defined their global geopolitical codes based on their global aims so that Great Britain was attempting to prevent decline of its hegemony, Germany simultaneously was pursuing to defeat Britain and lastly the United States was pursuing the realization of its world leadership (Flint, 2006). With the end of the Second World War and failure of Nazi Germany and also imperial Japan it was supposed that 'the United States was without any serious competition in imposing its vision of world order on both its vanquished foes and most of its recent allies', moreover, 'soviet influence extended over Eastern Europe and into Germany' (Agnew, 1993, p. 216).

These consequences formed some political-geographical assumptions, which led to policy that was called 'containment'. It even was mentioned as George Kennan's geopolitical code, what was against the policy of 'containment by integration' (Gaddis, 1982: 9), or enumerating the USSR as a partner in trend of formation the new geopolitical world order. Kennan's long telegram indeed explained impossibility of this integration. Tendency of the United States to integrate with USSR was in order to pursuing the 'one world' policy and it derived from the American idealistic thinking (Taylor & Flint, 2000). In fact, it was a replacement in the United States' geopolitical code from 'globalism' to 'regionalism'. It emphasised over some specific geographical regions and from this view different parts of the world had different vital values for the American security, so that it included 'the nations and territories of the Atlantic community, which include Canada, Greenland and Ireland, Scandinavia, the British Isles, western Europe, the Iberian Peninsula, Morocco and the west coast of Africa down to the bulge, and the countries of south American from the bulge north; the countries of the Mediterranean and the Middle East as far east as, and including, Iran; and Japan and the Philippines' (Gaddis, 1982: 30).

Here, East Europe was defined as the Soviet Union's sphere of influence, moreover it was determined as a 'other' against the 'free world' (Agnew, 1993). However, despite the regionalism orientation in the US foreign policy, there is no doubt that about two-thirds of the world was under authority of the United States' hegemony and in this regard, USSR and other rivals were never serious economic rivals for the US. It lasted 'for about a quarter of a century after 1945, the period sometimes termed "high hegemony" at the centre of the hegemonic cycle' (Taylor, 1993b: 6). In fact, with the defeat of the 'rival imperialism', related to pre-war period, also with pursuing the containment policy, related to the United States' geopolitical codes, the new era faced with a hegemonic order with the United States centrality. At that time, the world also confronted the liberal thoughts and practices, which there were in the United States as institutions and practices, and were spread at a global scale; they included 'mass production/consumption industrial organisation; limited state welfare policies; electoral democracy; and government economic policies directed towards stimulating private economic activities' (Agnew, 1993: 210).

It could be also analyzed with a specific level of the concept of world leadership that is called "institutional leadership" and means states agree with those rules and practices that form and guide their relations and cooperations. These institutions - the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance- increase the sureness to put trust in other states and they decrease the costs of securing specific agreements (Ikenberry, 1996). It also states hegemonic power's ability in imposing those visions and institutions that accompanied with, generally, consent of other states, and is discussed in the concept of geopolitical orders. These ideas and institutions beside the material capability form framework of joining the hegemonic power and world orders (R. W. Cox, 1981).

Geopolitically, it relates imposing the ideas and assumptions by more powerful states on the less powerful one, so that, in this form of hierarchical system the hegemonic power have an extreme influence on the geopolitical codes of other countries, and during this process almost all states' geopolitical codes in different levels fit together, and whereby the world accept the specific rules, ideas and institutions to form 'a single overall dominant pattern', which is called geopolitical world order (Flint & Taylor, 2007: 46). And ,indeed, for this reason it is said that each geopolitical world order rest on "a set of understandings shared by most states about the contemporary world order even when these involve military rivalry and economic protectionism"(Agnew & Corbridge, 1995: 22). In this context, there is this idea also that the cold war era offered a geopolitical system that contained two geopolitical orders (O'Tuathail, 2006) with two hegemons; the Soviet Union as brutal hegemony and the United States' hegemony, moreover, they were leaders of alliances of states with 'the military power, material resources and expansive ideology to effectively assert their leadership within far-flung regions of the world'(Ikenberry, 1996: 385).

On the other hand, however, the dominant idea refers to this reality that the cold-war, really, was a geopolitical world order with two superpowers; the United States as hegemonic power and the Soviet Union as challenger (Agnew, 1993; Nijman, 1993). In this respect, although the United States needed to the Soviet Union to keep its global position, hegemonic cycles stress upon one state as hegemon that is remarkably powerful in terms of economic, politics and culture (Taylor, 1993a), what could be found in the hegemonic power's definitions (Flint & Falah, 2004; Ikenberry, 1996; Wallerstein, 1984). On the basis of these hegemonic cycles and also definitions of hegemonic power and world leadership, at that time the United States was as hegemonic power, a country which attempted to maintain its hegemonic position. One of the most important documents to reveal the US geopolitical codes in the cold war era is the National Security Council (NSC-68). It was written in Harry S. Truman presidency in 1950. This document helps to reveal the purposes of world leadership.

In the part of 'A' from Section of 'IV', it stresses the importance of free institutions activities in the global sphere and portrays a special relation among them all over the world, so that defeating of any free institution anywhere will be depended to all free institution around the world. This document claims that, 'The assault on free institutions is world-wide now, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat of free institutions anywhere is a defeat everywhere'(NSC-68, 1950). It shows that the globe is considered under authority of the United States as a hegemonic leadership, and moreover, the free institutions across the world are accounted as the US interests and there are threats to those interests via the world of communist with the centrality of the Soviet Union. This refers to the US geopolitical code, which is fitted to definition of geopolitical codes. It also refers to a specific responsibility that has been termed 'the responsibility of world leadership'. In the Part of 'B' from the section of 'IV' it has been stated that 'the absence of order among nations is becoming less and less tolerable. This fact imposes on us, in our own interests, the responsibility of world leadership. It demands that we make the attempt, and accept the risks inherent in it, to bring about order and justice by means consistent with the principles of freedom and democracy'(NSC-68, 1950).

It, explicitly, refers to the US responsibility to resolve global problems, what is defined just for hegemonic power or for a superpower in a unipolar system and hegemonic cycles (Huntington, 1999; Modelski, 1978). In this respect, this document, in part 'A' from 'VI' section, also refers to survive of the American system as a necessity and stresses to presence of the United States at the global level to provide adequate world environment to survive the American system: 'Our overall policy at the present time may be described as one designed to foster a world environment in which the American system can survive and flourish. It therefore rejects the concept of isolation and affirms the necessity of our positive participation in the world community'(NSC-68, 1950). In this context, Flint (2006: 69) argued that 'the American system was the basis for the United States' role as world leader, and it required a global geopolitical code.

The enemy was identified as the Soviet Union. Allies were countries and people advocating free institutions'. From this point of view it was decisive controlling the Soviet Union's expansionism as the ideological and geopolitical challenger, through what was outlined as containment policy. Since, on the other hand, the cold war was an ideological struggle and two superpowers attempted to prevalence of their ideologies, it seems that the geopolitical codes of both superpowers were based on idealism, and because the given geographical area had been considered the globe, thus such codes were globalism (Nijman, 1993). In this respect, the nature of containment policy immediately after the Long Telegram of Kennan (Kennan's geopolitical codes), due to stressing on some specific geographical parts across the world, was regionalist. Indeed, It meant that 'not all parts of the world were equally vital to American security'(Gaddis, 1982: 30). From this point of view, a research that has been done based on the US presidents' speeches shows that amount of attention to different geographical regions and places or regionalist orientation has varied in different presidencies.

Based on this research it has had the lowest percent in presidents Kennedy, Carter and Reagan to attention to specific places, while it shows most attention to regionalist in Ford and Nixon presidency (O'Loughlin & Grant, 1990). Indeed, Nixon presidency coincided with indirect confrontations of superpowers in 1970s, those conflicts that occurred in the détente period and provided global condition to start the second cold war. It is important to note that the region of 'Middle East was by far most conflictual region in the world and witnessed virtually nonstop superpower competition throughout the 1970s'(Nijman, 1992). In this period the role of smaller countries was remarkable and the ability of superpowers was decreasing to keep the geopolitical order. Moreover, it should be also considered that at the same time, in the early 1970s, the United States faced inflation and unemployment that happened from 1967 to 1968. In addition, increasing the world oil price transferred a major amount of wealth from the United States and other industrial countries to the oil producers' regions. Subsequently, the US leadership and its hegemony were declining, although implementation of détente policy or Nixon doctrine created capability of the US to reduce costs of fighting with another superpower (Agnew, 1993).

The US geopolitical code in this period was characterized by the dominance of regionalism, which was a longest period of regionalist codes during the Cold War era. There is this view that 'this regionalist geopolitical code, constructed by the American geopolitician Henry Kissinger, was of an outspoken realist nature and clearly differentiated, in geographical terms, vital from non-vital interests'(Nijman, 1993: 133). In the end of 1970s that coincided with the beginning of Reagan presidency (1981-1989) the globalism geopolitical code returned to the sense of the US foreign policy. This period was started according to this view that global stability, during the cold war, has been guaranteed based on the US military powerful. Due to the United States had become weak and a kind of international anarchy had been formed, then the United States must remembered that the order in the world could be ruled only by one strong US. In this respect, Changing from a defensive policy to offensive one was done to more pressure upon the USSR (M. Cox, 1990).

Expanding the military rivalries, President Reagan (1988) with references to Cuba experience believed that the Containment policy was not able to resolve global political problems such as Communist regime in Nicaragua. He also emphasised on the revival of militarization, what had positive consequences for his administration so that this approach encouraged investment and employment at home; moreover, it 'demonstrated an American resolve to reassert its centrality in a world it had created'. Indeed 'for President Reagan at least, it was morning again in America' (Agnew, 1993: 226). It seems that it refers to ability of Reagan administration to reconcile between the realist and idealist logics, so that it was not seen 'discrepancy between American ideals and American interests, or at least this is how the public perceived it. America's tough stand and roll-back of communism was the right thing to do, and served America's geopolitical interests at the same time'(Nijman, 1993, p. 134).

### ***'Geopolitical Transition' and a 'historical moment'***

Beginning of geopolitical transition period almost coincided with George H. W. Bush's presidency, when geopolitical world underwent many geographical-political changes as well as instability and chaos particularly in Eastern Europe. With the Berlin wall downfall, the Cold War geopolitical world order was finished with all its characteristics which had formed a world system that was termed as bipolar system. Indeed, on the one hand, the eastern superpower's sphere of influence was collapsed and remained just one superpower and, on the other hand it was finished many years' efforts of the US to contain the eastern ideology that was carried out by the United States as the main principle of its geopolitical code. It was attempting to keep its hegemony and leadership in the west hemisphere (Nijman, 1993). Obviously, the Cold war international system had helped to sustain both superpowers and had formed a real stability which was converted to chaos and instability. Indeed, the big problem for the United States was to replace the new system in order to control the world and promote its leadership, although elimination of the Soviet Union as a powerful competitor was equal to eliminate some the US worries about alienating some its satellites to the other geostrategic realm.

In this commentary, the united states needed to re-establish its hegemony because in the post-Cold War and in the new condition, there were no longer two specific powerful pole to organize economic and political world, and at that time a fragmented global economic was formed, so that other states would be able to dominate over local and regional areas and form hegemonies (Agnew, 2003). Bush senior, indeed, went into office at an uncertain time, when basically the US geopolitical code in the Cold war became redundant (Flint, Adduci, Chen, & Chi, 2009). The US needed to redefine its codes to confront with the new different international issues. But it was hard to recognize the real end of the Cold War, and the US foreign policy became really cautious and represented little enterprise until 1990. It is clear that senior Bush's foreign policy had a realist and regionalist orientation. Basically, 'realpolitik orientation tends to be more geographical than its idealistic counterpart.

In other words, a geopolitical code based on realism generally appears more geographically informed than one based on idealism' (Nijman, 1993: 133). This orientation in Bush policy associated with term of New World Order, namely 'an orderly world with orderly rulers living in a stable equilibrium', resulted two significant geopolitical events: formation of the unified Germany and stabilizing the Persian Gulf region through repulsing Iraq from Kuwait (Krauthammer, 2005: 21). Indisputably, the Gulf War was most remarkable event in this time what revealed the US trends to regionalism with its clear policy towards the Middle East and the Persian Gulf region. It was different and unusual war from the twenty-century standards' perspective, so that it formed a coalition and harmony among those countries from East and West which were enemies to each other during many years in Cold War era (Ashton, 1995). Perhaps it was the best opportunity for the United States, dominating its authority and formation of the unipolar system (Huntington, 1999). Primacy of the US military power and its capability to led a global coalition to respond to a threat, just in the beginning of the new era, became a reason for that the United States was called as 'a guarantor of a new world order' (Taylor, 2004: 488).

At that time, George H. W. Bush faced to unique opportunity by collapsing Eastern superpower and his administration showed a strong tendency to adopt primacy in this time by stressing on the military preponderance as well as preventing a new strategic rival (McDonough, 2009). Just two hours after beginning of the US coalition's attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait on January 16, 1991, President Bush said: 'This is an historic moment. We have in this past made great progress in ending the long era of conflict and Cold War. We have before us the opportunity to forge for ourselves and for generations a new world order...' (Bush, 1991a). Clearly, it showed relationship between the US geopolitical code and its attempt to keep and promote its world leadership. It is interesting to note that Bush saw this opportunity for the US leadership in the Middle East and particularly in the Persian Gulf area.

In September 11, 1990, He also said: 'we stand today at a unique and extraordinary moment. The crisis in the Persian gulf, as grave as it is, also offers a rare opportunity to move toward an historic period of cooperation. Out of these troubled times, our fifth objective<sup>1</sup>-a new world order- can emerge...today that new world is struggling to be born, a world quite different from the one we've known. A world of law supplants the rule of the jungle...America and the world must support the rule of law...' (Bush, 1990). In other part of his speech, he has clearly referred to the US as sole powerful country to face of tyranny. He said: 'recent events have surely proven that there is no substitute for American leadership. In the face of tyranny, let no one doubt American credibility and reliability. Let no one doubt our staying power' (Bush, 1990). It is confirmed with Modelski (1978) and Huntington's (1999) ideas about the superpower ability to solve the international problems.

### ***Responsibility of 'Hegemonic power' and 'Regionalism' orientation***

Preserving American values, George H. W. Bush refers to The US responsibility to preserve and extend of freedom and democracy; 'And today, in a rapidly changing world, American leadership is indispensable. Americans know that leadership brings burdens, and requires sacrifice...We have a unique responsibility to do the hard work of freedom' (Bush, 1991b). Responsibility is an inherent component of hegemonic power. It includes 'the responsibility of defining and disseminating a particular model, or vision, of civilization, known as the prime modernity' (Flint & Falah, 2004: 1380). Indeed, only hegemonic power such as the United States can undergo the world responsibilities. Freedom, which Bush mentions as one of the US responsibilities, is one component of the US ideology that is introduced beside democracy and peace. They are American values that keeping them are as requirement for sustaining of the US world leadership. Based on this view and after this significant event, Bush claimed that 'we are the United states of America, the leader of the West that has become the leader of the world' (Bush, 1992b).

In the other words, the US reflected the Iraq invasion of Kuwait as a global problem, which was occurred in the specific geographical region, and undertook leading of world coalition against Iraq with using United Nations' resolutions. Indeed, as Nijman (1993) stressed, it was a new realism which was seen in the framework of new world order, a united nations with the new role, as well as, a main role for the United States as global policeman. Apart from coinciding the beginning of the George H. W. Bush presidency and beginning of the geopolitical transition, Bush also faced the collapse of the Soviet Union and he used the term New World Order to describe that geopolitical situation, was emerging from the global perspective with emphasis on the US leading role. President Bush used the language that was concentrated upon particular parts of the world, especially in the case of the Persian Gulf War. He stressed on the conflict and cooperation in specific geographical regions as well as particular countries. Moreover he considered a unique position for the United States among all countries around the world. He said also about Somalia crisis that: 'the people of Somalia...need our help...We must help them live. America must act...I understand the United States alone cannot right the world's wrongs. But we also know that some crisis in the world cannot be resolved without American involvement..

Only the United States has the global reach to place a large security force on the ground in such a distant place quickly and efficiently...’ (Bush, 1992a). It shows that the Bush administration has respected to particular regions with consideration of the US position among the powerful countries as highest position in the new post-Cold War geopolitical world order. But generally, from the geopolitical code perspective, although the US rhetoric in the shape of new world order seemed globalist, the US actions and its attention to specific regions are categorised in regionalist orientation. So based on this function it is argued that the US geopolitical code at that time had regionalist orientation (Flint et al., 2009). Another important geopolitical issue which was related to the US leadership was the US attempts to reconstruction of the world economy. It has been described as the US grand strategy that is liberal in orientation. Indeed, it refers to the US actions to build economic order through international institutions which formed a ruled-based international order.

In this manner it is formed international economic cooperation and binds the democratic industrialized countries around the world together. Organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) are a few examples. Based on this grand strategy the US is attempting to integrate other organizations as well as countries into an economic order that will maintain the world in that way that is loyal to the US interests and values. In this regard, Bush senior attempted to introduce a world order that ‘offered a positive vision of alliance and partnership built around common values, tradition, mutual self-interest, and the perspective of stability’ (Ikenberry, 2002: 46). As a necessity also Bush stresses to importance of the world trade and open markets everywhere under the US leadership. He says that ‘We all know that the key to our economic future is to insure that America continues as the economic leader of the world. We have that in our power....we will work to break down the walls that stop world trade. We will work to open markets everywhere.’ (Bush, 1992b).

### ***The ‘Confusing geopolitical Code’ and ‘Hegemonic decline’***

There is this view that after collapse of the Soviet Union, and in the late of G.H.W. Bush Presidency, the US geopolitical code had lost its solidity and it was criticisable for a lack of stability and also for a kind of confusion in foreign policy. It was appeared in Clinton presidency even more than previous periods. Indeed, there was a clear incoherence between concerns about domestic economic circumstances and promulgating the democratic values and moral principles, so that domestic economic concerns were on top of the agendas which emphasised the US self-interests in the world economy. Perhaps it was an effort to reconcile idealist and realist demands. (Nijman, 1993). It referred to an “American impasse” which was faced the US with a dilemma: disintegration between “America’s national economic health and its global status”. The United States had become the largest debtor opposition of Japan as its largest creditor (Agnew, 1993). Indeed, ‘domestic prosperity and a world leadership role are no longer compatible’ (Taylor, 1993b: 7). Although, with collapse of the eastern superpower, the United States became known as winner of the Cold war, its national economic problems beside the global anarchy due to disintegration of the Cold war geopolitical world order led to declining the US hegemony in this time.

Such events, emergence of Taliban in Afghanistan around 1993, ethnic and religious conflicts in former Yugoslavia in 1992, killing some American soldiers in Somalia in 1993, terrorist attack to World Trade Center in 1993 and so on showed that world was out of control of the powerful states and that was disorder. At that time, it was raised such arguments concerning ‘clash of civilizations’ (Huntington, 1993) and religions, which formed remarkably two main conflicting fronts in the world: Islam and Western civilizations. The geoeconomic competitions, on the other hand, were introduced as new arena to rival great powers in the new era (Luttwak, 1990, 1993). Majority of academic documents have described this period as a disordered time as well as stressed on declining the US authority over the world, although all of them recognized the US as sole and largest powerful country (Agnew, 1992, 1993; Cohen, 1991; Huntington, 1993; Luttwak, 1990; O’Loughlin, 1992; O’Loughlin & Wusten, 1993; O’Tuathail, 1992; Taylor, 1993a; Wallerstein, 1993).

In this regard, President Clinton (1997), in his state of the Union address, noted that the world faced to the racial, ethnic, and religious conflicts which encourage ‘fanaticism and terror’ and stated that the world was waiting for the US actions. He also recognized ‘inaction’ as ‘an enemy’ and stressed to ‘prepare America for the 21<sup>st</sup> century’, action to keep the American economy and democracy, ‘action to keep America the world’s strongest force for peace, freedom, and prosperity; and above all, action to build a more perfect Union’. Similar to other presidents he has considered the US responsibility about peace and freedom around the world. He with reference to importance of domestic prosperity stressed to prepare the US for the world leadership in the political and economic perspectives in the post-Cold war era as an unknown era. ‘To prepare America for the 21<sup>st</sup> century, we must master the forces of change in the world and keep American leadership strong and sure for an uncharted time’ (Clinton, 1997).

His statements explicitly refer to a hegemonic world power's attributes and the US clear tendency to promote its hegemony; to pay attention to economic primacy as material power to characterize world politics in distinct ways as well as spreading of American ideological principals in the global scale as 'a "rule-writer" for the world community' (O'Tuathail & Agnew, 1992: 195). A study, has been done on the presidential speeches, reveals that at that time there has been less notice to particular regions around the world. Indeed, it shows a changing direction in the US geopolitical code from the regionalist orientation to the globalism one. On that basis, focusing on particular conflicts, such as Northern Ireland, is due to 'a perception of the United States as a force for global peace' which is conducted 'through US-led global institutions' (Flint et al., 2009). Indeed, multilateral institutions like the Union Nations were committed some crucial responsibilities for peace, what in practice showed that were not able to manage conflict in different regions such as Somalia and Bosnia. these conditions, indeed, identified the US leadership as an essential element for this institutional order (McDonough, 2009).

This issue was emphasised by Clinton and he built a relationship between the US world leadership in different perspectives and its security: 'our security still depends upon our continued world leadership for peace and freedom and democracy. We still cannot be strong at home unless we are strong abroad' (Clinton, 1995). It means that president Clinton has mentioned some countries and regions within globalist language, countries such as Japan, North Korea and China in the East Asia, Somalia and South Africa in the Africa, India and Pakistan in the South Asia, Iraq and Iran in the West Asia, and Belorussia, Kosovo and Russia. It is worth mentioning that, referencing to regions and countries, he stressed the US leadership role to resolve problems around the world. He stated that 'no nation in history has had the opportunity and the responsibility we have to shape a world that is more peaceful, more secure, more free. All Americans can be proud that our leadership helped to bring peace in Northern Ireland. All American can be proud that our leadership has put Bosnia on the path to peace ... All American can be proud our leadership renewed hope for lasting peace in the Middle East' (Clinton, 1999).

### **Conclusion**

Analysis suggests that defining of the US geopolitical codes in different times strongly depended to the US global goals, those goals which have aimed gaining the US world leadership and its hegemonic power in the world. Keeping the US highest position in the Geopolitical world order has always been the ultimate goal of the US geopolitical codes. In the US foreign policy, indeed, Globalism and regionalism orientations in both realism and idealism thoughts have pursued maximizing the US hegemonic position in the global system. It returns to the US geopolitical culture, the American values and the American mission to expand freedom, peace and democracy around the world. It is a particular mission for the unique place with chosen people.

It is a mission in a coherent connection with the US national interests. It has been defined in order to ensure the US national security, so that in the US foreign policy, promotion of freedom around the world and the US security has considered equal. This mission has been seen as the US global responsibility and has always justified the US actions in different geographical areas. It needs military, economic and cultural capabilities to impose its ideas and assumptions to other states, what ultimately could be led to a hegemonic power. From this view, defining the national interests, threats, responding to those threats and justifications for actions as elements of the US geopolitical codes are considered in order to gaining the US main global goal; preserving its highest position in the geopolitical world order. It represents clearly a strong relationship between two important concepts; geopolitical codes and hegemonic cycles.

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